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Introduction
The scope of legal protection for industrial designs1 in the United
States traditionally has been narrow. There is no statute, federal or
state, specifically designed to provide protection to industrial designs.2
For the most part, product designers have had to rely on the limited
protection afforded by design patents to protect their product
designs-provided they could satisfy the stringent requirements for
obtaining a patent. Even if a product design could satisfy patent law
requirements, however, the protection afforded usually was not
commercially practicable.' This remains true today.
Another avenue design owners have pursued is to protect their
product designs as trade dress4 under trademark law, whose
requirements for obtaining protection are not nearly as stringent as
those of patent law. According trademark protection to a product
configuration--the shape of a product itself, rather than merely to its
1. Industrial design may be defined as "the innovative but not quite inventive work of
making inventions and other consumer goods easier to use, better looking and thus easier to
sell." See Michael E. Peters, Note, When Patent and Trademark Law Hit the Fan: Potential
Effects of Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp. on Legal Protection for Industrial
Design, 15 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 123, 125 n.23 (1996)[hereinafter Peters, Note](citing Jay
Dratler, Jr., Trademark Protection for Industrial Designs, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 887, 890
[hereinafter Dratler]). Industrial design attempts to "make products look good, to provide an
attractive appearance that makes consumers want to buy and use them." Dratler, supra, at 890
n.15. The Dratler article is a particularly comprehensive and thorough consideration of the legal
protection regimes for industrial design.
2. Congress has repeatedly failed to pass such a statute despite repeated lobbying efforts
of industry. See, e.g., Peters, Note, supra note 1, at 124 & nn.12-14; Dratler, supra note 1, at 888 n.
4. State statutes in this area generally will run afoul of federal preemption concerns. See infra
Part II.
3. See Dratler, supra note 1, at 888 n.2, 893 & n.28.
4. "Trade dress," a species of trademark, generally is defined as "the total image of a
product, including features such as size, shape, color or color combinations, texture, graphics, or
even particular sales techniques." Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enter., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431,
1439 (3d Cir. 1994)(quoting Computer Care v. Service Sys. Enters., Inc., 982 F.2d 1063, 1067 (7th
Cir. 1992)). Although originally thought to include only the appearance of containers and labels
used to package a product-that is, how a product was "dressed" for marketing-courts are now
in accord that the term "trade dress" includes the design of the product itself, the "product
configuration," as well as its labeling and packaging. See infra note 5 and Part III.C.
"Trademark" and "trade dress" will for the most part be used interchangeably in this article.
5. Although numerous commentators and decisions have addressed the issue of trademark
protection for product configurations, few have defined it. In Duraco, Judge Becker defined
"product configuration"as "trade dress alleged in the product itself, whether in a specific feature
or in some combination or arrangement of features, "and distinguished" that type of trade dress
from 'product packaging."' 40 F.3d at 1439. Product configuration is a species of trade dress. See
supra note 4. A product configuration is the shape or form of the product itself, as distinguished
from the product's packaging, e.g., the color or color combinations used on a product's
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packaging or name or symbol used in conjunction with the product-is
a relatively recent legal development.6 Granting such protection
should be a benign exercise in affording product owners, under the
rubric of trademark, commercially practicable and enforceable
property rights in their product designs. After all, in addition to
traditional subject matter such as words, symbols, and packaging,
trademark law also protects buildings,7 sounds,8 and even golf course
designs9 and fragrances.1" A problem arises, however, because
government-sanctioned protection for products themselves
traditionally has been the province of utility patents." Thus, where a
product is the subject of utility patent protection and the product
owner also seeks to protect the product's configuration, there is a
danger that what the owner is really trying to protect is the product
itself. Therefore, policies underlying patent and trademark law can
collide, undermining one or both of these federal intellectual property
regimes.12
packaging. Cf. Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distrib., Inc., 996 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1993).
It is important to distinguish between the product itself and the shape of the product.
For example, the shape of a closed face spin-cast fishing reel would qualify as a product
configuration; the reel itself-the product-would not be a product configuration. See Brunswick
Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1987); 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 7.25[4] (1995).
6. See generally Brunswick, 832 F.2d 513; Truck Equip. Serv., Ca v. Fruehauf Corp., 536
F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976); In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982). See
also MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 7.25[1]. Moreover, in its decision in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco
Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992), the Supreme Court has given its imprimatur to such protection
by facilitating an owner's establishment of a valid trade dress.
7. See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 503 U.S. 763 (decor of restaurant);
Fotomat Corp. v. Ace Corp., 208 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 92 (S.D. Cal. 1980). Building designs can be
registered under federal trademark laws. See, e.g., Reg. No. 764,837, 799 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 72
(1964)(McDonald's drive-in restaurant design).
8. See, e.g., In re General Elec. Broad. Co., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 560 (T.T.A.B. 1978). At
present, Harley-Davidson, the American manufacturer of motorcycles, is in the process of
federally registering the sound of its engine. See, e.g., Joseph Diamante & Darren W. Saunders,
Trademark, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 6, 1995, at B5.
9. See, e.g., Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I, Ltd., 936 F. Supp. 1299 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
10. See, e.g., In re Celia Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238 (T.T.A.B. 1990).
11. Generally, utility patents are issued to "useful" inventions, i.e., those that have "utility"
in the sense that they provide a useful purpose. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). Most products sold have
value because they provide a useful purpose that manufacturers or consumers need or want. For
example, one would usually buy a compact disc player because it plays compact discs for
listening. On the other hand, a person would not purchase a "pet rock" because of any use it
has-except perhaps as a paperweight. Design patents, on the other hand, are issued to
"ornamental designs" for an article of manufacture. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1994). See infra notes 69-71.
12. See, e.g., Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir.
1995); Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 65 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 1995), on remand, 935 F.
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A central tenet of intellectual property protection in the United
States is the existence of a bargain between society on the one hand,
and inventors and authors on the other. Inventors and authors are
given limited-duration monopolies during which they may exploit their
inventions and creations without interference from competitors 3 The
grant of a monopoly is intended to provide the requisite incentive for
invention and creation of works of authorship. In return for this
monopoly, the inventor discloses to the public how to make and use
the invention, and the author deposits her work with the Copyright
Office. Moreover, after the monopoly expires, the inventions and
creations enter the public domain, free for all to use or copy. Giving
others the knowledge to improve on the invention provides the basis
for the advancement of science, technology, and the arts the Founding
Fathers envisioned.14
An exception to limited-duration protection for intellectual
property occurs in the area of trademarks.15 Because trademark law is
concerned not with advancing technology or the arts, but rather with
reducing consumer confusion, fostering competition, and protecting
the goodwill and reputation of the trademark owner, no purpose is
served in limiting the mark owner's property interest to a finite period.
In fact, limiting the term of a trademark would undermine trademark
law's basic policy of reducing consumer confusion and fostering
competition. 6 Therefore, the length of trademark protection is
Supp. 1399 (N.D. 11. 1996), summ. J. granted, 940 F. Supp. 1337 (N.D. 11. 1996), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 1044 (1996); Zip Dee, Inc. v. Dometic Corp., 931 F. Supp. 602 (N.D. Il. 1996).
13. The Intellectual Property Clause, usually referred to as the Patent Clause, is contained
in Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the United States Constitution. It provides that Congress shall
have the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). Utility patents have a term of 20
years from the date the inventor files the patent application, 35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(2) (West
1996), design patents have a term of 14 years, 35 U.S.C. § 173 (1994), and works of authorship
have terms that expire 50 years after the author dies. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1994).
14. See supra note 13. On several occasions, the United States Supreme Court has
reaffirmed this framework of providing an incentive in return for disclosure and ultimate
dedication to the public as a supremely effective means for advancing science and the arts. See,
e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146-151 (1989); Graham v.
John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-10 (1966).
15. See infra Part III.D.1.
16. Trademarks are intended primarily to (i) reduce confusion among consumers as to who
makes (markets) a particular product, and (ii) preserve competition; and secondarily, to protect
the goodwill of the producer (i.e., protection is derivative). See infra Part III.A. Since they are
intended primarily to advance consumer awareness rather than any body of knowledge, it would
make little sense to limit the term of the trademark. The longer a mark is used in connection with
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circumscribed only by the owner's use of the mark; a trademark's term
of protection ends only if the owner ceases to use it commercially.
So long as each item of intellectual property can be assigned
to a discrete intellectual property regime-patent, copyright, or
trademark-any discrepancy between the regimes concerning length
of protection does not raise an issue. Patents and copyrights will be
subject to limited terms of protection, and trademarks will receive
perpetual protection so long as their owners continue to use them. In
most situations, intellectual property comfortably fits within one
category or another without overlap.
Several recent lower court decisions, however, demonstrate that
situations involving product configurations, where patent and
trademark law are at counter purposes, are becoming more common.17
When the policies underlying patent and trademark law collide, the
impact threatens to transform the above-described reciprocal patent
bargain into a grant of a perpetual patent monopoly to the inventor.
This article addresses these concerns in the context of a product
configuration or feature having been disclosed in a utility patent, and
suggests that courts should adopt a strict rule to resolve conflicts
between patent and trademark law. Part I discusses the history and
policies underlying the Patent Act, and the stringent conditions for
obtaining a patent intended to effectuate those policies. Part II
reviews the Supreme Court's Sears/Compco/Bonito Boats line of cases
in which the Court, despite pulling back from an early broad
condemnation of state law attempts to bypass federal patent
requirements, nevertheless reaffirmed a right in the public to copy and
use intellectual property, particularly after a patent expired. Part III
gives an overview of trademark law goals and policies, explaining why
trade dress protection is an attractive complement to traditional
a product, the stronger the consumer's association of that product with a particular producer,
source, or expected quality becomes. Although in certain instances a competitor will need a mark
to compete effectively in the market in which the mark is used, there is usually an abundance of
words or symbols to go around for everyone who wants to compete. See infra text accompanying
notes 122-125. In fact, in most situations, society would want a perpetual association of a mark
with its source so as to continue to avoid confusion.
17. See cases cited supra note 12. The incidence of cases at the intersection of patent and
trademark law will increase because of the failure of the functionality doctrine to remove all
overlap between utility patent and trademark protection, see infra Part III.E., and the nearly
universal recognition by courts, following the Supreme Court's decision in Two Pesos, Inc. v.
Taco Cabana, Inc., 503 U.S. 763 (1992), that trade dress law now includes protection of product
configurations. It will become more common for a person who has a utility patent in a product to
also seek trade dress protection for the shape of the product.
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patent protection for product configurations. Part IV discusses the
functionality doctrine, long thought to reconcile utility patent-
trademark conflicts, and explains why, in the situations with which this
article is concerned, it fails. Part V discusses several recent federal
decisions and critically analyzes the various approaches the courts
have taken to resolve this quandary at the interface of patent and
trademark law. Finally, Part VI explains why the policies underlying
patent law mandates a strict rule approach that best effectuates the
conflicting goals of the two intellectual property regimes.
I
Patent Law and Policies
A patent grants to its owner a monopoly that gives the owner the
right to prevent the public from copying or otherwise using the
patented invention. A monopoly being at odds with competition, the
patent system is designed to ensure that only those inventions that will
benefit society by advancing science and technology are awarded a
patent. Moreover, the right to exclude competition is limited in
duration. This enables the public, upon the patent's expiration, to
realize the invention's benefit to society by freely copying and using
the invention that is disclosed in the patent. This section discusses how
the patent system is peculiarly designed to secure for the public the
benefits of true scientific and technological advances.
The Supreme Court has identified several purposes of the Patent
Act:
First, patent law seeks to foster and reward invention; second, it
promotes disclosure of inventions, to stimulate further innovation
and to permit the public to practice the invention once the patent
expires; third, the stringent requirements for patent protection seek
to assure that ideas in the public domain remain there for the free
use of the public.1
8
1& Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979)(citing Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974)). See also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6
(1996):
[Congress may not] enlarge the patent monopoly without regard to the innovation,
advancement or social benefit gained thereby. Moreover, Congress may not authorize
the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public
domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available. Innovation,
advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent
requisites in a patent system which by constitutional command must "promote the
Progress of . . . useful Arts."
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The Supreme Court has held that the centerpiece of the patent system
is disclosure and use.'9 The first purpose is simply the means by which
the second is accomplished. The third compliments the second; both
operate to ensure that the public may freely copy and use all that is, or
should be, in the public domain.
In order to obtain a patent, the inventor must satisfy numerous
strict conditions. Although the basic requirements for obtaining a
patent-utility, novelty, and non-obviousness-are statutory, the
Patent Clause itself mandates these stringent standards.' In keeping
with the Clause's theme to advance science by inducing creative effort,
the patent statute is designed to ensure that only worthy inventions
are granted a patent monopoly. The patent law's effectiveness in
inducing creative effort depends on this uniform federal system that
preserves for the public's use whatever is already in the public domain
and awards a monopoly only to those efforts that advance the "useful
Arts."21
19. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989). See also id. at
146, 151; Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 255-56 (1945); Singer Mfg. Co. v.
June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896).
20. See supra note 13; Graham, 353 U.S. at 6 (citing Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket
Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147,154 (1950)(concurring opinion)).
21. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 151. The Supreme Court has stated that allowing a person to
gain patent-like protection without satisfying the Patent Act's conditions would undermine the
federal scheme of protection for intellectual property. In Bonito Boats, the Supreme Court
noted:
[T]he States may not offer patent-like protection to intellectual creations which would
otherwise remain unprotected as a matter of federal law. Both the novelty and the
nonobviousness requirements of federal patent law are grounded in the notion that
concepts within the public grasp, or those so obvious that they readily could be, are the
tools of creation available to all. They provide the baseline of free competition upon
which the patent system's incentive to creative effort depends. A state law that
substantially interferes with the enjoyment of an unpatented utilitarian or design
conception which has been freely disclosed by its author to the public at large
impermissibly contravenes the ultimate goal of public disclosure and use which is the
centerpiece of federal patent policy. Moreover, through the creation of patent-like
rights, the States could essentially redirect inventive efforts away from the careful
criteria of patentability developed by Congress over the last 200 years.
Id. at 156-57.
After noting that the patent bargain, see infra text accompanying notes 23-24, depended
upon "a backdrop of free competition in the exploitation of unpatented designs and
innovations," the Court observed that "[t]he offer of federal protection from competitive
exploitation of intellectual property would be rendered meaningless in a world where
substantially similar state law protections were readily available. To a limited extent, the federal
patent laws must determine not only what is protected, but also what is free for all to use." Id. at
151.
1997]
Recognizing the importance of technology to an agrarian society,
the Founding Fathers included in the United States Constitution the
Patent Clause, which expressly gives Congress the power to grant
patents and copyrights to "promote the progress of Science and useful
Arts." The Patent Clause and statutes passed pursuant to it" were
intended to create a bargain between society and the inventor, a
straightforward quid pro quo arrangement in which the government
would grant to inventors a limited-duration monopoly allowing them
to exploit their inventions without fear of competition. In return, the
inventor was obliged to disclose to the public precisely how the
invention worked, so that others could improve upon it and make
further advances in the relevant technology. Thus, the inventor's
disclosure was to be the consideration that would support the
government's grant of patent rights; only if properly disclosed would
the invention be available for use, thus allowing society to benefit
from its bargain. Further, once the patent term expired, the invention
would enter the public domain and become available for the public to
use and copy freely.'
The young Republic's eventual reward would be advancement
beyond an agrarian economy and reliance on England as a source of
its machined goods.35 The basic quid pro quo structure of the patent
system has remained the same to the present. In the two hundred
years since the Patent Clause and the laws pursuant to it were passed,
22. Both Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson were noted inventors themselves. See
generally DUMAS MALONE, 6 JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME: THE SAGE OF MONTICELLO (1981). Jefferson
was a moving force behind the Convention's adoption of the Clause providing for a limited
monopoly to encourage invention, and was the author of the 1793 Patent Act. See Graham, 353
U.S. at 7-8.
23. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (Patents); 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Copyright). Although both the
Patent and Copyright Acts have been passed pursuant to the Intellectual Property Clause, this
article is concerned only with the Patent Act and its ramifications on industrial designs. The
general consensus is that Copyright law is not generally a practicable solution for protecting
industrial designs. See, e.g., JAY DRATLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COMMERCIAL, CREATIVE
AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY § 5.02[3] (1996)[hereinafter DRATLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW].
24. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 152. Put another way, the promised monopoly
provides the necessary incentive for inventors to invent; the bargained-for disclosure helps otheis
to advance science and technology by enabling them to improve upon the disclosed invention-
or forces them to discover a different, often better way to accomplish the same results as the
invention. When faced with a technology that he cannot make or use because it is the subject of a
patent, another inventor may decide to design around the patented technology rather than pay a
license fee to use it. Sometimes, this can result in the second inventor making a better product.
25. England's prohibition on technology exports in the latter part of the 18th century is
well-documented. The country, newly-independent from England, would want to be able to
produce its own machines and not rely on its former sovereign.
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it has operated successfully. Over five and a half million patents have
been issued, and the United States continues to lead the world in the
development of technology.2
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of this quid pro quo patent
system is that it exists at all. That the Founding Fathers wanted to
advance technology in an agrarian nation is not surprising; the
mechanism they chose to achieve that advancement-granting limited-
duration monopolies-is. A full appreciation of the importance to the
bargain of the inventor's disclosure and eventual dedication to the
public of his invention requires an understanding of just how
extraordinary a measure a monopoly-even one of limited duration-
was to the Founding Fathers.
"The [Patent] clause is both a grant of power and a limitation."'
First, as a grant of power, it authorizes Congress to "secur[e] for
limited Times to . . . inventors the exclusive Right to
their ... Discoveries." 2 This "exclusive Right" is the monopoly.
When this language was written, Americans had an aversion to
monopolies. 9 Thomas Jefferson, himself a noted inventor and one of
the architects of the early patent law, was at first adamantly opposed
to the government's granting any monopoly, even a monopoly that
"might serve to incite 'ingenuity.' 30 Eventually, however, Jefferson
came to recognize the value of using monopoly as an incentive for
invention, so long as the monopoly was not viewed as a right of the
inventor, and was limited to those inventions that furthered human
knowledge. It was to be a reward "to bring forth new knowledge," and
since it was not a right, the knowledge would eventually be available
for free public use.31
26. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office [hereinafter "PTO" or "Patent Office"] recently
issued U.S. Patent No. 5,535,707, for a "steer head wrap," designed to protect steers during
rodeo roping competitions. See 1188 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 1747 (1996).
27. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1996).
28. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
29. As Graham points out, the precipitating cause of the American Revolution was a
monopoly on tea. 383 U.S. at 7.
30. Graham, 383 U.S. at 7-8 ("[Jefferson] argued forcefully that 'the benefit even of limited
monopolies is too doubtful to be opposed to that of their general suppression,"')(quoting V
WxrTINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 47 (Ford ed., 1895))."
31. Graham, 383 U.S. at 8-9:
[Jefferson] rejected a natural-rights theory in intellectual property rights and clearly
recognized the social and economic rationale of the patent system. The patent
monopoly was not designed to secure to the inventor his natural right in his discoveries.
Rather, it was a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge. The grant of an
exclusive right to an invention was the creation of society-at odds with the inherent
19971
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Jefferson's view of what kind of discovery or invention should be
rewarded with a monopoly fits in precisely with the second property
that inheres in the Clause: it functions as a limitation on Congress's
power to grant a monopoly. Not only must the term of the monopoly
be limited in time, the "exclusive Right" may be granted only to
promote advances in the "useful Arts." a Congress thus may grant a
limited-duration patent monopoly only to innovative discoveries that
result in the requisite advancement of science with its concomitant
benefit to society. Moreover, Congress may not issue patents that
result in the removal of "existent knowledge from the public domain,
or restrict free access to materials already available."' Finally, only
through the inventor's full disclosure as required by the patent
bargain, could the invention truly enter the public domain and
advance the arts by enabling others to use the invention.
In summary, "[i]nnovation, advancement, and things which add to
the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system
which by constitutional command must 'promote the Progress
of . . . useful Arts. '' Before even a limited monopoly in an
invention can issue, the government must confirm that the invention
is, in Thomas Jefferson's words, "worth to the public the
embarrassment of an exclusive patent."'  Consequently, the strict
requirements that inventions must satisfy before a patent is issued are
constitutionally-mandated.
A. Conditions for Patentability
Assuming an invention is patentable subject matter,' the inventor
must prove to the satisfaction of the patent examiner that the subject
free nature of disclosed ideas-and was not to be freely given. Only inventions and
discoveries which furthered human knowledge, and were new and useful, justified the
special inducement of a limited private monopoly. Jefferson did not believe in granting
patents for small details, obvious improvements, or frivolous devices. His writings
evidence his insistence upon a high level of patentability.
32. Id. at 5. Graham also noted that this limitation fit in with the concern that a power to
grant a patent monopoly could devolve into the unqualified and absolute prerogative of the
English royalty "granting monopolies to court favorites in goods or businesses which had long
before been enjoyed by the public." Id. at 5 (citation omitted).
33. Id. at 5-6.
34. Id. at 6.
35. Id. at 9.
36. In 1793, the first United States Patent Act of 1790 was amended slightly to cover "any
art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any improvement [on same]." Act of
Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318. These four classes of invention have remained the same
since, the only change occurring in the last major revision in 1952, where "art" was changed to
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invention has utility,' novelty, and is non-obvious. Although there are
"procedural" or "technical" conditions an invention must meet to
support a patent grant,38 these are the three basic or substantive
requirements of patentability. The rationale for these requirements is
simple: an invention must give something to society to justify the grant
of a monopoly and its potential harmful economic effects.39 Unless an
invention is "new," that is, not already available, there is no need to
provide the monopoly incentive to have it disclosed; unless it is a
"useful" advance in the arts, there is no reason to provide financial
incentives for its creation; and there is no need to encourage minor or
"obvious" advances in the arts.
1. Utility
In order to qualify for a patent, an invention must be "useful."'4
This is generally an easy condition to satisfy and is seldom subject to
litigation. All an inventor must do is show that the invention has a
commercial potential or a "sufficient human purpose." 1 Nevertheless,
"process," which brought the statutory language in line with how courts had been construing the
word "art." See generally 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 1.01 (1995)[hereinafter CHISUM].
The Supreme Court has held that the proper subject matter of a patent is "anything under
the sun that is made by man." See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)(holding
bacterium, not occurring naturally but created through genetic engineering, was patentable
subject matter). By limiting patent coverage to those things "made by man," this definition of
patentable subject matter necessarily excludes laws of nature, physical phenomena, and things
that naturally occur. Id.
37. Instead of utility, a person applying for a design patent must demonstrate, in addition to
novelty and non-obviousness, that the subject design is "ornamental." See infra text
accompanying notes 43-44, 70.
38. See infra Part I.A.5.
39. See generally Graham, 383 U.S. at 9-17.
40. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). This requirement applies only to utility patents. The
corresponding requirement for design patents is "ornamentality." See 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1994).
41. See DRATLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 23, at § 2.03[2]; CHISUM, supra
note 36, at § 4.02[1] (quoting 1 W. ROBINSON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL
INVENTIONS 463 (1890)(It must be more than "a mere curiosity, a scientific process exciting in
wonder yet not producing physical results, or [a] frivolous or trifling article or operation not
aiding in the progress nor increasing the possession of the human race.")).
Indeed, a finding of infringement is conclusive proof of utility, there being no incentive to
copy another's patent invention unless it were useful and thus commercially viable. See, e.g.,
Raytheon v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 959 (Fed. Cir. 1983)("People rarely, if ever, appropriate
useless inventions."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 835 (1984). See also Nestle-Le Mur Co. v. Eugene,
Ltd., 55 F.2d 854, 856 (6th Cir. 1932).
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there are some instances, not relevant to our discussion here, when
utility is an issue and will render a patent invalid.42
2. Ornamentality
Utility is a requirement of utility patents; the corresponding
requirement for design patents is "ornamentality."43 In fact, if the
particular aspect of an article for which a design patent is sought is
"functional," it cannot be the subject of a design patent.'
3. Novelty
Unlike most foreign patent systems, the United States rewards
the first person to invent, rather than the first person to file a patent
application for the invention. The novelty requirement demands that
the invention for which a patent is sought is "new," that is, not already
known and in use.4 If an advance is already in the public domain and
available to copy and use, there is no reason why the government
should grant a monopoly; the invention presumably is already
contributing to technology's advance.
The novelty requirement is set out in section 102 of the Patent
Act, which has seven subsections, each of which sets out a separate
test for novelty.47 If an invention fails any of these tests, it will not
42. For example, an invention that is not "operable," i.e., does not work for its intended
purpose, is not patentable. See, e.g., In re Newman, 782 F.2d 971, 973 (Fed. Cir. 1986). In
addition, an invention that has no known use is not patentable. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S.
519, 532-36 (1966)(refusing patent to chemical process for producing a chemical whose only
known use was in scientific research). Finally, there are other instances where utility can be an
issue. See CHIsuM, supra note 36, at §§ 4.02, 4.04; DRATLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra
note 23, at § 2.03[2].
43. See 35 U.S.C. § 171.
44. See, e.g., Power Controls Corp. v, Hybrinetics, Inc., 806 F.2d 234, 238-40 (Fed. Cir.
1986)(holding design patent that claimed a plastic "clamshell" package for a dimmer light switch
functional and invalid). It is important to distinguish between the terms "utility" and
"functional," each of which has a specific meaning and legal repercussions in intellectual
property law. See infra Part IV.E. Design patents are discussed in more detail infra. See infra Part
I.B.1.
45. See, e.g., Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1272 n.1 (1985). See 35 U.S.C. sub-sections
102(a) and (g), which implement the "first to invent" rule.
46. See generally CHISUM, supra note 36, at § 3.01. See also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148-49 (1989).
47. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994). Section 102 of 35 U.S.C. provides:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described
in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the
applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign
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qualify for a patent.48 Section 102 is a minefield for any invention that
is not the first in the United States and thus does not advance the
"useful Arts."49
country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date
of the application for patent in the United States, or
(c) he has abandoned the invention, or
(d) the invention was first patented or caused to be patented, or was the subject of an
inventor's certificate, by the applicant or his legal representatives or assigns in a foreign
country prior to the date of the application for patent in this country on an application
for patent or inventor's certificate filed more than twelve months before the filing of
the application in the United States, or
(e) the invention was described in a patent granted on an application for patent by
another filed in the United States before the invention thereof by the applicant for
patent, or on an international application by another who has fulfilled the requirements
of paragraphs (1), (2), and (4) of section 371(c) of this title before the invention thereof
by the applicant for patent, or
(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented, or
(g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made in this country by
another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it. In determining priority of
invention there shall be considered not only the respective dates of conception and
reduction to practice of the invention, but also the reasonable diligence of one who was
first to conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to conception by the
other.
48. Not all parts of section 102 address the issue of novelty in the sense discussed here, i.e.,
that the inventor really is the first to make the invention in the United States, and so deserves a
limited monopoly in his discovery. Sub-sections 102(b), (c), and (d) address the issue of statutory
bar and "loss of rights." A detailed discussion of the differences between statutory bar/loss of
rights and novelty is beyond the scope of this article. It is enough to note that subsections 102(b),
(c), and (d) relate to actions taken by the inventor or third parties before the inventor has filed
his application, but after he has invented it. See generally CHIsuM, supra note 36, at ch. 6. If, for
example, the inventor has sold his invention-effectively reaping the rewards of the invention's
advance-more than one year before she files a patent application, she will be deemed to have
lost her right to a patent. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). In other words, even though an inventor was the
first to make a particular invention, she risks losing her rights to obtain a patent if she uses it but
does not promptly disclose it through the patent system. Novelty generally refers to events or
actions by others before the inventor has made his invention.
49. Section 102 prohibits issuance of a patent where the invention was "known or used" by
another person in the United States, or was described in either a domestic or foreign patent
publication, before the date of invention claimed by the patent applicant. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). The
focus is on the invention having been publicly disclosed in the United States; unless disclosed, it
is as if the invention does not exist. The test for such knowledge being available to the public is
whether the disclosure of the knowledge is sufficient to "give possession of the invention to a
person of ordinary skill" in the United States. See, e.g., In re Borst, 345 F.2d 851, 855 (C.C.P.A.
1965), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 973 (1966). Since mere use or knowledge of an invention in a foreign
country probably would not give rise to sufficient disclosure, only a printed foreign patent or
publication, knowledge of both of which presumably isalready available in the United States, can
function to invalidate a patent. Similarly, the "use" of the invention prior to the claimed
invention date must also be sufficiently public to give access to the knowledge. A secret use of an
invention does not bar granting a patent to another, later inventor of the same invention. See,
e.g., Gillman v. Stern, 114 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 718 (1940). In other words,




The non-obviousness requirement ensures that patents are issued
only to significant inventions, i.e., those inventions that truly are an
advance in technology or science.-° In essence, section 103 of the
Patent Act asks whether an invention truly has been made. Section
103 was added in 1952 and construed in a seminal 1966 Supreme Court
opinion, Graham v. John Deere Co.5 After taking pains to review the
history of, and policies underlying, patent law,' the Court concluded
that section 103 had codified a 100-year-old standard for patentability
the Court had established: for a patent to issue, the invention must
demonstrate more "ingenuity and skill . .. than were possessed by
an ordinary mechanic, acquainted with the business."'  The current
standard states that a patent cannot be granted to an invention if it
would have been obvious to "a person having ordinary skill in the
art. '54 It does not require a "flash of genius"'  on the part of the
inventor; it simply requires something more than "ordinary skill."'
Graham sets out a three-part test for non-obviousness, the details
of which are beyond the scope of this article.' What is important is
that this is another basic requirement any invention must satisfy
before the government will reward the inventor with a patent
monopoly. Together with the utility and novelty requirements,
conditioning the patent grant on the invention's being non-obvious
ensures that only "those inventions which would not be disclosed or
kind of disclosure the patent law is designed to reward. For a concise discussion of novelty, see
DRATLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 23, at § 2.03[1].
50. See 35 U.S.C. section 103, which conditions a patent grant on the subject matter of the
invention not being "obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains." In other words, if "an ordinary mechanic"
in the field would have made the subject invention had he given it sufficient thought, then it
would not qualify for a patent. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 5-10. See supra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
53. Graham, 383 U.S. at 11-13 (citing Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267
(1851)).
54. Graham, 383 U.S. at 3 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1964)).
55. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17.
56. Id. at 15.
57. Id. at 17-18 ("[T]he scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences
between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill
in the pertinent art resolved."). In addition to the three-part factual inquiry, the court also set out
several "secondary considerations" for the court to consider. Id. ("Such secondary considerations
as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to
give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented.
As indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness, these inquiries may have relevancy.").
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devised but for the inducement of a patent" are awarded a patent
monopoly!"
5. Other Patent Requirements
a. 'Trocedural"
In addition to the three fundamental requirements of utility,
novelty, and non-obviousness, there are several requirements relating
to what the inventor must disclose in the patent application itself:
enablement, best mode, and definiteness.59 Underlying all these
requirements is the same theme: if disclosure is the inventor's
consideration to support the government's award in the patent
bargain, it must be sufficient to allow others to understand how the
invention works so that they can improve on or design around the
invention. If the inventor fails to satisfy any one of them, the patent is
invalid.
b. Duty of Candor to Disclose
Finally, the inventor also has a duty of candor to the Patent Office
when prosecuting his patent application. Since the patent applicant is
presumably an expert in the field of his invention, he is more likely
than the patent examiner to have specific information about
inventions known or used, or even about obscure publications that
discuss technology similar to his and which may be relevant to the
issue of the invention's novelty or obviousness. Moreover, a patent
prosecution is an ex parte proceeding. There is no person opposing the
application who could apprise the examiner of such prior inventions or
58. Id. at 11.
59. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994), which sets out the requirements of enablement, best mode
and definiteness. An inventor must describe his invention in sufficiently clear terms "as to enable
any person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to make and use the" invention. 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 1. In addition, the inventor must "set forth the best mode contemplated by inventor of
carrying out his invention." Id. Both the enablement and best mode requirements are set out in
the patent specification, which is the written narrative that sets out, in more or less plain
language, what the inventor believes his invention is and why it is an advance of the art that
deserves a patent. In addition to the specification, the patent must contain at least one claim. 35
U.S.C. § 112 [2. The claim is that part of the patent, written in highly technical language, that sets
out precisely the metes and bounds of the patent. It is the claim, as construed by the courts with
reference to the specification, against which any accused infringing device, product, or process is
measured. Section 112 2 requires inclusion of claims in the patent "particularly pointing out and
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." This is the
definiteness requirement. For a concise discussion of these procedural requirements, see
DRATLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 23, at § 2.04[2].
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publications. Consequently, the patent law imposes on inventors a
duty of candor to disclose to the Patent Office all such relevant
information. ° It requires both a general duty of candor and good faith
not to practice any fraud before the PTO,1 and also a specific duty to
disclose to the PTO "all information known to that individual to be
material to patentability as defined." 62
B. Design Patents
Even if a person has obtained a utility patent for her invention,
she may nevertheless want to protect the patented invention's design
or shape, i.e., the product configuration. 63 Utility patent protection of
an inventive product does not preclude patent protection for the
design as well. In other words, a product's design may be patentable
even if the product itself performs a function. 4
When the Patent Clause was drafted in the late Nineteenth
Century, little or no importance was placed on protecting the designs
of manufactured articles. People placed little store in fancy designs of
mechanical products; they did not need a machine that had a pleasing
appearance to it. It mattered only that the machine performed the task
for which it was designed. 65 The form or design a machine or consumer
article took was a secondary consideration. Over time, this situation
changed. As manufacturers vied for customers for their competing
60. The duty of candor is a court-created doctrine, see In re Harita, 847 F.2d 801, 807-08
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (discussing history of duty's development), that now is governed by regulations
issued by the PTO. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.175, 1.555, 1.56 (1992), as amended in 57 Fed. Reg. 2021,
2034 (Jan. 17, 1992).
61. See, for example, 37 C.F.R. section 1.56(a), which states"no patent will be granted on
an application in connection with which fraud on the Office was practiced or attempted or the
duty of disclosure was violated through bad faith or intentional misconduct."
62. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a). Violation of the duty of candor through failure to disclose known
information material to patentability is known as "inequitable conduct." See, e.g., Atlas Powder
Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984). It was formerly
known as "fraud on the Patent Office." Id. The sanction for such inequitable conduct is severe:
all the claims of the patent, even those claims not related to the failure to disclose, are rendered
unenforceable. See, e.g., J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex, Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1560-61 (Fed. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822 (1985).
63. See supra note 5.
64. See, e.g., Avia Group Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1563 (Fed. Cir.
1988). See generally CHISUM, supra note 36, at § 1.04[2][d]. See also infra note 71.
65. The Industrial Revolution, which began about 1750 in England and Europe, and the
late 18th Century in the United States, involved the transformation of a largely agrarian way of
life into one dominated by mechanized inventions such as textile mills, which greatly increased
production efficiency by decreasing man-hour demands. See generally PETER N. STEARNS, THE
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN WORLD HISTORY (1993).
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products, they placed a premium on the design and not merely the
function of the article. 6 Congress recognized the importance of design
in marketing products-enhancing their salability-and passed the
Design Patent Act in 1842.61 Nevertheless, design patent protection
generally is not sufficient for most industrial designs, first, because
most industrial designs cannot satisfy the requirements for a design
patent, and second, even if designs satisfy patent requirements, they
often fall prey to validity defenses.
1. Requirements for a Design Patent
The conditions for patentability of a design patent are similar to
those for a utility patent. A person may obtain a design patent for a
term of 14 years,' for "any new, original and ornamental design for an
article of manufacture."'  The Supreme Court has stated that "a
design must present an aesthetically pleasing appearance that is not
dictated by function alone, and must satisfy the other criteria of
patentability."'  In short, if form follows function in a design, it will
66. See generally Peters, Note, supra note 1, at 125 & n.20 (referencing FRANK 1. SCHECHTER,
THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATION OF THE LAW RELATING TO TRADEMARKS (1925)).
67. 35 U.S.C. §§ 171-173 (1982)(enacted as Patent Act of 1842, ch. 263, 5 Stat. 543 (1842)).
A design patent generally requires a high level of uniqueness in construction and appearance.
Design patents protect what is "ornamental," utility patents protect what is "useful." See
generally CHISUM, supra note 36, at § 1.04; MCCARTHY, supra note 5, at § 7.30. See also In re
Koehring, 37 F.2d 421,425-426 (C.C.P.A. 1930):
In declaring that, by the enactment of the design patent law, Congress expressed a
desire to promote more beauty, grace, and ornamentation in things used, observed, and
enjoyed by our people, the courts have not omitted on frequent occasions to mention
the fact that such ornamentation as was intended was an element in the salability of the
article. . . . As Congress meant the design patent law to apply to tools and
mechanisms of utilitarian character, it follows, we think, that it had in mind the
elimination of much of the unsightly repulsiveness that characterizes many machines
and mechanical devices which have a tendency to depress rather than excite the
esthetic sense.
68. 35 U.S.C. § 173 (1994). Although Congress recently changed the term for a utility
patent from seventeen years from the issue date of the patent to twenty years from the
application filing date, 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994), codified as amended, Pub. L. No. 103-465, §
532(1)(a), 108 Stat. 4990 (1994), it did not change the term for a design patent.
69. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1994). Courts construe "article of manufacture" broadly. See, e.g., In re
Zahn, 617 F.2d 261, 268 (C.C.P.A. 1980)(holding part of an article-the shank of a drill bit-
qualifies as an "article of manufacture"); see generally CHISUM, supra note 36, at § 1.04[2] nn. 8-
10.
70. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989).
"Ornamentality" generally requires that the article of manufacture have an "aesthetically
pleasing appearance." See, e.g., In re Koehring, 37 F.2d 421 (C.C.P.A. 1930); CrnsuM, supra note
36, at § 1.04[2][c]. As to functionality, the mere fact that an object is useful does not preclude
patentability of its configuration or shape. See, e.g., Avia Group Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc.,
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not qualify for protection. 71 As with utility patents, an ornamental
design must be novel and nonobvious.3 Moreover, it must satisfy the
same procedural requirements; a designer has the same duties of
candor and disclosure to the Patent Office.
3
To be sure, there are differences between design and utility
patents. Aside from design patents not covering utilitarian function,
the two kinds of patents also differ in how their claimed scope of
protection is described, the remedies available, and the standard for
determining infringement. First, unlike utility patents in which highly
specialized language in the patent claim describes the boundaries of
the claimed invention, design patents do not rely upon a written
description. Rather, the focus of a design patent is a single drawing in
853 F.2d 1557, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1988)("There is no dispute that shoes are functional and that
certain features of the shoe designs in issue perform functions. However, a distinction exists
between the functionality of an article or features thereof and the functionality of the particular
design of such article or features thereof that perform a function. Were that not true, it would not
be possible to obtain a design patent on a utilitarian article of manufacture ...or to obtain
both design and utility patents on the same article.")(emphasis added). Thus, elements of a
design may be functional, so long as the design is not dictated by the function it performs. See,
e.g., Power Controls Corp. v. Hybrinetics, Inc., 806 F.2d 234 (Fed. Cir. 1986). See generally
CHISUM, supra note 36, at § 1.04[2][d].
71. On the other hand, because utility patents cover functional aspects, and design patents
cover ornamental aspects, it is entirely possible for both a utility and design patent to cover
different aspects of the same article. A classic example would be utility and design patents
covering different aspects of an automobile, or even different aspects of a spray container. The
Federal Circuit has stressed that design patents cover different aspects of a product from a utility
patent:
Design patents do not and cannot include claims to the structural or functional aspects
of the article ...... If the patented design is primarily functional rather than
ornamental, the patent is invalid .... " "It is true . . . that a design may embody
functional features and still be patentable, but in order to attain this legal status under
these circumstances, the design must have an unobvious appearance distinct from that
dictated solely by functional considerations." . . . Thus it is the non-functional,
design aspects that are pertinent to determinations of infringement. . . . [A] design
patent is not a substitute for a utility patent. A device that copies the utilitarian or
functional features of a patented design is not an infringement unless the ornamental
aspects are also copied, such that the overall "resemblance is such as to deceive.
Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 838 F.2d 1186, 1188-89 (Fed. Cir. 1988)(internal citations omitted).
72. See, e.g., L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1124 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 291 (1993). See generally CHISUM, supra note 36, at § 1.04[2][e] & [f].
73. 35 U.S.C. § 171 provides that "[t]he provisions of this Title relating to patents for
inventions shall apply to patents for designs, except as otherwise provided." See also supra Part
I.A.5. for a discussion of the procedural requirements for obtaining a patent, including what the
applicant must disclose in the patent and to the Patent Office in order to fulfill her end of the
patent bargain.
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which the claimed design is pictured.74 Second, there is a difference in
the remedies available for patent infringement; the owner of a design
patent, on proof of infringement, is entitled to recover the infringer's
profits in addition to any damages.75 Third, the courts apply different
tests to determine whether infringement has occurred.76 Finally, the
purpose of the two kinds of patents are different. While utility patents
are intended to "promote the Progress of Science" by rewarding
inventors who contribute to the "useful Arts," design patents are
intended to promote the "decorative arts."'77
2. Validity Defenses
Despite the foregoing differences between design and utility
patents, they share a common characteristic: both are subject to
myriad defenses that can render them invalid. 8 Even more important
for the design owner who seeks protection for his design, most
industrial designs simply do not satisfy the patentability conditions of a
design patent, that is, even if they are "ornamental," they still lack
the inventive or novel elements of section 171, or both. 9 Thus,
74. "No description, other than a reference to the drawing, is ordinarily required." 37
C.F.R. § 1.153 (1996). See CHisuM, supra note 36, at § 1.04[3].
75. 35 U.S.C. § 289 (1994).
76. Infringement of a utility patent requires a careful construction and interpretation of the
written claims, usually accompanied by substantial expert testimony. See generally CHisuM, supra
note 36, at ch. 18. In determining whether a design patent has been infringed, on the other hand,
the focus is on the visual similarities of the patented and the allegedly infringing designs; nor does
a court rely upon expert testimony, instead seeking the impressions of the ordinary, prudent
observer.
[I]f, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually
gives, two designs are substantially the same,-if the resemblance is such as to deceive
such an observer, and sufficient to induce him to purchase one supposing it to be the
other,-the one first patented is infringed by the other.
Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1871). The similarities to the ordinary
observer must, however, be due to the novel aspects of the design, that is, those aspects for which
the patent was awarded. Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1444 (Fed. Cir.
1984). See also CHisuM, supra note 36, at § 1.04[4].
77. Gorham, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) at 524; Avia Group Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853
F.2d 1557, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
78. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (granting to all patents a presumption of validity, subject to any
defense of invalidity based on failure of invention to satisfy patentability conditions set out in
sections 102 and 103, or failure to comply with disclosure requirements contained in sections 112
and 251. 35 U.S.C. §§ 112, 251 (1994)). For trademarks, the relevant section is 15 U.S.C. section
1057(b) (1994). See infra note 132.
79. See DRATLER, supra note 1, at 893 & n.28. See also 35 U.S.C. § 171 (requiring
ornamental design candidate for protection be both "new" and "original"). See also Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989)("a design must present an
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although obtaining a patent for an "article of manufacture" is a means
of protecting the design that an owner will usually consider, the
difficulty of obtaining the patent in the first instance and the very real
likelihood it will be declared invalid often operate to foreclose patent
law as a practicable alternative for protection."
Nevertheless, manufacturers still apply for design patents and the
Patent Office continues to issue them. Design patents have some value
or persons would not obtain them. Their value as the sole means an
owner will use to protect an industrial design, however, is suspect.
Thus, a design patent is only one way in which an owner will usually
protect her property. In light of the many recent cases affording
protection to industrial designs under the rubric of trademark law,'1 an
owner usually will also seek to protect a design as trade dress.
The foregoing has been a brief recitation of the requirements for
obtaining a patent. As already noted, the stringent requirements for
patentability exist, in the words of Thomas Jefferson, for "drawing a
line between the things which are worth to the public the
embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not."'
They act to ensure that only those inventions that will actually
contribute to advancing science and technology, thereby contributing
to the public good, will receive the limited-duration patent monopoly,
aesthetically pleasing appearance that is not dictated by function alone, and must satisfy the
other criteria of patentability").
80. In addition to the threshold requirements for a patent and its susceptibility to a
declaration of invalidity notwithstanding the presumption of validity, 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994),
courts have adopted doctrines to limit the scope of a patent's protection. For example, once a
patent issues, its claims are strictly construed so that it cannot secure a monopoly beyond that
claimed in the patent, see, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942);
the owner's control over the patented product is severely limited once it is sold, see, e.g., United
States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250-52 (1942); and the patent monopoly is still subject to
the antitrust laws. See, e.g., I.B.M. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936). See also Dratler,
supra note 1, at 891-95. Dratler points out that design patents are routinely found invalid,
although he was writing at a time before studies had assessed the effect of the creation of the
Federal Circuit on design patent validity. Id. at 893 & n.28. Since its creation in 1982, the Federal
Circuit has shifted the earlier tendency of the various circuits to grant little deference to the
presumption of validity for patents. In addition to their relative uselessness in litigation, however,
Dratler also noted the time-consuming and expensive application process as a deterrent to using
design patents to obtain design protection. Dratler, supra note 1, at 893-94.
81. See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992); Kohler Co. v. Moen
Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 640 (7th Cir. 1993); Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., Inc., 9 F.3d
1091 (4th Cir. 1993); Ferrari S.P.A. Escercizio Fabriche Automobili E Corsi v. Roberts, 944 F.2d
1235, 1241 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1219 (1992); In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc.,
671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982); Krueger Int'l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
82. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966).
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and after that monopoly expires, the disclosed invention will be
available for all to use.'
It is this difficulty in obtaining design patents and the strict limits
placed on their duration once obtained that make trademark law a
more attractive complement to utility patent protection than is design
patent protection. 81 Trademark protection for a patent-disclosed
product configuration, however, is not limited in time as is the product
itself. Thus, it can interfere with the public's right to copy and use the
patented invention itself, a right the Supreme Court has stated is the
"centerpiece" of the patent system and has repeatedly vindicated. The
next section discusses the decisions that have left little doubt regarding
this right.
II
Preemption of State Unfair Competition Law
A discussion of whether patent law precludes trademark
protection for a product configuration that has been disclosed in a
utility patent would be incomplete without a discussion of the Sears-
Compco-Bonito Boats line of Supreme Court cases.' Each of these
cases, in pronouncements of varying breadth, stated a general federal
policy of preserving a right of the public to copy and use unpatented
articles or designs. So many courts and commentators have argued a
narrow reading of these decisions so as to limit their application to
federal preemption of state intellectual property laws, that one court
has observed, "distinguishing Sears, Compco and/or Bonito Boats has
become a veritable jurisprudential art form."8 Regardless of whether
these cases are so limited to preemption situations, however, all of
them state a federal policy, implicit in the Patent Clause, that the
public has a right to copy and use that which is in the public domain.
83. See supra text accompanying note 18.
84. See infra Part III.D.
85. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376
U.S. 234 (1964).
86. See Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1505 (10th Cir.
1995)(citing Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 526, n.7 (10th Cir. 1987)); 1
MCCARTHY, supra note 5, §§ 7.24[1]-7.25[5]; Dratler, supra note 1, at 916-24 (explaining the
courts' reliance on section 43(a) of Lanham Act to make an "end run around Sears/Compco");
Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1341,1360-62 (1987). See
also Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 640 (7th Cir. 1993); Ferrarii S.P.A. Escercizio v.
Roberts, 944 F.2d at 1241, cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1219 (1992); In re Teledyne Indus., Inc., 696 F.2d
968,971 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
19971
These decisions affirm the goals of the patent system to ensure not
only that ideas in the public domain remain there, but also that the
subject matter of patents becomes free for all to use upon expiration
of the patent.
A. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.
In Sears, the issue was "whether a State's unfair competition law
can, consistent with the federal patent laws, impose liability for or
prohibit the copying of an article which is protected by neither a
federal patent nor a copyright."' The Court answered the question in
the negative.
The Stiffel Co. had obtained design and utility patents on a "pole
lamp" that was commercially successful. After Sears copied the design
and began selling its own, cheaper version, Stiffel sued Sears for
patent infringement and violation of the Illinois Unfair Competition
Act. The district court held both patents invalid, but found Sears liable
under the Illinois law; the circuit court affirmed even though there was
no evidence that Sears had attempted to "palm off" its lamp as one of
Stiffel's.8 In reversing the circuit court, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that Illinois could not prohibit the mere copying of an unpatented
article. "Just as a State cannot encroach upon the federal patent laws
directly, it cannot, under some other law, such as that forbidding
unfair competition, give protection of a kind that clashes with the
objectives of the federal patent laws."'
In reaching this result, the Court considered both the language of,
and policies inherent in, the Patent Clause, as well as the Supremacy
Clause. It observed that since 1790 when the first patent law was
enacted pursuant to the Patent Clause, Congress had set the
conditions for issuing patents, which state law cannot countermand."
The Court noted that patents are intended to encourage invention by
rewarding the inventor with a limited-duration right to exclude others
from making or using his invention.' To ensure the public realizes its
end of the patent bargain, the conditions for obtaining a patent are
strictly imposed and the limitations on the patent monopoly strictly
87. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,225 (1964).
8& Id. at 226-28 & n.2.
89. Id. at 231.
90. Id. at 229.
91. Id. at 229-30. See also supra notes 22-33 and accompanying text.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [VOL. 19:339
AT THE INTERFACE OF PATENT AND TRADEMARK LAW
enforced. 2 The Court stressed that "when the patent expires the
monopoly created by it expires, too, and the right to make the
article-including the right to make it in precisely the shape it carried
when patented-passes to the public."'  The Court concluded that
allowing a state to grant perpetual protection to articles that are
entitled to patent protection "would be too great an encroachment on
the federal patent system to be tolerated."'
Nevertheless, although the Court held that a state could not,
without more, prohibit the mere copying of an article undeserving of
patent protection, it could, where the public may be confused as to the
source of goods, require labeling or other precautionary measures to
avoid such confusion.
95
B. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc
In Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., the Supreme Court
reversed the circuit court, holding that the lower court order conflicted
with federal patent laws. 96 The Court reasoned that to allow a state to
92. Sears, 376 U.S. at 230. The Court noted that even after an invention crosses over the
high threshold of patentability, it is subject to being strictly construed, the patentee's control over
a patented article after it is sold is limited, and the patent monopoly, although government-
sanctioned, is still subject to the antitrust laws. Id. See also supra notes 78-80 and accompanying
text.
93. Sears, 376 U.S. at 230 (citing Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120-22
(1938); Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169,185 (1896)).
94. Sears, 376 U.S. at 232. Noting the importance of uniformity in this area of the law, the
Court concluded a state could not, consistent with the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,
extend a patent beyond its expiration date or grant patent protection, either directly through a
state patent law, or indirectly, through some other state law. Id. at 231-32. Applying this holding
to the facts before it, i.e., where the Stiffel lamp patents had been declared invalid, the Court
concluded: "To allow a State by use of its law of unfair competition to prevent the copying of an
article which represents too slight an advance to be patented would be to permit the State to
block off from the public something which federal law has said belongs to the public." Id. at 232-
33.
95. Sears, 376 U.S. at 232:
[A] State may, in appropriate circumstances, require that goods, whether patented or
unpatented, be labeled or that other precautionary steps be taken to prevent customers
from being misled as to the source, just as it may protect businesses in the use of their
trademarks, labels, or distinctive dress in the packaging of goods so as to prevent
others, by imitating such markings, from misleading purchasers as to the source of the
goods.
96. 376 U.S. 234 (1964). Compco was decided on the same day as Sears. The district court
had held a design patent issued to Day-Brite on a fluorescent light fixture's reflector invalid. The
court determined that the reflector's cross ribs imparted strength and attractiveness to the fixture
and thus the reflector was not entitled to a design patent. Moreover, Day-Brite's application for a
utility patent on the reflector had been rejected. Id. Although the court dismissed the patent
infringement claim, it noted evidence of confusion, and under Illinois' Unfair Competition Act
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prohibit copying of an article, unprotected by patent law, would
conflict with federal patent policy set out in the Patent Clause and
patent laws, "of allowing free access to copy whatever the federal
patent ...laws leave in the public domain."'  While such factors as
"confusion" and "nonfunctionality" may be relevant to a state law
which requires those who sell copies to take precautions such as
labeling to avoid confusion, the state cannot prohibit the copying
outright, as the Illinois Unfair Competition Act did.' s
After Sears and Compco, the Supreme Court retreated somewhat
from the broad statements of those cases, allowing states some leeway
in regulating matters of intellectual property.' Lower courts followed
enjoined Compco from selling its identical fixtures and ordered it to pay damages, and the circuit
court affirmed. Id. at 235-36.
97. Id. at 237. In an oft-quoted passage, Justice Black wrote:
That an article copied from an unpatented article could be made in some other way,
that the design is "nonfunctional" and not essential to the use of either article, that the
configuration of the article copied may have a "secondary meaning" which identifies
the maker to the trade, or that there may be "confusion" among purchasers as to which
article is which or as to who is the maker, may be relevant evidence in applying a
State's law requiring such precautions as labeling; however, and regardless of the
copier's motives, neither these facts nor any others can furnish a basis for imposing
liability for or prohibiting the actual acts of copying and selling.
Id. at 238.
98. In addition, the Court noted that Illinois had no such labeling law, so it held Compco
could not be liable. Further, although both Sears and Compco could have been decided on the
ground that the defendants' alleged conduct did not fit within the Illinois unfair competition law,
the Court's invalidation of the law rendered such a determination irrelevant. Sears, 376 U.S. at
228 n.2; Compco, 376 U.S. at 236-37. The Court instead issued broad, relatively "rigid" rulings
precluding states from giving patent-like protection under their own laws. In Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156 (1989), Justice O'Connor (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974)), see infra note 99, wrote that the Court's "decisions since
Sears have taken a decidedly less rigid view of the scope of federal pre-emption under the patent
laws." Although the Court discarded the broad, rigid view of Sears-Compco, it nevertheless
reaffirmed Sears' position "that the States may not offer patent-like protection to intellectual
creations which would otherwise remain unprotected as a matter of federal law." Bonito Boats,
489 U.S. at 156.
99. In Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973), the Court considered a California statute
that made it a criminal offense to 'pirate' recordings produced by others. At the time of the
alleged criminal conduct, federal copyright law did not cover piracy. Even though the protection
afforded by the California statute had no durational limit as did federal copyright law, the Court
held first, that the Patent Clause did not vest all power exclusively in the federal government to
issue copyrights. Id. at 556-57. Second, it held that unless Congress makes a determination that a
particular class of writings requires exclusive federal regulation, the states are free to regulate in
that area. Id. at 559. Finally, the Court noted that having no temporal limitation on the rights
granted under the California statute did not invalidate it because any such limitations mandated
by the Patent Clause apply only to Congress. Id. at 560-61.
In Kewanee Oil, the Court held that because of the difference between the purposes and
policies underlying patent law and trade secret law, federal patent law did not preempt Ohio's
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suit, effectively circumventing the broad holdings of Sears and
Compco.1 ° Finally, in 1989, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of
whether federal patent law preempted a state law's attempt to grant
patent-like protection, and answered with a qualified yes.
C. Bonito Boats, Inc v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc
In Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,' the Court
struck down a Florida statute that granted patent-like protection to
product configurations, in that case the design of a fiberglass boat
hull.1° In holding federal patent law preempted the Florida law,
however, the Court noted that the "broad preemptive principle" set
out in Sears was "inappropriate" in light of the balance between
federal and state intellectual property protection Sears itself
recognized."W The Court then narrowed Sears:
Thus, while Sears speaks in absolutist terms, its conclusion that the
States may place some conditions on the use of trade dress indicates
an implicit recognition that all state regulation of potentially
patentable but unpatented subject matter is not ipso facto
pre-empted by the federal patent lawsY°4
Despite this narrowing of the Sears preemption language, the
Bonito Boats Court nevertheless reaffirmed the general tenor of Sears
and Compco. The Court first noted that its decisions since Sears and
Compco, which rejected a per se preemptive analysis, depended in
trade secret law. In particular, the Court noted that Congress has not expressed an intent to
preempt trade secret law. Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 480.
Finally, in Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979), an unsuccessful patent
applicant sued for a declaratory judgment that the contract it had entered into for payment of
royalties on the now unpatented article was unenforceable. The Court reversed the circuit court's
conclusion that the contract was unenforceable, holding that federal patent law did not preempt
state contract law so as to preclude enforcement of the contract for so long as the contracting
party sold the underlying "invention," even if a patent had not been granted. Id. at 263.
100. See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 5, §7.25.
101. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
102. The Florida statute made "'[it ...unlawful for any person to use the direct molding
process to duplicate for the purpose of sale any manufactured vessel hull or component part of a
vessel made by another without the written permission of that other person."' FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 559.94 (West 1987), cited in Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 144-45. The process involves making a
mold of a boat hull design and then pouring fiberglass into the mold. The plug mold process is a
relatively cheap means of copying a design. In this case, the Supreme Court noted that Bonito
was able to create the original hull only by exerting "substantial effort." Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at
144.
103. Id. at 154. In Sears, the Court had conceded that states may require competitors who
copy original designs to label their designs so as to reduce confusion among consumers. Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,232 (1964).
104. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 154.
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each case upon a finding that the state law at issue did not interfere
with the goals of the patent laws set by Congress.' Having
distinguished those cases, the Court reaffirmed that "the federal
patent system depend[ed] upon substantially free trade in publicly
known, unpatented design and utilitarian conceptions."'" It concluded
that where a state law treads on the province of patent law, it will be
preempted:
[T]he States may not offer patent-like protection to intellectual
creations which would otherwise remain unprotected as a matter of
federal law. Both the novelty and the nonobviousness requirements
of federal patent law are grounded in the notion that concepts
within the public grasp, or those so obvious that they readily could
be, are the tools of creation available to all. They provide the
baseline of free competition upon which the patent system's
incentive to creative effort depends. A state law that substantially
interferes with the enjoyment of an unpatented utilitarian or design
conception which has been freely disclosed by its author to the
public at large impermissibly contravenes the ultimate goal of public
disclosure and use which is the centerpiece of federal patent policy.
Moreover, through the creation of patent-like rights, the States
could essentially redirect inventive efforts away from the careful
criteria of patentability developed by Congress over the last 200
years.
1°7
The Court then held that the Florida plug mold law offered
greater protection than available under a valid unfair competition or
trade secret law in that it imposed liability for merely copying an
unpatented design, "without any showing of consumer confusion, or
breach of trust or secrecy." 1 8 In short, the law limited the public's
right "to exploit ideas that the patent system mandates shall be free
for all to use."1"
Many commentators have read Bonito Boats to have severely
limited the reach of Sears and Compco, some even arguing that Bonito
105. Id. at 155-56 (discussing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), and
Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979)). See supra note 99.
106. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 156.
107. Id. at 156-57. See also supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text. The boat design at
issue was not the subject of either a design or utility patent. The above-quoted language was thus
made in the context of intellectual property that could not have qualified for a patent, as opposed
to property whose patent protection had expired, and should be limited to its factual situation.
The public's right to copy whatever is in the public domain, however, applies equally to the
subject matter of patents which by operation of law enters the public domain upon expiration of
the patent term. See supra Parts II.A and B.
10& Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 167.
109. Id.
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Boats has returned state unfair competition law to its status before
Sears and Compco were decided." ° Nevertheless, despite any such
limitation of its application, the language in Bonito Boats strongly
reaffirmed the right of the public to copy freely and use whatever
patent law has deemed is in the public domain.'
III
Trademark and Trade Dress Law
The issue this article addresses arises because of the relatively
recent judicial recognition of trademark law's ability to protect
product configurations and features n2 Because product owners may
seek trademark protection not merely in lieu of, but in addition to a
utility patent-the traditional means of protecting products
themselves-the potential exists for conflict between the policies and
goals of the two intellectual property regimes. This conflict derives
primarily from the durational limits placed on the respective
government-sanctioned "monopolies." Patents, as we have seen, are a
constitutionally-mandated limited-duration monopoly.lU Trademark
protection, on the other hand, is potentially unlimited in time; so long
as the trademark owner continues to use it commercially, the mark
will be accorded protection." 4 To better understand the potential
conflict, however, it is helpful to consider both the policies underlying
trademark law and the precise scope of protectable subject matter.
A. Purposes and Policies of Trademark Law
Trademark law is considered a branch of unfair competition
law."5 Its primary purpose is to protect consumers from being
110. See, e.g., Theodore H. Davis, Copying in the Shadow of the Constitution: The Rational
Limits of Trade Dress Protection, 80 MINN. L. REV. 595 (1996); Dratler, supra note 1, at 923
n.195, 937 n.270, 942 n.289. See also MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 7.24[2] & n.15.
111. See, e.g., Anthony Dowell, Note, Trade Dress Protection of Product Designs: Stifling the
Progress of Science and the Useful Arts for an Unlimited Time, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 137
(1994); Dratler, supra note 1, at 940 n.282.
112. See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 7.30[2].
113. See supra text accompanying notes 27-33.
114. See infra text accompanying notes 133-134.
115. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), UNFAIR COMPETITION, Foreword (1995)[hereinafter
RESTATEMENT]. See also International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d
912, 915 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981); Melissa Gleiberman, From Fast Cars to
Fast Food: Overbroad Protection of Product Trade Dress Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,
45 STAN. L. REV. 2037 n.1 (1993); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 2.02 (3d ed. 1996).
1997]
confused or deceived as to whose product they are buying."6 By
preventing consumer confusion, the law secondarily secures to the
producer its investment in its reputation for quality, i.e., its goodwill. 7
Trademark law also enhances competition by giving producers a
shorthand means of communicating to consumers by advertisements
or the product's packaging that it produces the particular goods,
thereby lowering consumers' search costs and facilitating comparison
shopping. 8 Because these benefits will derive only from a long-term
association between the trademark and the producer, trademark law
places no time limit on a trademark's term of protection. So long as a
mark accomplishes these goals and does not frustrate competition, it
will be entitled to protection.
B. Protectable Subject Matter: Words, Symbols, and Packaging
The extent to which these policies and purposes are realized
depends in large part upon how broadly courts interpret protectable
subject matter under the law. Courts generally have read the Lanham
Act broadly. Section 45 of the Lanham Act defines a trademark as
including "any word, name, symbol or device, or any combination
thereof." '119 Traditionally, trademark protection was limited to words,
names, and symbols used to label a product or service, or to the way
the product was "dressed" for marketing, i.e., the product's packaging
or "trade dress."' A person who had first used such a mark in
connection with goods or services was entitled to protection from a
competitor using the same or confusingly similar mark to market the
116. See S. Rep. No. 1333,79th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274-75.
117. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park 'N Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985). See also Ferrari
S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1249 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1219
(1992)(Kennedy, J. dissenting)("[T]he protection afforded by the Lanham Act is primarily to
potential purchasers. The protection accruing to a producer is derivative of and only incidental to
this primary protection.").
118. The real cost to the buyer of a product is the cost of the product plus the cost of the
search in finding the lowest priced product. Advertising ultimately lowers the cost for the buyer
because it communicates to the buyer-without the buyer having to spend the time and energy to
discover for himself-the best price. See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information,
69 J. POLIT. ECON. 213 (1961), reprinted in GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY
(1968). See also W.T. Rogers Co., Inc. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 338 (7th Cir. 1985); Dratler, supra
note 1, at 926 n.210.
119. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994). In its entirety, section 1127 defines a trademark to "include[]
any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof . . . used by a person . . . to
identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or
sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown."
120. See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 8.01[2]; RESTATEMENT § 16, cmt. a.
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competitor's goods. This protection extended only to words, symbols,
and packaging; it did not extend to the product or shape of the product
itself. Such protection could be obtained only by meeting the strict
requirements for obtaining a design patent.ul
The reason for readily granting a monopoly in a word, symbol, or
package design-as opposed to the product itself-is simple. Where
the trademark to be protected is an arbitrarily-chosen word or a
symbol used to label the product, or even the package the product
comes in, there is little concern that granting exclusive use of the mark
will burden competition by prohibiting its use by competitors. There is
a virtually infinite supply of names, symbols, and even packaging
designs; they are, in essence, "a dime a dozen."'122 Such arbitrarily-
chosen names, symbols, or package designs have no intrinsic value to
consumers. Whatever value they have comes from their association
with the producer's products, and the corresponding favorable or
unfavorable connotations those products have for consumers.
Consumers can be expected to choose a product not because of any
value in the trademark itself, but rather because of the goodwill the
producer has developed by making a desirable product.'
In short, the word or symbol signifies the source of the product. If
consumers associate the mark with quality products, they will be more
likely to buy the products. If the product with that mark always comes
from the same producer, they will always obtain the product they
want. Thus, if a competitor uses the mark on its own goods, it more
likely than not does so because it is trying to "pass off" its goods as
121. See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 7.30[2]. See also In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc.,
671 F.2d 1332, 1336-38 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (recounting history of protection for product features and
configurations, recognizing that earlier courts had denied protection to product shapes).
122. See, e.g., Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 65 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 1995);
Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distrib., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 584 (2d Cir. 1993)(stating
that a "limitless" supply of combinations of colors and designs exists for bottle labels); William
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 267,
276 (1988).
123. Put another way, you may want to purchase a refrigerator because of its storage
capacity, its efficient energy use, or even its color. You would not, however, purchase an
"Amana" because you thought the name was intrinsically attractive, or because the box it came
in could, with some imaginative modifications, be transformed by your children into an airplane.
Rather, you might buy an Amana because you or a friend have had good experiences with
refrigerators manufactured by Amana in the past, or perhaps because you have read favorable
reports about Amana appliances in a consumer journal, or even because you were impressed by
advertising describing its features. Thus, if Amana means anything to you, it is probably because
of its association with large household appliances such as refrigerators, stoves, dishwashers, etc.
You might not so readily purchase, for example, Amana brand bread or a pair of shoes made by
Amana (unless, perhaps, you had very big feet).
1997]
HASTINGS COMMIENT L.J.
those of the mark owner's rather than because of any inherent value in
the mark itself.1" By reserving that mark for the owner, the law
prevents consumer confusion over source.
Because of their virtually infinite number, this analysis works well
when the mark is an arbitrarily-chosen word, symbol, or even
packaging, for which there is a virtually limitless supply. The plot
thickens, however, when the chosen word describes the product or has
some value apart from its developed goodwill. Here, competition may
be hindered by limiting the words competitors can use. Even in this
case, however, the law limits only the way in which the competitor can
identify its product; it does not limit the products the competitor can
sell.115 When trademark protection is given to a product configuration,
however, competitors are limited not only in the words they use to
identify their products, but also in the product itself.
C. Protectable Subject Matter: Product Configurations
In the last twenty years "trade dress" has come to mean "the total
image" of a product, including "features such as size, shape, color or
color combinations, texture, graphics or even particular sales
techniques."' Although originally thought to include only the
appearance of containers and labels used to package a product,1' 7
courts are now in accord that the term "trade dress" includes the
design of the product itself, the "product configuration," as well as its
124. See Thomas & Betts, 65 F.3d at 657.
125. For example, if a manufacturer makes a general household cleaning product called
"Easy Kleen," and is awarded a trademark for that product, a competitor would not be able to
make a general household cleaning product called "Easy Kleen" (or "Easy Clean" or "EZ
Clean," etc.). Depending on other factors, see infra text accompanying note 157, it might be able
to make a product called "Quick Clean" or "Time Saver," but it would not be foreclosed from
making a general household cleaner. The law would prohibit the competitor only from using the
manufacturer's mark in association with a household cleaner. Moreover, a computer software
designer would be able to market a program that uninstalls programs called "Easy Kleen"
because the words themselves have no intrinsic value relative to computers. Nor is it likely a
person would buy a product called "Easy Kleen" unless he had some idea of how well the
product performs.
126. See John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983). See
also Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 888 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1989); Roulo v. Russ Berrie &
Co., 886 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1075 (1990); LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart
Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1985). See also RESTATEMENT § 16, cmt. a ("The design features of
the product itself are also sometimes included within the meaning of 'trade dress,' although the
substantive rules applicable to the protection of product designs differ in some respects from
those applicable to packaging and related subject matter.")
127. RESTATEMENT § 16, cmt. a.
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labeling and packaging.28 This creates a potential problem that
numerous courts and commentators have identified: unlike most
words or labels, there is generally only a limited supply of available
designs for products themselves.' Prohibiting competitors from using
these designs could inhibit competition in that product market. This
would occur when the consumer wants the product not because of who
made it but rather because of what the product looks like or how it
performs. In other words, the product configuration itself may have
value to the consumer apart from its trademark function as a signifier
of source.' Courts thus must distinguish between a product's
intrinsically valuable features and its features as a source-designator.
Since there is often considerable overlap of these properties in product
configurations, the courts' task is complicated.1 31 Courts would not
face the task unless obtaining protection for product features under
trademark law provided some advantage over patent law. There are,
in fact, several advantages.
D. Advantages of Protecting Product Designs by Trademark
In the last fifteen or twenty years there has been a substantial
increase in design owners' seeking trademark protection in addition
to, or even in lieu of, design patent protection. Protecting product
designs under trademark law is attractive for several reasons. First,
unlike the limited term given a patent, a trademark's term of
protection is perpetual, delimited only by the owner's continued
commercial use of the design mark. Second, it is easier to obtain a
128. See, e.g., Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enter., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1439 (3d Cir.
1994); Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 640 (7th Cir. 1993); Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp.
of Am., Inc., 9 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1993); In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332
(C.C.P.A. 1982); Krueger Int'l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). See also
MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 8.01[3], and cases cited therein. After the Supreme Court's decision
in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992), there is little question on this
score, notwithstanding that some courts have suggested that the trade dress in Two Pesos, the
design of a restaurant, was "more akin" to packaging. See, e.g., Duraco Prods., 40 F.3d at 1442.
Nevertheless, Duraco concluded that product configurations were protectable as trade dress. Id.
at 1446.
129. See, e.g., Thomas & Betts, 65 F.3d at 657. Indeed, inquiring whether there are sufficient
alternative designs available for competitors to use is the critical issue in determining whether a
product configuration is functional. See infra notes 190-194 and accompanying text.
130. See infra note 154.
131. See, e.g., Thomas & Betts, 65 F.3d at 657; W.T. Rogers Co., Inc. v. Keene,,778 F.2d 334,
340 (7th Cir. 1985). It is usually because of this dual purpose that product configurations or
features have, i.e., inherently-appealing as well as source-identifying properties, that courts face
such a difficult task in resolving these types of cases.
1997]
trademark than it is to obtain a design patent. Finally, a trademark in a
product design is less likely to fall prey to a successful invalidity
defense than is a design patent. m
1. Unlimited Term of Protection
Trade dress protection is unlimited in time so long as the owner
continues to use the mark commercially. Protecting a design under
patent law, however, limits the owner to a 14-year term of exclusive
use.' Thus, even where a designer has obtained a valid design patent
and is entitled to preclude all of its competitors from copying and
using that design, the designer can do so only for a period of 14 years.
After that time, whatever competitive advantage the patent owner
may have had is lost.
Trade dress under the Lanham Act, on the other hand, retains its
protective mantle for as long as the owner continues to use the design
commercially. Generally, trade dress is not dedicated to the public
unless the owner abandons the design.L1 This raises the issue whether
132. As already noted, design patents are subject to the same invalidity defenses as are utility
patents. See, e.g., In re Borden, 90 F.3d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996)(holding design for dual purpose
container obvious in light of prior art references.). See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
Trade dress can also be subject to "invalidity" claims because they are non-distinctive or
functional. As to the former, it is the owner's burden to prove the distinctiveness of its dress.
This, however, is substantially easier than hurdling the threshold patent requirements. The
burden of proof in a functionality analysis depends on the jurisdiction. See MCCARTHY, supra note
5, § 7.26[3][d]. Because the inquiry in a functionality analysis usually turns on whether there are
sufficient alternatives available for competitors to use, all a plaintiff need prove is that there are
such alternatives, while a defendant must prove that there are not. Thus, the burden appears to
be relatively easier for a plaintiff to meet. See infra notes 190-194 and accompanying text.
Trademarks, like patents, are accorded a presumption of validity. 35 U.S.C. § 282
(1994)(patents); 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (1994)(trademarks). Trademarks that have appeared on the
principle register for five years, however, are deemed "incontestable," and consequently subject
only to certain enumerated defenses. The defendant initially must carry a heavy burden in
showing that the owner's incontestable mark should not have been issued or should not now be
accorded protection. See, e.g., Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park 'N Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189 (1985).
133. 35 U.S.C. § 173. A utility patent, by contrast, is entitled to 20 years protection from the
filing date of the application. 35 U.S.C. § 154.
134. Since they are intended primarily to advance consumer awareness rather than any body
of knowledge, it would make little sense to limit the term of the trademark. The longer a mark is
used in connection with a product, the stronger the consumer's association of that product with a
particular producer, source, or expected quality becomes. Usually, so long as the mark owner
continues to use the mark commercially, the protection remains. A mark is deemed abandoned
when the owner has ceased using the mark in commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994). Nonuse of a
mark for three years is prima facie evidence of abandonment. Id. The owner, however, must have
intended to cease all use of the mark. There are cases where the owner has ceased using a mark,
then resumed use. In fact, courts have held that where an owner can demonstrate an intent to
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design patent and trade dress protection are mutually exclusive, the
argument being that trade dress's potentially perpetual term of
protection frustrates the patent law's policy goals of dedication to, and
free use by the public. 0
2. Relative Ease of Obtaining Trade Dress Protection
In contrast to patent rights, trade dress rights may be obtained
under the common law without ever having applied for registration to
the Patent and Trademark Office. An owner may obtain protection
merely through commercial use of the trade dress, i.e., marketing the
product under the trade dress. Moreover, registration is not a
prerequisite to protection under the Lanham Act; section 43(a)
provides a remedy for infringement of unregistered marks.L
Nevertheless, although section 43(a) has been the traditional
route for plaintiffs to sue for trade dress infringement in the federal
courts, trade dress for product shape can now be registered under the
Lanham Act.W As more and more courts find favorably for plaintiffs
in trade dress cases, it is likely that most design owners will register
their trade dress.' Moreover, obtaining a federal registration is
substantially easier than obtaining a patent.13
resume use of a mark after cessation, it will not be deemed to have abandoned the mark. See,
e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Humble Exploration Co., Inc., 695 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1983).
135. See infra notes 146-160 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768. A registered trademark owner can proceed under
section 32 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994). A trademark is defined under the
Lanham Act as construed by the courts to include "trade dress," including product configuration.
The point here, however, is that the owner need never have even attempted to register its trade
dress to obtain protection for it.
137. See MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 8.01[5], n. 36. See also Zip Dee, Inc. v. Dometic Corp.,
931 F. Supp. 602 (N.D. I11. 1996), which involved a product configuration that had been registered
with the PTO. Zip Dee is discussed in detail, infra Part V.A.4, and Part V.B.2.
138. Courts continue to find product configurations protectable. See, e.g., Kohler Co. v.
Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 640 (7th Cir. 1993); Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am, Inc., 9 F.3d
1091 (4th Cir. 1993); In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982); Krueger
Int'l, Inc. v, Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); MCCARTHY, supra note 5,
§ 8.01[3], and cases cited therein. One reason most owners will choose to register their dress is
because courts accord registered marks a presumption of validity, a substantial advantage in any
lawsuit.
139. See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 19.40. It is not coincidental that many practitioners
recommend that lawyers protect their clients by registering trade dress rather than just
depending on any common law rights they may have.
3. Available Defenses
Although trademarks and trade dress are subject to defenses of
invalidity, for example, nondistinctiveness and functionality, the focus
of most trademark cases is on infringement, that is, whether the
defendant's product is confusingly similar to the trademark owner's
product.' In patent suits, on the other hand, a patent's validity is
nearly always heavily litigated.14
Once a patent issues, and the patentee has identified an infringer,
the patentee is not home free. Even if the defendant's accused product
does in fact infringe the patent, the plaintiff still may not prevail. A
person cannot be liable for infringement of an invalid patent. 142
Notwithstanding the presumption of validity that comes with the
patent grant, 43 a patent nevertheless is subject to myriad defenses that
can render it invalid.' 4 Indeed, prior to the creation of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which was given
exclusive jurisdiction for appeals from cases involving patents, the
majority of patent suits ended in the patent being declared invalid.1 45
140. See infra notes 157-158 and accompanying text (discussing likelihood of confusion).
141. See, e.g., Dratler, supra note 1, at 893 & n.28.
142. See generally CHIsuM, supra note 36, § 19.02[1]. A patent that has been declared invalid
has the same legal effect as an expired patent; the public is free to use the disclosed invention
without compensating the inventor. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225
(1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
143. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994).
144. See generally CHISUM, supra note 36, § 19.02. Pursuant to section 282, the presumption
of validity can be defeated by the infringer's showing that in obtaining the patent, the patentee:
(1) failed to comply with any "condition for patentability" set out in sections 102 and 103 of the
Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1994), which inter alia require that the invention be novel, i.e.,
that the inventor be the first in the United States to have made the invention, and that it also be
non-obvious, i.e., that an ordinary person skilled in the particular technical area of the invention
not be able to have made the invention had she given thought to the problem the inventor
allegedly solved; (2) failed to comply with the disclosure requirements of section 112 of the
Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994), which inter alia requires the patentee to disclose the "best
mode" for practicing the patent, as well as disclose sufficient information in the patent to
"enable" a person who is familiar with the technical area of the patent to actually practice the
invention, i.e., make and use the invention for which a patent was awarded; (3) failed to comply
with the requirements of section 251, 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1994), which addresses the conditions for
obtaining a re-issue patent. In addition, a patent may be rendered unenforceable for a variety of
reasons, including inequitable (deceptive) conduct before the PTO and misuse of patent rights.
See 35 U.S.C. § 282; see also supra note 80. Most patents are declared invalid because of failure to
comply with the conditions of patentability contained in sections 102 and 103 of the Patent Act.
These sections require that the conditions of novelty and non-obviousness be satisfied before a
patent will issue. See supra Part I.A.3-4.
145. See, e.g., Dratler, supra note 1, at 893 & n.28. Since the creation of the Federal Circuit,
this trend appears to have been reversed. It is possible that by creating the Federal Circuit by
merging the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, and transferring
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E. Coexistence of Design Patent and Trade Dress Protection
Because of the unlimited duration of trademarks, the relative
difficulty of qualifying for a design patent, and the problems it
presents in litigation, few manufacturers will rely on design patent
protection alone to protect their intellectual property.' This raises
the question whether the two intellectual property regimes can protect
the same feature or design. Generally, both the courts and
commentators agree they can.'47
Several commentators and courts have argued that one or the
other law should prevail in these situations, concluding that patent
law, primarily because of its constitutionally-mandated limited
duration, should prevail.1 48 Other courts have suggested that utility and
design patents should be treated differently because utility patent
protection usually will preclude trademark protection under the
doctrine of functionality.'49
jurisdiction for patent appeals from the regional circuit courts to it, Congress was sending an
"implicit message" that it would prefer that the new court, as did the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, give deference to presumption of validity. See EDMUND W. KITCH & HARVEY S.
PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCEss 793-94 (Rev. 4th ed. 1991).
This situation might suggest that either the Patent and Trademark Office is examining
patent applications incompetently or that patentees are defrauding the Office and not fully
disclosing the prior art. The true situation is neither. The reason why many litigated patents are
declared invalid is because the patent application process is already very expensive without
adding to it the cost of doing a comprehensive search of the prior art-which may include not
only inventions and writings in the technical area of which the invention is a part, but also any
related area with which the inventor should have been familiar-to determine whether the
invention is nonobvious and novel. It is often only when a defendant, facing a potential patent
judgment of millions of dollars in damages, which damages can be trebled, see 35 U.S.C. § 284
(1994), will "pull out all the stops" or "look under all the rocks," making large expenditures to
uncover a relatively obscure prior art reference that will render the patent invalid.
146. As noted, they will also assert protection under the Lanham Act, especially after the
Supreme Court's decision in Two Pesos, where the Court effectively sanctioned the use of trade
dress law to protect designs. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). See also
supra text accompanying note 137 (discussing the availability of federal registration for trade
dress).
147. See, e.g., Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 636-43 (7th Cir. 1993); W.T. Rogers Co.
v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 337 (7th Cir. 1985); Dratler, supra note 1, at 928-35; MCCARTHY, supra
note 5, § 7.30.
148. See, e.g., Kohler, 12 F.3d at 640 (Cudahy, J., dissenting); Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v.
Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1248 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1219 (1992)(Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 935 F. Supp. 1399 (N.D. I11. 1996)(Thomas
& Betts, II). Anthony Dowell, Note, Trade Dress Protection of Product Designs: Stifling the
Progress of Science and the Useful Arts for an Unlimited Time, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 137
(1994).
149. See, e.g., Kohler, 12 F.3d at 636-43; L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co, 988 F.2d
1117, 1130-32 (Fed. Cir. 1993); W. T. Rogers, 778 F.2d at 337; In re Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344,
As to design patents, since patent and trademark law not only
have different purposes, but also different requirements for
establishing liability of accused products, merely because a particular
design is-or was-entitled to design patent protection should not
preclude it from being protected as trade dress.1 Put another way, the
two regimes can coexist peacefully to protect the same product
configuration because they have different requirements that must be
satisfied to prove infringement under the Lanham Act.
In Two Pesos, the Supreme Court identified three conditions to a
plaintiff's establishing liability for trade dress infringement: (1) the
trade dress must be distinctive, either inherently or by having acquired
secondary meaning; (2) it must be nonfunctional; and (3) the allegedly
1348-49 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1080 (1974). See also Elmer v. ICC Fabricating, Inc., 67
F.3d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1995), where the court held that the trade dress was invalid. In discussing the
effect on competitors of a manufacturer's having previously obtained a utility patent on a car-
mounted advertising sign, however, the court explained:
it was HTH's burden to prove that the availability of alternative designs substantially
eliminates any competitive need for the features that HTH seeks to protect via
trade dress. . . . HTH made no such showing. * * * If the asserted trade dress had
been narrowly defined to cover only one of the many product configurations within the
scope of the claim, one might have a different case. In such case, upon expiration of the
'994 [i.e., utility] patent competitors would be free to practice the '994 invention; they
could sell "aerodynamic" vehicle-mounted signs. They simply could not choose a
product configuration that would be confusingly similar to the trade dress of HTH's
product.
Id. at 1580 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). The trade dress owner in Elmer thus
lost because it had defined its trade dress to be coextensive with all the configurations disclosed
in the utility patent and could not show that there were sufficient alternative configurations
available to allow competitors to compete effectively.
Functionality, discussed more fully infra Part IV, is a judicially-created doctrine whose
primary purpose is to ensure that a person cannot obtain perpetual patent-like protection
through trademark laws. Although originally adopted to prevent the subject matter of utility
patents from becoming perpetual patents in contravention of patent policy, courts have expanded
the doctrine substantially over the years. Under the doctrine, courts deny trademark protection
to product features or packaging that a competitor in the same market would need in order to
compete effectively. The functionality doctrine, however, is an imperfect solution to preventing
the subject matter of utility patents from becoming the perpetual property of the inventor. This,
in fact, is the central issue of this article. The functionality doctrine, however, generally would not
apply to design patents; if a design is functional, then it should not have received a design patent
in the first place. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., Kohler, 12 F.3d at 636-43; W. T. Rogers, 778 F.2d at 337; Dratler, supra note 1,
at 928-35; 1 CHISUM, supra note 36, at § 1.04[6] (1995); MCCARTHY, supra note 5, at § 7.30. Indeed,
despite an earlier refusal to do so, the PTO has for many years registered as a trademark a
product design that was also the subject of a design patent. In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328
F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (holding design patent in container for product does not preclude
trademark protection for same); In re Honeywell, 497 F.2d 1344 (C.C.P.A.)(holding same rule
applies to product configuration itself and not just containers), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1080 (1974).
See MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 7.30[2], nn.7 & 11.
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infringing trade dress must be likely to confuse consumers as to the
source of the infringer's product. 15 If any of these elements is missing,
there can be no liability. The doctrine of functionality, concerned
more with the intersection of utility patents and trademarks, is
discussed in detail below. 52 The requirements of distinctiveness and
likelihood of confusion are of more immediate concern to the issue of
whether design patent and trade dress protection can coexist.
A design patent, which is available only for industrial designs,
protects any novel, nonobvious, and ornamental design, regardless of
whether that design has source-identifying properties or not. 3 A
trademark in a product feature or configuration, however, is valid only
if the design is distinctive, that is, identifies the source of the
product.' t In other words, patent law protects any novel, nonobvious,
and ornamental design; trademark law only protects designs that serve
as a source-designator, i.e., designs that function as trademarks. In part
relying on this distinctiveness requirement, courts in the past have
argued that trademark and patent law do not overlap in the subject
matter they cover and thus are not mutually exclusive. ' This reliance
on a distinctiveness requirement to differentiate between design
patent and trade dress protection is suspect, however, after the
Supreme Court's decision in Two Pesos.5%
151. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769-70.
152. See infra Part IV.
153. See MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 7.30[2].
154. One of the best statements of what is meant by source-identifying is found in Sinko v.
Snow-Craggs Corp., 105 F.2d 450 (7th Cir. 1939), a case involving "brodie" or "suicide" knobs,
small spinning knobs that attached to an automobile steering wheel and enabled people to spin
the wheel with one hand. In explaining whether Sinko could protect its design, the court stated:
Sinko created a desire on the part of the public for one of two things, either for knobs
made by Sinko, above all other knob makers, or for knobs made in a particular manner
regardless of who made them. If it is the first situation, the law of unfair competition
gives Sinko the right to monopolize or to exclude other makers from copying the
product. If it is the latter situation, Sinko receives no such right to monopolize even
though he might have been the first to make the article in the particularly desirable
manner.
Id. at 453.
What the court meant is that it is not sufficient that consumers want a particular product.
The important question is why consumers want it. If they want the product because of what it is,
then it is not entitled to trademark protection. If they want the product not just because of what
it is, but also because they care about where the product comes from, and the particular design
indicates to them the product's source, then the design is entitled to trademark protection.
155. See, e.g., Kohler, 12 F.3d at 636-43; W. T. Rogers, 778 F.2d at 337.
156. In Two Pesos, the Court held that an inherently distinctive trade dress did not require
proof of secondary meaning before it was entitled to protection. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana,
Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). From the point of view of the intersection of patent and trade dress law,
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Further, a design patent precludes another from using that design
for any purpose. On the other hand, even if a design is distinctive, a
trademark in it precludes another from using that design only if it is
likely that the other's use of the same or similar design will cause
confusion among the public as to the source of the product.' 7 In other
words, trade dress protection is triggered only if the alleged infringing
product violates one of trademark law's policies, to prevent consumer
confusion.m On the other hand, a valid design patent in a product
container, for example, will prevent the use of the same or similarly
designed container with any goods, not just those that are so related to
the patent owner's goods that consumers likely would be confused.' 9
however, requiring proof of secondary meaning was an added assurance that the trade dress was
not merely ornamental in the sense of being aesthetically pleasing-all that is required of an
ornamental design, see supra note 70, but also that it functions as an identifier of source, and thus
is entitled to protection under trademark law. The Supreme Court, however, reasoned there is
"no persuasive" reason to distinguish trade dress from trade marks under the Lanham Act, so no
secondary meaning is required. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 773.
Although the court ruled that inherently distinctive trade dress does not require proof of
secondary meaning, it never defined what it meant by "inherently distinctive." This void has
spawned a cottage industry of courts attempting to provide a definition for the term. Compare
Stuart Hall Co., Inc. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 1995) with Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy
Plastic Enter., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431 (3d Cir. 1994). One district court, in fact, has focused its inquiry
on the market in which the product configuration appears, adopting the view that the proper
inquiry as to whether the configuration is inherently distinctive is "'whether the design, shape or
combination of elements is so unique, unusual or unexpected in this market that one can assume
without proof that it will automatically be perceived by customers as an indici[um] of origin."'
Krueger Int'l, Inc. v. Nightingale, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)(citing MCCARTHY,
supra note 5, § 8.02[4]). "[U]nique . . . in this market," however, is very similar to the test for
determining nonobviousness for a design patent. See CHISUM, supra note 36, § 1.04[2][f],
indicating that distinctiveness is a poor point for differentiating the reach of design patents and
trademarks.
157. See, e.g., Kohler, 12 F.3d at 637 ("[Wlhile a patent creates a type of monopoly pricing
power by giving the patentee the exclusive right to make and sell the innovation, a trademark
gives the owner only the right to preclude others from using the mark when such use is likely to
cause confusion or to deceive."). Courts apply a muti-factor analysis to determine whether the
accused infringer's mark is likely to cause confusion among consumers. Although there are some
slight variations among the tests employed by the various courts, they are all patterned on the
multi-factor analysis Judge Friendly set out in Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287
F.2d 492 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961). See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 5,
§ 23.03.
158. See, e.g., Haig & Haig, Ltd. v. Maradel Prods., Inc., 249F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). In
Haig & Haig, the owner of a trademark on the configuration of the "pinch bottle" for Scotch
whiskey was not entitled to an injunction against a defendant who was marketing after-shave
lotion and bubble bath in a "pinch bottle." The court expressly held that plaintiff would have
made out trademark infringement if the defendant had sold Scotch whiskey; the goods it actually
sold, however, were unrelated to Scotch.
159. See MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 7.30[2].
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Thus, trademark protection for designs is somewhat
circumscribed vis i vis patent protection. The latter is absolute in its
ability to prevent another's copying; the former provides limited
protection, preventing only uses likely to confuse consumers. Courts
therefore reason that the protection afforded by each is not
coextensive; they can co-exist and protect the same design.
Consequently, despite criticism by courts and commentators regarding
this dual protection scheme, it is unlikely that the law will change
anytime soon to require a design owner to choose between one or the
other for protection.'
In summary, the general consensus is that trademark and design
patent protection are not mutually exclusive because of their different
requirements for establishing liability. Courts have held that an
inquiry into the functionality of a design should eliminate any conflicts
between utility and design patents, so dual protection of a product and
its shape should not be prohibited per se. Moreover, the concern over
conflicts in this situation is not great because both kinds of patents
provide limited-duration protection. Where an owner seeks both
utility patent and trademark protection for a product and its
configuration, however, real concerns arise because of the
discrepancies in terms of protection. Although courts have expected
that applying the functionality doctrine should resolve any such
conflicts, the next section demonstrates how this doctrinal
presumption fails.
160. Another issue is what a court should do where a product is entitled to design patent
protection but the owner does not seek it, instead preferring to go the trade dress route. See, e.g.,
Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1993). The dissent in Kohler thought that so long
as a design could qualify for patent protection, regardless of whether the owner sought it, the
owner was not free to choose to register it as trade dress. Id. at 646-49. One problem with this
approach is that it would turn every trade dress case into a patent case, with experts testifying as
to whether the design indeed could have received a design patent. On the other hand, that is





The Doctrine of Functionality
A. Introduction
Functional features,161 being the exclusive province of utility
patents, are not protectable either by trade dress"6 or design patent."6'
Courts apply the doctrine of functionality to ensure that functional
products or designs that have failed to obtain utility patent protection,
or whose protection has expired, are made freely available for all to
copy.1' 4 Put another way, it ensures that trademark law cannot be used
to circumvent the patent laws. The doctrine manifests strong public
policies: even if a product configuration or other form of trade dress is
distinctive and even if there is evidence of actual consumer confusion
by another party's copying the configuration, a finding that it is
functional precludes trademark protection."6 Understanding the
doctrine's purpose explains its power to trump a mark owner's
otherwise scrupulous compliance with trademark requirements.
B. Policies and Goals of the Functionality Doctrine
The functionality doctrine has several policies or goals. 66 The
primary goal, which effectively encompasses the others, is simply that
trademark law should not provide a means to obtain perpetual utility
161. Within the sphere of intellectual property law, the term "functional" generally refers to
shapes or features that have a utilitarian or "useful" purpose. If the feature gives a product more
utility or is cheaper to make, then it will be held to be legally functional. See, e.g., In re Morton-
Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1338-39 (C.C.P.A. 1982). See infra Part IV.C for a discussion
of the different versions of the functionality test courts have adopted.
162. See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763,769 (1992)(requiring that
trade dress be distinctive and non-functional, and that there be evidence of likelihood of
confusion before case for trade dress infringement under the Lanham Act can be established).
163. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
164. In addition to the courts refusing protection to functional features, the Patent and
Trademark Office will reject an application for trade dress registration if the dress is functional.
See, e.g., In re Bose Corp., 772 F.2d 866, 871-72 (Fed. Cir. 1985);In re Teledyne Indus., Inc., 696
F.2d 968, 971 (Fed. Cir. 1982); In re Cabot Corp., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1224 (T.T.A.B. 1990); In
re Peters, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1390 (T.T.A.B. 1988); In re Avocet, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 517
(T.T.A.B. 1984).
165. See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 7.26[1]; Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co.,
115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995)(explaining how the doctrine of functionality acts to avoid hindrances to
competition); Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769.
166. See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 7.26[1].
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patent protection for features that are not patentable.1" The Supreme
Court recently restated this policy:
The functionality doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks to
promote competition by protecting a firm's reputation, from instead
inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a producer to control a
useful product feature. It is the province of patent law, not
trademark law, to encourage invention by granting inventors a
monopoly over new product designs or functions for a limited time,
35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 173, after which competitors are free to use the
innovation. If a product's functional features could be used as
trademarks, however, a monopoly over such features could be
obtained without regard to whether they qualify as patents and
could be extended forever (because trademarks may be renewed in
perpetuity).168
Thus, the doctrine is based on the premise that trademark law should
not provide a shortcut to perpetual patent protection by granting a
monopoly in a functional product feature."6
The Court's statement also recognizes what is generally regarded
as the second important policy underlying the doctrine, fostering
competition. Although the Supreme Court apparently realizes a policy
of encouraging competition underscores the principal policy against
167. See generally id. at § 7.26. See also Dratler, supranote 1, at 899 nn.62-66; In re Morton-
Norwich Prods., Inc, 671 F.2d 1332, 1335-37 (C.C.P.A. 1982); Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of
Am., Inc., 9 F.3d 1091, 1099 (4th Cir. 1933)(Niemeyer, J., dissenting)("The doctrine of
functionality is an extra-statutory doctrine, neither defined nor limited by the express provisions
of the Lanham Trademark Act, which denies a perpetual monopoly of that which is
functional . . . . [It] is a public policy trump card that may be played against an otherwise valid
trademark, not an element to be considered in determining a mark's validity.").
168. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1304 (emphasis added).
169. See Dratler, supra note 1, at 939, stating:
At its core, the functionality doctrine is based upon a simple premise: trademark law
should not provide a shortcut to achieve perpetual utility patent protection. Thus the
fundamental meaning of the word "function" in the doctrine's name is not merely any
purpose, but a useful or utilitarian purpose in the utility patent sense. If a feature of an
article is dictated by such a useful purpose, it is functional and must be protected, if at
all, by a utility patent. In contrast, features of an article that merely serve to identify the
source or sponsorship of the article are not functional and can serve as trademarks.
Thus, the distinction between the identification function of trademarks and other useful
purposes lies at the core of the doctrine of functionality.
The Second Circuit has also weighed in on this issue by noting that
[c]ourts must proceed with caution in assessing claims to unregistered trademark
protection in the design of products so as not to undermine the objectives of the patent
laws. . . . To avoid undermining the purpose of the patent laws to place useful
innovations in the public domain after expiration of a limited monopoly, courts must be
sensitive to whether a grant of trade dress protection would close all avenues to a
market that is otherwise open in the absence of a valid patent.
Stormy Clime, Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 978 (2d Cir. 1987).
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allowing undeserved utility patent protection, many other courts and
commentators appear to view it as a separate policy.17 For example,
the Restatement (Third), of Unfair Competition states that "in
determining whether a particular design is 'functional' and therefore
ineligible for protection as a trademark, the ultimate inquiry is
whether a prohibition against copying will significantly hinder
competition by others."''" Thus, the doctrine "is an attempt to identify
situations in which the public and private interest in avoiding
confusion is outweighed by the anticompetitive consequences of
trademark protection.""17 These two "policies" of functionality,
however, are in essence the same thing. The doctrine of functionality
fosters competition by not allowing functional product features-
features that are properly the province of a utility patent-to be
monopolized.173
Within the sphere of intellectual property law then, the term
"functional" generally refers to shapes or features that have a
utilitarian or "useful" purpose. Within that sphere, however, it has
several meanings or uses to which courts put it. First, whether a
particular design is functional, that is, whether the design is "dictated"
by its function, will determine whether it can be the subject of a design
patent.174 Second, trademark protection is withheld from product
features175 that give a product feature or configuration a functional
170. See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 7.26[1]. Compare Dratler, supra note 1, at 940 ("To
some extent, the goal of protecting competition does describe the doctrine of functionality in its
initial incarnation [preventing trademark law from bestowing perpetual patent protection]").
171. RESTATEMENT, supra note 115, § 17, cmt. a.
172. Id.
173. In his exhaustive consideration of industrial design protection, Professor Dratler
recognized that the two policies were to some extent co-extensive. Dratler, supra note 1, at 940.
He then proceeded to argue that the courts' focusing on the pro-competition policy of the
doctrine, without factoring in its utility patent roots, had removed the analytical principle of
demarcation that enabled a fair and reasonable assessment of the functionality issue. That, he
reasoned, had led to the overreaching of the aesthetic functionality doctrine, which had largely
eviscerated any protection for industrial designs. Id. at 941. See infra note 177.
174. A finding that a design is functional prevents the owner from avoiding the strict
requirements of a utility patent by obtaining a design patent and attempting to preclude others
from using that design. See, e.g., Powers Controls Corp. v. Hybrinetics, 806 F.2d 234, 236-37 (Fed.
Cir. 1986)(holding design of plastic "clam shell" packaging for a light dimmer switch functional
and not qualifying for design patent).
175. Here, it is important to identify what exactly is being protected. Generally, any
industrial product will have utility, i.e., have a useful purpose. That does not mean, however, that
every aspect or feature of that product is useful or necessary to the functioning of the product.
Thus, even if the product as a whole has utility-and thus can be protected only by a utility
patent-a feature or part of the product, or the product's particular shape, its product
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advantage. 176 This is the classic statement of functionality in trademark
law, a test designed to implement the primary policy of the doctrine.
Finally, where a product feature-even if nonfunctional in the
utilitarian sense-is such that it is needed by others to compete
effectively in the same market, then courts will not allow trademark
protection for that configuration. This is really an extension of the
second use of functionality: the doctrine of aesthetic functionality.V
configuration, still may be protected under trademark law because that particular feature does
not have utility (or put another way, is ornamental). See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co.,
832 F.2d 513,520 (10th Cir. 1987)(stating issue as not "whether the front cover [of the fishing reel
at issue] itself is functional, but whether the shape or configuration of the front cover is
functional.")(emphasis added). See also In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332,1338
(C.C.P.A. 1982)("a discussion of 'functionality' is always in reference to the design of the
thing under consideration (in the sense of its appearance) and not the thing itself. One court, for
example, paraphrasing Gertrude Stein, commented that 'a dish is a dish is a dish.' . . . No
doubt, by definition, a dish always functions as a dish and has its utility, but it is the appearance
of the dish which is important in a case such as this, as will become clear.")(citations omitted).
See also MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 7.26131[b].
See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 115, § 17, cmt. b which explains,
A packaging or product feature is not functional merely because the feature serves a
utilitarian purpose. The recognition of trademark rights is precluded only when the
particular design affords benefits that are not practically available through alternative
designs. A bottle, for example, is a utilitarian element of the packaging for wine, but
the design of a particular wine bottle is not functional under the rule of this Section
unless the shape or other aspects of the bottle provide significant benefits that are hot
practically obtainable through the use of alternative bottle designs.
Conversely,
The fact that the overall design or combination contains individual features that are
themselves functional does not preclude protection for the composite. The issue is
whether trademark protection should be recognized in the particular combination or
arrangement of features, and the functionality of the combination or arrangement as a
whole is determinative. . . . If the overall design of a product or package is otherwise
functional, however, the addition of minor nonfunctional elements will not render the
overall design protectable; trademark rights will be limited to only the nonfunctional
elements.
Id.
176. See, e.g., In re Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1342. After discussing the history and
application of the doctrine, the court concluded that while the spray top housing for a spray
bottle bottle was utilitarian, i.e., "perform[ed] its intended functions in an admirable way," the
design of the spray bottle was not functional in the trademark sense, that is, there were available
to competitors many alternative designs which performed the same useful purpose. Because the
particular design was not needed for effective competition, it did not provide the applicant with a
competitive advantage, and so the spray top housing was entitled to trademark protection.
177. This third analytical framework of functionality is not really a different framework.
Rather, it is what Dratler refers to as functionality without the doctrinal anchor; the functionality
test with an emphasis on encouraging competition rather than preventing intellectual property
owners from bypassing the utility patent system. See Dratler, supra note 1, at 941. When the
emphasis on competition is taken to extremes, it manifests itself as the doctrine of aesthetic
functionality. This doctrine has been called "oxymoronic and vacant." Id. See also MCCARTHY,
1997]
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Put another way, there are three ways the concept "functional" is
applied in intellectual property law: (1) to differentiate the proper
subject matter of design and utility patents; (2) to differentiate the
proper subject matter of trademarks and utility patents; and (3) to
ensure the playing field in a given market is level, by ensuring that no
single player is given a perpetual monopoly on even a non-utilitarian
design if that design is necessary for effective competition. This article
is concerned with how the second standard is applied in cases in which
a product feature is disclosed in a utility patent.
C. Judicial Definitions of Functionality: Competitive Effect
Given the functionality doctrine's purpose to prevent the grant of
''perpetual utility patents," how do we determine whether a particular
design is functional? Courts have devised numerous definitions of
functionality. The Supreme Court's definition in Inwood Laboratories,
Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc. is probably the most cited definition: "In
general terms, a product feature is functional if it is essential to the use
or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the
article." 178 Other courts have followed Inwood's lead and framed the
issue in similar terms." Still other courts have also focused on the part
supra note 5, § 7.26[5]. Under the most extreme definition of aesthetic functionality, a design
feature that has no utility in the patent sense but is instead ornamental, nevertheless can be
"functional" in the trademark sense if it is an "important ingredient" in the commercial success
of the product, a definition that eviscerates trade dress protection for non-utilitarian features.
Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952). Courts, however, have largely
rejected this standard. Most courts that recognize the doctrine of aesthetic functionality now
define it in terms of the aesthetic feature's effect on competition. See, e.g., Wallace Int'l
Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 1990) ("'distinctive and
arbitrary arrangements of predominantly ornamental features' entitled to trademark protection
[are limited] to only those features 'that do not hinder competitors from entering the same
market')(quoting Stormy Clime, Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971,977 (2d Cir. 1987)).
17& 456 U.S. 844,851 n.10 (1982).
179. For example, the Second Circuit (citing Inwood and quoting from prior decisions,
elaborated upon the Inwood definition and defined functionality in the following terms:
A design feature of a particular article is "essential" [to the use or purpose of the
article] only if the feature is dictated by the functions to be performed; a feature that
merely accommodates a useful function is not enough. And a design feature "affecting
the cost or quality of an article" is one which permits the article to be manufactured at
a lower cost, or one which constitutes an improvement in the operation of the goods.
Stormy Clime, 809 F.2d at 975 (internal citations omitted). As an example of a feature that
merely accommodates a function, the court discussed the shape of the plastic spray bottle in In re
Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332,1342 (C.C.P.A. 1982). The Court used the pillow
shape of the shredded wheat biscuit as example of being functional because of its effect on cost in
Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938). There, the Court noted cost of
manufacture would have been increased and quality lessened by another form of biscuit. Id. See
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of the definition that considers the effect of the feature on the cost or
quality of the article, thus making it necessary for competitors to
have.180 Finally, the Restatement defines a functional design as one
that
affords benefits in the manufacturing, marketing, or use of the goods
or services with which the design is used, apart from any benefits
attributable to the design's significance as an indication of source,
that are important to effective competition by others and that are
not practically available through the use of alternative designs.1
m
Although each court that has defined functionality appears to
have framed it slightly differently,182 all of the definitions have one
thing in common: they state a concern, either directly or by
implication, that competition not be impaired. For example, although
the Supreme Court's definition in Inwood does not mention
competition or competitors by name, the Court recently restated that
definition and concluded that it means that a feature is functional "if
exclusive use of the feature would put competitors at a significant
non-reputation-related disadvantage."'' 83
That all of these definitions ultimately focus on whether
competition is hindered is not surprising in light of the primary policy
underlying the doctrine: to ensure that perpetual patent-like
also Artemide SpA v. Grandlite Design & Mfg. Co., 672 F. Supp. 698, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("A
feature 'affect(s) the cost or quality of an article when it permits the article to be manufactured at
a lower cost or constitutes an improvement in the operation of the goods.").
180. For example, the Seventh Circuit has defined a functional feature as "one which
competitors would have to spend money not to copy but to design around." W.T. Rogers Co.,
Inc. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334,339 (7th Cir. 1985). The court explained, using familiar examples:
[I]f an automobile manufacturer places at the front end of its hood a statue of Mercury,
it can if it wants make this its trademark (or one of its trademarks), because its
competitors do not need a statue of Mercury on the hoods of their cars in order to be
able to compete. To put this differently, a functional feature is one which competitors
would have to spend money not to copy but to design around, as they would have to
do if they wanted to come up with a nonoval substitute for a football. It is something
costly to do without (like the hood itself), rather than costly to have (like the statue of
Mercury).
Id. (emphasis added). See also Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1189
(7th Cir. 1989)("A feature is functional if it is one that is costly to design around or do without,
rather than one that is costly to have.").
181. RESTATEMENT, supra note 115, § 17. Under this scheme, "the ultimate inquiry is whether
a prohibition against copying will significantly hinder competition by others." Id., cmt. a. Further,
to determine whether competition is hindered, a court should ask whether the "benefits [of a
particular design] cannot practically be duplicated through the use of other designs." Id. cmt. b.
182. For a survey of the different definitions adopted by the federal circuit courts, see 1
MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 7.26[3][a].
183. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1304 (1995).
HASTINGS COMM/ENT LJ.
protection is not given either for an invention whose patent has
expired or for one which could not hurdle the initial patentability
threshold."8 What underlies the functionality doctrine itself is nothing
less than a belief that any monopoly, which by definition hinders
competition, must be limited in both scope and time. That is precisely
what the patent grant attempts.""
Thus, by framing the test for functionality as an inquiry into
whether allowing a person to appropriate a particular design would
"hinder" competition, the doctrine is intended to prevent a design
owner from bypassing patent law to obtain perpetual patent-like
protection.""
184. As noted, the functionality doctrine is intended to preclude from trademark protection
not only functional features that were part of an expired patent, but also functional features for
which no patent was-or even could have been-obtained. Some courts have concluded,
however, that utilitarian designs can be protected as trade dress. See, e.g., In re Morton-Norwich
Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982). That is because although the design may have a
function and "perform it admirably well," it is only one of many equally viable alternatives and
competition is not hindered by its exclusive use. A problem arises, however, when a court applies
the same test to a product feature that has a utilitarian function, albeit not in the trademark
sense, but which was disclosed in a patent. Then, patent policies of disclosure and use mandate
that the product feature be treated differently. This is developed more fully below. See infra
notes 311-321 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently
reaffirmed this when it stated:
The functionality doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks to promote
competition by protecting a firm's reputation, from instead inhibiting legitimate
competition by allowing a producer to control a useful product feature. It is the
province of patent law, not trademark law, to encourage invention by granting
inventors a monopoly over new product designs or functions for a limited
time, . . . after which competitors are free to use the innovation.
Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1304.
186. See, e.g., Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1304 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD), UNFAIR COMPETITON
§ 17, cmt. b); Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1006 (2d Cir. 1995); Brunswick Corp.
v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 519 (10th Cir. 1987)("[T]he question of whether the feature is
functional should turn on whether 'the protection of the configuration would "hinder
competition or impinge upon the rights of others to compete effectively in the sale of
goods."'")(internal citations omitted); In re Morton-Norwicl, 671 F.2d at 1342; RESTATEMENT,
supra note 115, § 17, cmt. a ("the ultimate inquiry is whether a prohibition against copying will
significantly hinder competition by others.").
At least one commentator, however, has criticized this focus on competitive effect as largely
unworkable, especially when a jury is asked to decide whether a particular design will hinder
competition. MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 7.26[3][a]. Professor McCarthy honed in on Judge
Posner's characterization, in W. T. Rogers Co., Inc. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334(7th Cir. 1985), of how
a jury should be instructed regarding functionality. After first noting that "our legal system often
gives the very difficult cases to juries to decide," id. at 340, Judge Posner noted that
the jury has to determine whether the feature for which trademark protection is sought
is something that other producers of the product in question would have to have as part
of the product in order to be able to compete effectively in the market-in other words,
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D. Evidence Relevant to Functionality
There are several factors which a court or jury can consider in
evaluating the evidence to determine whether a particular product
feature1 7 is functional. These factors, set out in In re Morton-Norwich
Products, Inc., are:
(1) The existence of a utility patent that discloses the utilitarian
advantage of the design;
(2) The design originator "touts" its utilitarian advantages in
advertising or other promotional materials;
(3) Other alternatives to the design are available; and
(4) The design "results from a comparatively simple or cheap
manufacturing method. ''1..
All four factors need not be satisfied for the design of a product
feature or configuration to be functional.1" Of the four, most courts
in order to give consumers the benefits of a competitive market-or whether it is the
kind of merely incidental feature which gives the brand some individual distinction but
which producers of competing brands can readily do without.
Id. at 346.
The problem in such a competitive-need inquiry is that the jury is left without guidance as to
what kind design competitors would "have to have" in order to be able to "compete effectively."
MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 7.26[3][a]; Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1341, 1367 (1967). But see M.A. Cunningham, Utilitarian Design Features and
Antitrust Parallels: an Economic Approach to Understanding the Functionality Defense in
Trademark Litigation, 18 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 569 (1996)(suggesting judge or jury can
determine effect on competition of a utilitarian design by considering evidence that typically is
presented in antitrust trials). As a substitute, Professor McCarthy suggests the following test: "a
design feature is functional if the article works better because it is in this particular shape."
MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 7.26[3][a]. See, e.g., In re R.M. Smith, Inc., 734 F.2d 1482 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
187. Again, it is necessary to stress that the inquiry is not directed to the usefulness or
function of the article as a whole. See supra note 175. If that were true, then the doctrine of
functionality necessarily would swallow the entire area of trade dress protection. With precious
few exceptions, any article of manufacture for which trade dress protection might be sought
would have some utility. Rather, the proper inquiry is whether "this particular shape and form of
product which is claimed as trade dress is functional," or whether "the article is in this particular
shape for utilitarian reasons." MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 7.26[3][b]; see also Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,203-04 (2d Cir. 1979)(stating:
Plaintiff does not claim a trademark in all clothing designed and fitted to allow
free movement while performing cheerleading routines, but claims a trademark in
the particular combination of colors and collocation of decorations that distinguish
plaintiff's uniform from those of other squads. . . . [Tihe fact that an item serves
or performs a function does not mean that it may not at the same time be capable
of indicating sponsorship or origin, particularly where the decorative aspects of the
item are nonfunctional.).
188. In re Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1340-41.
189. Id. at 1341-42.
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consider the third, whether other design alternatives that perform the
useful function equally well exist, to be the most important.' ° In fact,
to resolve the competition issue the Restatement directs courts to ask
whether the "benefits [of a particular design] cannot practically be
duplicated through the use of other designs."1' If there are many
equally suitable alternative designs either potentially available or
actually in use, then it is unlikely that the product feature's appearance
is dictated by the product's purpose. 192 Thus, competitors are able to
compete without having to use the disputed feature.' In summary, if
190. This is because it is most closely related to a competitor's ability to compete effectively.
See, e.g., Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., Inc., 963 F.2d 628, 634 (3d Cir.
1992)("[P]roduct configurations [are] functional when only a limited number of viable
alternatives exist."); Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Insus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 823-24 (3d Cir. 1981). See
also W. T. Rogers, 778 F.2d at 340 (quoting In re Bose Corp., 772 F.2d 866, 872 (Fed. Cir.
1985)("'If the feature asserted to give a product distinctiveness is the best, or at least one, of a
few superior designs for its de facto purpose, it follows that competition is hindered,' and
trademark protection will be denied.")).
191. RESTATEMENT, supra note 115, § 17, cmt. b (explaining:
[T]he benefits afforded by a particular design do not themselves determine whether
that design is functional; a design is functional only if those benefits cannot practically
be duplicated through the use of other designs. The availability of alternative designs
that satisfy the utilitarian requirements or that otherwise afford similar advantages is
therefore decisive in determining functionality. If a particular design affords benefits
that are superior to those of any practical alternative design, it is functional if the
benefits are important to effective competition.).
192. See, e.g., In re Lincoln Diagnostics, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1817, 1824 (T.T.A.B.
1994) (explaining hypothetical alternative designs have probative value where "there is
supporting evidence as to the comparable efficacy and manufacturing cost of the alternatives.").
See also MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 7.26[3][e]. Cf. In re Honeywell, Inc., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1600 (T.T.A.B. 1988)(holding fact that competitors had not needed to use particular design of a
thermostat cover was evidence the design was not functional). See also In re Morton-Norwich,
671 F.2d at 1341-42. There is no bright line for determining what is a sufficient number of
alternatives to avoid a finding of functionality. It is generally agreed, however, that more than a
"few" alternative designs are necessary. See, e.g., cases cited at MCCARTHY, supra note 5,
§7.26[3][e], nn.80, 80.1. For example, seven hypothetical alternative designs have been
considered a "very limited number," and allows a finding of functionality. See In re Lincoln
Diagnostics, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1824.
193. Courts recognize the relevance of this particular factor to ensuring robust competition.
See, e.g., In re Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1341 ("Since the effect upon competition 'is really
the crux of the matter,' it is, of course, significant that there are other alternatives available.").
See also Dratler, supra note 1, at 944 ("If alternative designs can perform the same utilitarian
function equally well, then exclusive use of only one of them will neither harm competition nor
thwart the purposes of the utility patent system."); RESTATEMENT, supra note 115, § 17, cmt. b.
Thus, a "hinder competition" jury instruction, that is, one that directs the jury to determine
"whether the feature for which trademark protection is sought is something [competitors] would
have to have as part of the product in order to be able to compete effectively in the market,"
W. T Rogers, 778 F.2d at 346, may be unworkable by itself because it gives the jury no guidance
to determine whether competitors actually need the feature to compete effectively. If, however,
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only a few designs for a feature or configuration are available, then
there is room for at most a few competitors. Competition will suffer
and ultimately it will be consumers who will lose. Where many designs
are available, however, competition will be robust.' 9
E. Why Functionality Is an Incomplete Answer to Preserving the Province
of Utility of Patents
If the functionality doctrine is applied, it should effectively avoid
potential conflicts between patent and trademark law, that is, it should
ensure that a person cannot bypass the stringent utility patent
requirements to obtain perpetual patent-like protection for product
features-or so most commentators and courts have concluded.1" By
foreclosing the trademark avenue to unqualified traffic-useful
features without alternative substitutes, the doctrine should also
promote robust competition to the benefit of consumers. Perhaps
more important, by forcing owners to protect patentable features
under patent laws, it ensures that the features are, pursuant to the
Patent Clause, ultimately made available for all to use.
Removing functional product features from trademark
consideration, however, does not necessarily implement the doctrine's
goal of preventing "end runs" around patent law. Patentees have
successfully identified certain useful features that were disclosed in
utility patents as protectable trade dress because those same features,
although "useful" in the patent sense, are not "functional" within the
meaning of trademark law. As several courts have suggested, this
results in functionality being an imperfect defense to a claim of
trademark infringement, or an "incomplete answer" to achieving its
the court also directs the jury to determine how many alternatives to the design at issue there are,
it accomplishes the same thing by focusing the jury on an easily determinable fact.
194. That the availability of alternative designs is central to a determination of functionality
is evident by the Supreme Court's recent statements in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505
U.S. 763 (1992). There, although the Court did not address the issue of functionality, it impliedly
approved the lower courts' finding that the plaintiff's restaurant interior was not functional when
it stated "a design is legally functional, and thus unprotectable, if it is one of a limited number of
equally efficient options available to competitors and free competition would be unduly hindered
by according the design trademark protection." Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 775 (approving Fifth
Circuit's characterization of test for functionality). The Court further noted that applying this test
would ensure competition was not hindered. Id.
195. See, e.g., Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1304; Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
489 U.S. 141,166-67 (1989); W.T. Rogers, 778 F.2d at 337; Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Dura
Elec. Lamp Co., 247 F.2d 730, 732 (3d Cir. 1957); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 7.26[1]; Dratler,
supra note 1, at 928, 938.
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intended goal of preventing trademark law from being used as a
shortcut to perpetual utility patent protection. 196
When one speaks of an invention having a function or "utility,"
what is generally meant is that the invention has a "useful purpose."'"
Functional in trademark terms, however, means something more than
a product feature having "utility" or a "useful purpose." Put another
way, just because a product feature has a "useful purpose" does not
preclude it from being proper subject matter for trademark law. In its
seminal 1982 decision, In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals, in rejecting an earlier decision's
holding on the interplay between product utility and trademark law,
explained:
This broad statement of the "law", that the design of an article
"having utility" cannot be a trademark, is incorrect and inconsistent
with later pronouncements. * * * Most designs . . .result in the
production of articles, containers, or features thereof which are
indeed utilitarian, and examination into the possibility of trademark
protection is not to the mere existence of utility, but to the degree of
design utility.'
Thus, a feature's utility by itself does not end the inquiry. The
court explained that since the functionality of a design depends on the
design's utility, not the product's utility, a product feature would not
be considered functional and ineligible for a trademark unless that
particular feature's design was "superior." Moreover, such superiority
is determined in terms of competitive need, that is, the need of others
196. Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 65 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 1995),on remand, 935 F.
Supp. 1399 (N.D. III. 1996); Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498
(10th Cir. 1995); Zip Dee, Inc. v. Dometic Corp., 931 F. Supp. 602 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
197. See supra Part I.A.1.
198. In re Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1338 (discussing In re Dennison Mfg. Co., 39 F.2d
720, 721 (C.C.P.A. 1930))(emphasis added). The Federal Circuit, as did the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals, continues to distinguish between de facto and de jure functionality. See, e.g.,
In re Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1337-38. As explained in a subsequent decision,
[D]e facto functionality means that the design of a product has a function, i.e., a bottle
of any design holds fluid. De jure functionality, on the other hand, means that the
product is in its particular shape because it works better in this shape. This distinction is
useful because the configuration of a product is not necessarily lacking in trademark
significance because of "the mere existence of utility"; rather, it should depend on "the
degree of design utility."
In re R.M. Smith, Inc., 734 F.2d 1482, 1484 (Fed. Cir. 1984)(citing In re Morton-Norwich,
671 F.2d at 1338). Although the Federal Circuit's dichotomy has been criticized, see MCCARTHY
supra note 5, § 7.26[3][a], when a product is de jure functional, it means simply that there is a
competitive need for it and it is functional in the classic trademark sense. I have not used the
court's terminology, choosing instead to speak in terms of patent utility and functionality in the
trademark sense.
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to use that particular feature in order to compete effectively."l Thus,
in affirming the direction in which the law had been going, the court
set forth the competitive need standard discussed above: a product
feature is functional and precluded from trade dress protection not
because it is "useful," but because it is the best design, or one of a few
superior designs, and thus is needed by competitors.n
There is a potential gap then, between what is functional and
solely the province of patent law, and what is merely "useful" and thus
protectable under trademark law. Unlike the functionality doctrine,
patent law requires only that an invention have a utilitarian function
or a "useful purpose,"' not that it be the best or even one of the best
at what it claims to do.' The utilitarian nature of a feature in an
invention alone thus will not preclude trade dress protection. 3 The
result is that product features that have utility, precisely the kind of
subject matter that purportedly is the exclusive province of limited-
199. In re Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1339-40.
200. In essence, the court established an approach to cases at the intersection of trademark
and utility patent law that required courts to closely study items disclosed in patents to determine
whether they were "functional" in the trademark sense, or merely ornamental and thus
potentially entitled to trademark protection. Id. at 1343.
201. See supra Part I.A.1.
202. In Zip Dee, Inc. v. Dometic Corp., 931 F. Supp. 602, 608 (N.D. I1. 1996), discussed in the
next section, District Judge Shadur explained:
Assume that Inventor creates a mousetrap that meets the usefulness test (as well as the
other requirements) for a utility patent. For 17 years Inventor gets a monopoly on the
production and sale of the mousetrap, which-athough there are dozens of other
competing mousetraps on the market, and although it may even cost more to produce
(and so it may cost consumers more to buy)-finds a place in the market. When the
patent expires Competitor begins to copy Inventor's mousetrap. Inventor (no longer
able to block such copying through a patent infringement action) then sues Competitor
for trademark infringement, claiming that Inventor is entitled to a product
configuration trademark. In that scenario the functionality defense will not protect
Competitor: It does not need that particular product configuration to compete
effectively in the mousetrap market, because there are many other-indeed perhaps
better-ways to build a mousetrap. But to allow Inventor to have a product
configuration trademark would effectively extend his utility patent into eternity, far
beyond the 17 years set out in the statutory patent bargain. In such a situation
functionality alone is not enough to protect the 'bargain' of the patent laws from
invasion by a product configuration trademark.
(footnote omitted).
203. See, e.g., In re Morton-Norwich Prods. Inc., 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982); Clamp Mfg.
Co., Inc. v. Enco Mfg. Co., Inc., 870 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Diester Concentrator Co., 289
F.2d 496, 502 (C.C.P.A. 1961)("A feature dictated solely by 'functional' (utilitarian)
considerations may not be protected as a trademark; but mere possession of a function (utility) is
not sufficient reason to deny protection."); Zip Dee, 931 F. Supp. at 602.
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duration patent law, are accorded perpetual trademark protection-
despite the doctrine developed to avoid that very result.'
There are not many cases that have squarely addressed the issue
raised by the functionality doctrine's apparent failure in situations
where a useful, albeit "nonfunctional" product feature, is disclosed in
a utility patent. The situation, however, does arise, and when it does, it
implicates the policies underlying both the patent and trademark laws.
The cases that have addressed the issue are discussed, and their
respective approaches criticized, in the next section of this article. In
the final section, the author suggests how this quandary might be
resolved.
V
Court Decisions and Criticisms
Several recent federal court cases2 have inquired whether the
disclosure of a product feature or configuration in a utility patent
204. The functionality doctrine is intended not only to prevent the extension of patent
protection beyond the limited term granted, see, e.g., Elmer v. ICC Fabricating, Inc., 67 F.3d
1571, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995)(finding asserted trade dress unprotectable because it was broadly
defined that enforcing it "would effectively extend the life of the patent"), but also to prevent an
inventor from altogether bypassing patent law-with its limited-duration protection-to achieve
patent-like protection under trademark law. See supra text accompanying notes 166-169.
Functionality thus is intended to preclude from protection not only (1) product features that have
qualified or once qualified for patent protection, but also (2) product features that could have
qualified for protection, and (3) product features that have some utility or usefulness, but could
not have overcome the stringent patent requirements and thus could not have qualified for patent
protection. Each of these situations raise slightly different concerns, requiring that the
functionality analysis be tailored to the needs of each.
A problem arises, however, because the functionality analysis is applied uniformly
regardless of whether the case involves a utility patent or not. Compare, for example In re Bose
Corp., 772 F.2d 866 (Fed. Cir. 1985), or In re Teledyne Industries, Inc., 696 F.2d 968 (Fed. Cir.
1982), both of which involved product configurations disclosed in a patent, with Kohler Co. v.
Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 640 (7th Cir. 1993), or W. T. Rogers Co., Inc. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 339
(7th Cir. 1985), neither of which involved patents. Despite the presence of utility patents in the
first two cases, the courts applied the same "competitive-need" analysis as the latter two courts to
determine whether the claimed features were functional.
205. Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 65 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 1995),on remand, 935 F.
Supp. 1399 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498
(10th Cir, 1995); Zip Dee, Inc. v. Dometic Corp., 931 F. Supp. 602 (N.D. Ill. 1996). Earlier cases
involved trade dress protection for features that either were disclosed in a utility patent, see, e.g.,
Clamp Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Enco Mfg. Co., Inc., 870 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1989), or in which the asserted
trade dress was an inevitable consequence of the patented process. Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar
Corp. of Am., Inc., 9 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1993). Neither case, however, addressed the relative
merits of the policies underlying the patent and trademark laws. In Clamp, the court held that
although it was a "close" question, there was not sufficient evidence for it to determine that the
district court had erred in finding the dress non-functional. 870 F.2d at 516-17. In Shakespeare,
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precludes the grant of trade dress protection to that feature or
configuration, even where the feature is not functional in the
trademark sense. The issue arises at the intersection of patent and
trademark law, implicating the policies and goals of both federal
intellectual property laws. Before these decisions, most courts and
commentators had assumed the functionality doctrine would obviate
any conflict between the two regimes. As already discussed,
however, the functionality analysis as applied distinguishes between
design features that have utility, i.e., perform a "useful purpose,"
which, depending on the circumstances, may or may not be trademark
fodder, and product features that are "functional" in the doctrinal
sense (necessary for effective competition and for which no trademark
protection is available), a7 It is because there are product features that
are "useful" but not "necessary for competition" that the functionality
analysis can fail its purpose in cases involving utility patents. The issue
then becomes whether trademark law must give way to patent law
where a distinctive, doctrinally "nonfunctional" product feature was
disclosed in a utility patent.a2
This section describes several cases that have addressed this issue
and explains why the issues they raise go to the very heart of the
United States intellectual property legal system, and why their
different approaches do not adequately reconcile the conflict between
patent and trademark law.
the court disposed of the issue by giving deference to the trade dress' incontestable status,
holding that since functionality was not one of the enumerated defenses under 15 U.S.C. § 1064,
it could not be invoked to invalidate the trade dress. 9 F.3d at 1097-99. See supra note 132.
206. See W.T. Rogers Co., Inc. v. Keene, 778 F.2d334, 337 (7th Cir. 1985); MCCARTHY, supra
note 5, § 7.26 [1]; Dratler, supra note 1, at 928, 938.
207. See, e.g., In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982)(explaining
housing for spray mechanism for household cleaners performs useful purpose, but is not
"functional" in trademark sense because there are sufficient number of alternative designs for
housings that work just as well and enable others to compete effectively).
208. Although most courts ask whether trade dress protection is available for features that
were disclosed in expired patents, the analysis and concerns apply equally to extant patents. One
court has suggested the analysis is different for expired and presently-valid patents. See Thomas
& Betts, 935 F. Supp. at 1409, discussed infra Part V.A.3. The court reasoned that if the existing
patent is also alleged to be infringed and thus at issue, much of the patent analysis its bright-line
standard avoids would have to be performed anyway. Id. Where, however, the patent is not
directly at issue, the same concerns regarding the public availability of disclosed patent matter
apply as for an expired patent. It would make little sense to allow a patent owner to press a trade
dress claim during the life of a patent if that same claim is lost upon the patent's expiration. See
infra text accompanying notes 298-300. See also Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. v.




A. The Court Decisions
1. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. v. Duracraft Corp.
In Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. v. Duracraft Corp.," the
court squarely addressed whether patent policy dictated that a product
configuration-in that case a spiral grill for a fan that was disclosed in
a utility patent for the fan-could be protected as trade dress under
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act where the grill was not functional in
the trademark sense. The court answered in the affirmative.
Plaintiff Vornado had been the first company to sell a fan with a
spiral grill.21 It timely filed an application for a utility patent on the
fan. Although the spiral grill by itself could not be patented, the
application included a claim that included the spiral grill as an element
and described the configuration of fan and grill as providing "an
optimum air flow." '' Although Vornado's tests demonstrated that its
spiral grill did not work any better than the more common straight
radial grill, a patent issued in 1990.212 A few months after the patent
issued, Duracraft began selling a fan with a spiral grill that was much
cheaper than Vornado's more expensive model. Foreclosed from
asserting patent infringement,213 Vornado sued Duracraft under
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act for trade dress infringement.
The district court concluded that although the spiral grill was
functional in the lay sense,214 it was legally non-functional because
competitors did not need to use a spiral grill in order to compete with
209. 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1995).
210. Id. at 1500.
211. Id. at 1500, 1510. An element is a component of a patent claim. The claim demarcates
the boundaries of the invention. In other words, the inventor essentially states, "my invention is
comprised of all the elements I have listed here." In order for an accused product to infringe the
patent, then, the accused product must contain all the elements included in the claim. Further,
the patent is not invalid for lack of novelty unless the claim includes all the elements identified in
a previously-disclosed piece of prior art. See, e.g., CHIsUM, supra note 36, § 3.02.
212. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1500. The inventive aspect of the spiral grill "was that the point of
maximum lateral spacing between the curved vanes was moved inboard from the grill's outer
radius, so that it was at the impeller blade's point of maximum power." The court noted that the
spiral grill could not have been patented by itself becauseas a spiral grill, it already belonged in
the prior art, i.e., that which was already known from previous patents or other sources. Id.
Vornado subsequently applied for, and was granted a reissue patent that expanded its claims. Id.
213. Duracraft had designed its fan so that it did not infringe Vornado's patent, and Vornado
conceded that it did not. Id. at 1500-01.
214. Id. at 1501. It was functional in the lay sense presumably because it performed a useful
function in facilitating air flow.
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Vornado.2U The district court further found that Vornado's grill
design was inherently distinctive and that consumers were likely to be
confused by Duracraft's use of a similar design.2 16 Finding that the grill
satisfied all the elements of trade dress infringement, the court granted
Vornado an injunction.
The Tenth Circuit addressed only one issue on appeal, concluding
it was dispositive of the case: that the district court had erred in
rejecting the argument that federal patent law barred Vornado's trade
dress claim. Refusing to address the broader issue of "whether every
useful or potentially patentable product configuration is excluded
from trade dress protection," it decided whether product
configurations that are at least "significant inventive components" of a
patented invention can be the subject of trade dress protection.217
The court first looked to the wording of section 43(a), and
concluded that it was no help in resolving the issue.218 The court
concluded that although the line of Supreme Court cases from Singer
through Bonito Boats was not dispositive, it was "impossible to ignore
the clear and continuing trend they collectively manifest in favor of
the public's right to copy. '"219 This recognition of the public's right to
copy was central to the court's ultimate conclusion that Vornado's
trade dress claim must fail.'
215. Id. at 1501 & n.3 (citing Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 519 (10th Cir.
1987), which stressed Tenth Circuit's finding of non-functionality, a prerequisite for trademark
protection, relies heavily on availability of suitable alternatives for design in question). See also
supra text accompanying notes 190-194.
216. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1502. The court also concluded that protecting "nonfunctional
product configurations under the Lanham Act was not incompatible with patent law" or policies.
Id. at 1501-02.
217. Id. at 1503.
218. Id. at 1504. The court conceded that even though section 43(a) does not expressly
mention product shapes or configurations, judicial decisions historically have substantially
broadened the scope of the statute to the point where it is at least a partial law of federal unfair
competition. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 776-85 (1992)(Stevens, J.,
concurring). With the recent enactment of a federal anti-dilution statute, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109
Stat. 985 (Jan. 16, 1996)(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125), it has become more than a "partial"
federal unfair competition law. Under the anti-dilution provisions, owners of "famous" marks
need not even prove likelihood of confusion. Id.
219. Id. at 1505. See supra Part II. See also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
489 U.S. 141, 167-68 (1989); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232-33
(1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964); Kellogg Co. v.
National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 119-22 (1938); Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169,
185 (1896).
220. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1508 ("[T]he inability freely to copy significant features of patented
products after the patents expire impinges seriously upon the patent system's core goals, even
when those features are not necessary to competition.").
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Having determined that the functionality doctrine could not
always resolve the overlapping jurisdictions of patent and trademark
law concerning product configurations, 1 the court weighed the
policies underlying both to determine whether one was preeminent.
m
The court noted that the ultimate goal of the patent system is not the
reward of a patent monopoly, or even the increased competition by
virtue of the increased product supply that results from the patent
law's operation. Rather, patent law's ultimate goal is "to give the
public the benefits of technological progress."' Moreover, the court
continued, by requiring that an invention be "useful" and not
requiring that it be the "best" or one of a few "superior" inventions,
the drafters of the patent law were seeking disclosure and ultimate use
of a "multiplicity of inventions," not just a few superior inventions.M
With this observation, the court focused on the very framework
that drives not only the patent system, but also many scientific and
technological advances. 2 The Vornado court concluded that in the
221. Id. at 1507. See supra Part IV.E. The court explained that obtaining a utility patent
required only that an inventor show that the invention serves some beneficial, useful purpose.
Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1506-07. This is usually the easiest patentability requirement to satisfy. See
CHIsuM, supra note 36, § 4.02. The same configuration, however, will be functional in the
trademark sense only if competitors need to use the particular design feature in order to compete
effectively. If sufficient suitable alternatives to the product feature are available for competitors
to use, then the trade dress is not functional. Thus, it is possible to have a feature that is useful for
purposes of obtaining a patent, but not functional in the trademark sense. Vornado, 58 F.3d at
1507.
222. Congress has never indicated which of the statutes should apply where there is a
conflict. Since both cannot apply, the court took the position that it must determine "which one
must give way." Id. For a summary of the policies underlying patent law, see supra text
accompanying notes 18. For a summary of the policies underlying trademark law, see supra text
accompanying notes 116-118.
223. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1507-08. See also supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
224. The court stated:
[T]he patent system seeks not only superior inventions but also a multitude of
inventions. A variety of choices is more likely to satisfy the desires of a greater number
of consumers than is a single set of products deemed 'optimal' in some average sense
by patent examiners and/or judges. And the ability to intermingle and extrapolate from
many inventors' solutions to the same problem is more likely to lead to further
technological advances than is a single, linear approach seeking to advance one
'superior' line of research and development.
Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1508.
225. As discussed infra Part VI.A.I.a., the patent system's framework for making new
technology and advances in science available for all to use is patterned after the similar means by
which new advances and theories in science are regularly communicated. By publication and
presentations at conferences and seminars, information freely flows from one scientist or
laboratory to another. Different approaches are taken for the same problem. Some provide a
clear path to a solution. Others become dead ends. Nevertheless, the results are usually published
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face of such logic, the Lanham Act, which could prevent some
inventions from entering the public domain upon expiration of the
patent which disclosed it, would have to give way to the Patent Act.
The court conceded that the Lanham Act covers product features, and
that some consumers will rely on a product's shape to tell one brand
from another. It explained, however, that although some consumers
might be confused if courts allow free copying of a product shape that
has achieved a source-identifying function, the Lanham Act was never
intended to remove all consumer confusion.m Such marginal
consumer confusion is at best, the court stated, a "peripheral concern"
of section 43(a), and should give way to the overriding policies of the
Patent Act to make available to all for copying matter disclosed in a
utility patent.'
The court concluded by noting that whether a competitor needed
to use a particular product feature or design may be the proper inquiry
where only Lanham Act goals were relevant,229 but where the goals of
patent law are also at stake, it is necessary to ask the degree to which
the owner needs to use a useful, albeit "nonfunctional," product
feature to identify its brand, rather than a name, label, or package.M
The court held that
[w]here a disputed product configuration is part of a claim in a
utility patent, and the configuration is a described, significant
inventive aspect of the invention, see 35 U.S.C. § 112, so that without
it the invention could not fairly be said to be the same invention,
and a different researcher working on the same problem may be able to use the first researcher's
results either to find a way out of the dead end, or to advance her own research.
The same is true of the patent system. Several of the framers were inventors and scientists
themselves. See generally DUMAS MALONE, 6 JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME: THE SAGE OF MONTICELLO
(1981). Jefferson was a moving force behind the Convention's adoption of the Patent Clause
providing for a limited monopoly to encourage invention, and was the author of the 1793 Patent
Act. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 353 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1966). They recognized not only the
importance of technological advancements for their agrarian nation, but also how to accomplish
those advances. It involved not only providing incentives to inventors, but also ensuring that
information about the invention was communicated. In short, they were interested in a large
number of "better mousetraps," not just the best mousetraps.
226. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1509-10.
227. Id. (citing Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 121 (1938); Versa Prods.
Co. v. Bifold Co. (Mfg.) Ltd., 50 F.3d 189,207 (3d Cir. 1995)).
228. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1509.
229. For example, this would apply in situations where the design owner has eschewed
patent protection and sought only trademark protection for its design. See, e.g., Kohler Co. v.
Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1993).
230. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1508.
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patent law prevents its protection as trade dress, even if the
configuration is nonfunctional2 31
Finally, it also noted that "[a]lthough the efficient combining of
form and function is at the heart of good industrial design, promoting
it is not a Lanham Act objective."'  It is a Patent Act objective. Thus,
although the court recognized the importance of industrial design, and
that it often required the incorporation of functional features, the
policies underlying patent law created a presumption against
protecting trade dress when a utility patent is involved.
2. Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp. (Thomas & Betts I)
The Seventh Circuit panel in Thomas & Betts I I confronted a
different situation from Vornado. In Vornado, the description of the
product feature, the spiral grill, appeared as a limitation in the claim
itself. In Thomas & Betts I, however, the allegedly protectable product
feature-the rounded head of a cable tie-appeared in the patent
specification. 1 Consequently, Thomas & Betts I can be distinguished
from Vornado on its facts. Nevertheless, the court considered Vornado
in detail. Although it eventually decided the case on distinctiveness
grounds and reversed the magistrate's grant of a preliminary
injunction, it indicated a willingness to expand the holding in Vornado
231. Id. In essence, the court would shift the emphasis from whether competitors "needed"
the feature to compete effectively to whether the owner "needs" the feature to identify its goods.
The court concluded that it would be a very rare occasion where an owner would need its
configuration as a source-identifier:
It would defy logic to assume that there are not almost always many more ways
to identify a product than there are ways to make it. . . . And if one of the ways to
configure the product itself has been deemed important enough to the advance
of technology for the government to grant a utility patent, we must find its value as a
product feature to exceed its value as a brand identifier in all but the most unusual
cases.
Id. at 1510 (footnotes & citations omitted).
232. Id. at 1510 n.9.
233. Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 65 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 1995) [hereinafter
Thomas & Betts I], on remand, 935 F. Supp. 1399 (N.D. Ill. 1996)[hereinafter Thomas & Betts I].
234. Specifically, Thomas & Betts Idefined its trade dress as a cable tie with "a rounded, low
profile head configuration with a vertical slot which is aligned with the body of the cable tie,
and * * * includes a metal barb visible in the lower portion of the vertical slot." 65 F.3d at 656.
Cable ties are small nylon belts used to bundle electric wires. Although cheap to produce, they
are ubiquitous in industries using electronics, and billions are sold every year. Plaintiff Thomas &
Betts had obtained a patent (the Schwester patent) on a two-piece cable tie with an oval head,
metal barb and transverse slot. The slot, barb, and head portion are elements in each of the
patent's claims. The claim at issue did not specify a rounded head. A rounded head, however,
was disclosed in the patent's specification. Id. In addition, Thomas & Betts Iinvolved an expired
patent, whereas Vornado involved an unexpired patent. Id.
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to foreclose from trade dress protection design features that appear
anywhere in a utility patent, in the patent specification as well as in the
claim3m
In Thomas & Betts I, the defendant argued for a broad
prohibition against giving trademark protection to any product feature
that was disclosed in an expired patent. The court conceded that
language in a 1945 Supreme Court opinion supported the defendant's
position.z3 Although the language was dicta, the court seemed
intrigued by the possibility that the defendant's position was correct.
The court briefly discussed functionality, but drew no conclusions. It
did, however, consider the Vornado holding in detail.
Although Vornado restricted the reach of its holding to design
features disclosed in patent claims, the Thomas & Betts court
suggested there was little reason for doing so.7 Claims usually are
drawn as broadly as possible so as to bring within a patent the
broadest scope of potentially infringing products. Limitations often
must be added to patent claims, however, to render them valid in light
of the prior art. The Thomas & Betts I court therefore reasoned that
it was likely that the spiral grill in Vornado's patent was added not
235. Id. at 659-60.
236. Id. at 659 (quoting Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Co., 326 U.S. 249,256 (1945):
By the force of the patent laws not only is the invention of a patent dedicated to the
public upon its expiration, but the public thereby becomes entitled to share in the good
will which the patentee has built up in the patented article or product through the
enjoyment of his patent monopoly. Hence we have held that the patentee may not
exclude the public from participating in that good will or secure, to any extent, a
continuation of his monopoly by resorting to the trademark law and registering as a
trademark any particular descriptive matter appearing in the specifications, drawings or
claims of the expired patent, whether or not such matter describes essential elements of
the invention or claims.)
237. Thomas & Betts 1, 65 F.3d at 659-60. Vornado held:
[W]here a disputed product configuration is part of a claim in a utility patent, and the
configuration is a described, significant inventive aspect of the invention . . . so that
without it the invention could not fairly be said to be the same invention, patent law
prevents its protection as trade dress, even if the configuration is nonfunctional.
58 F.3d at 1510.
238. Prior art is a patent law term for what is already known in a particular field from
previous patents or other materials such as journal articles. Because the information already
exists, it already belongs in the public domain and cannot be the subject of patent. See Aronson
v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979), which observed that "the stringent
requirements for patent protection seek to assure that ideas in the public domain remain there
for the free use of the public." Therefore, each limitation added to a claim narrows the scope of
the monopoly under the patent grant because any infringing product must include all the




because it was a "significant inventive aspect," but rather because
Vornado would not have been granted the patent unless it had added
that limitation.239
The patent in Thomas & Betts I, on the other hand, included the
cable tie head as a required element without identifying a particular
head shape. The round shape claimed as protectable trade dress had
been disclosed in the specification. Since the specification cannot be
used to limit the claim,'1 the scope of the claim was broader, including
within its bounds any head, regardless of its shape. The court reasoned
that during the term of its patent, Thomas & Betts could preclude
competitors from using any metal barbed cable ties with any head
shape.241 Thus, the fact that the product feature appeared in the
specification rather than the claim was not relevant.
Further, the court stated it was wrong to limit Vornado's holding
to subject matter disclosed in the claims for a more fundamental
reason. As part of the patent bargain, the inventor must not only
disclose in the claims that are the boundaries of her claimed invention,
but also must disclose in the specification sufficient information to
enable others to practice the claimed invention. It is the specification
that explains how to make and use the patented invention. Without
the specification, the public's right to copy would be meaningless. It
would make little sense to remove from trademark jurisdiction only
those design features contained in the technically-worded claims that
define the limits of patent protection, while allowing trademark
protection for features disclosed in that part of the patent that teaches
the public how to make and use it, thus giving effect to the right to
copy.2
42
Despite the apparent appeal of a rule broader than Vornado's
which would encompass product features disclosed in the specification
239. Thomas & Betts 1, 65 F.3d at 660.
240. The specification can be used to to interpret the meaning of the language in the claim,
but it may not be used specifically to limit the scope of the claim to avoid invalidity challenges.
See, e.g., Sjolund v. Masland, 847 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Constant v. Advanced Micro-
Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Although the specification may aid the court
in interpreting the meaning of disputed language in the claims, particular embodiments and
examples appearing in the specification will not generally be read into the claims."). See generally
CHISUM, supra note 36, § 18.03[2].
241. Thomas & Betts I, 65 F.3d at 660. The court recognized, however, that this fact did not
mean that the shape of the head was any less important than the design of the grill in Vornado.
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as well as claims, the court declined to rule, deciding the case on the
grounds that plaintiff had presented insufficient facts to prove its
round cable tie head had acquired secondary meaning.243 It reversed
the magistrate's grant of a preliminary injunction and remanded the
case for further proceedings.
3. Thomas & Betts II (The District Court Decision)
On remand from the Seventh Circuit, the district court considered
the parties' arguments again, this time with the benefit of the circuit
court's comments on resolving patent/trademark conflicts." The
defendant Panduit brought motions for summary judgment against
Thomas & Betts's trade dress claims on the patent/trademark law
conflict issue, functionality, secondary meaning, and likelihood of
confusion.
After generally discussing the Patent Act, the Lanham Act, and
the Vornado decision, the court rejected Thomas & Betts' reliance on
Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc, a Seventh Circuit decision that had held that
"a product's different qualities can be protected simultaneously, or
successively, by more than one of the statutory means for protection of
intellectual property." 2 5 Distinguishing Kohler because it did not
involve a utility patent, the court adopted a "strict rule" to apply in
cases where a trade dress interest is claimed for a design feature
disclosed in an expired utility patent.' The court held that "the
subject of an expired utility patent which is disclosed as the 'best
mode' in the patent cannot be the subject of trademark protection
with respect to the invention disclosed to the public." 7 It reasoned
that such a "bright-line" test best served the public's interest protected
under the Patent Act to copy and use a patent once it has expired,
243. Id. at 660-64. Presumably this would include illustrations of the product feature or
configuration the patentee now claims as protectable trade dress.
244. Thomas & Betts H, 935 F. Supp. at 1399.
245. Id. at 1407 (citing Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 638 (7th Cir. 1993)).
246. Thomas & Betts 11, 953 F. Supp. at 1408. The Kohler court's discussion focused on the
interplay between design patents and trade dress. See supra Part III.E. (discussing the general
view that design patent and trade dress protection are not mutually exclusive). The court's
discussion in Kohler, however, was theoretical, as the trade dress owner, Moen, had not even
obtained a design patent, nor was any evidence ever presented that it could have obtained a
design patent on its faucet. 12 F.3d at 640 n.10. It is important to understand the distinction the
Thomas & Betts H court made here. Kohler was not applicable because it addressed different
legal and factual issues. Kohler's broad language on the compatibility of patent and trademark
law thus provided little guidance to the Thomas & Betts II court because the patent bargain,
which was central to the court's decision in Thomas & Betts H, was not even at issue there.
247. Thomas & Betts H, 953 F. Supp. at 1409.
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"while still preserving the Lanham Act protection for methods of
marketing so as to prevent source confusion."248 A plaintiff still could
protect its packaging and advertising under the Lanham Act; it simply
could not protect the "physical shape" of the product, in this case the
cable tie with an oval head.'
The court expressly refused to apply a functionality analysis to
determine whether a design feature disclosed in a utility patent should
be granted trade dress protection. Such a test "is unsound public
policy, contravenes the Patent Act and would defeat the expectations
of the public and the parties," in addition to "promot[ing]
litigation. '" 50 The court also reasoned that policy concerns aside, in
cases such as the one before it, functionality analysis simply did not
work.21 Moreover, where there is an expired utility patent acquired
under a patent bargain in which the inventor understood the invention
would be free for all to use upon the patent's expiration, the full force
of patent policy mandates that no trade dress protection be granted. 52
In summary, Thomas & Betts II applied a strict test to avoid the
difficulties inherent in applying a functionality analysis at the interface
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1410. The court also noted that a strict rule was narrow. It would apply only in
cases where the product configuration has been disclosed in a utility patent. Thus, it would have
no impact on trademark protection of product configurations in general.
250. Id. at 1408. The inventor, the public, and competitors are all aware of the patent
bargain, which is contained in the Patent Act. They should all expect that once a patent expires,
whatever is contained in that patent is dedicated to the public to copy and use without any
further cost. See also infra notes 322-329 and accompanying text. If the public's right to copy
turns on whether the feature is functional, then litigation is required, forcing the court to resolve
fact questions that "lead to unnecessary litigation which would stifle companies from utilizing
products coming off patent." Id. at 1409. See also infra Part VI.C.
251. Id. at 1409-10. The court quoted a passage from Zip Dee in which District Judge Shadur
explained why functionality fails to resolve the issue. Id. at 1408 (quoting Zip Dee, Inc. v.
Dometic Corp., 931 F. Supp. 602 (N.D. Ill. 1996)).
252. Id. at 1410 (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 165
(1989); Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 119 (1938); Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus
Co., 326 U.S. 249, 256 (1945)). Despite its holding that the functionality test was inappropriate in
utility patent cases, the court nevertheless applied the test in the interests of judicial economy.
There is a certain irony in the court's addressing the functionality issue at all. The court had
relied on judicial economy as one of the reasons why it should not address functionality. It noted,
however, that since this was a case of first impression on the trade dress-utility patent issue,
judicial economy required it to resolve all the outstanding issues (functionality, distinctiveness,
likelihood of confusion) in the event the Seventh Circuit did not agree that the patent issue
resolved the dispute. Thomas & Betts II, 953 F. Supp. at 1407. The court concluded that the cable
tie's oval head was functional. Id. at 1413. In addition, the court found that Thomas & Betts had
failed to show its oval head had acquired secondary meaning and ruled in favor of Panduit's
motion. Id. at 1416. Finally, the court found as a matter of law that there was no likelihood of
confusion presented by Panduit's selling its cable tie product. Id. at 1417.
[VOL. 19:339
of patent and trademark law. Its approach precludes from trade dress
protection any design feature disclosed in a patent specification, not
just one that contributes significantly to the invention, or one that
provides a functional advantage.
4. Zip Dee, Inc. v. Dometic Corp.
In Zip Dee, Inc. v. Dometic Corp., 3 the court considered
allegations that the defendant's products infringed plaintiff Zip Dee's
trade dress-a slatted metal cover for roll-up recreational vehicle
awnings. Plaintiff owned an expired patent for a recreational vehicle
awning that included the slatted metal cover as one of several
embodiments set forth in the patent's specification,' as well as
several "live" patents that disclosed the trade dress either as the
preferred embodiment of the invention z5 or as part of a dependent
claim.' The court first inquired generally whether the slatted metal
cover's disclosure in the now-expired '869 patent precluded plaintiff's
claim to trade dress protection. The court held it did not.'
253. 931 F. Supp. 602 (N.D. I11. 1996).
254. U.S. Patent No. 3,324,869 ("the '869 Patent"), issued in 1967, for a roll-up recreational
vehicle awning assembly, including a metal cover. Patents are numbered in chronological order,
more recent patents having higher numbers than older patents. For example, Morse's patent for
the telegraph, issued in 1840, is U.S. Patent No. 1,647. In discussing patents, it is common practice
to refer to them by their last three numbers. Thus, Patent No. 3,324,869 is given the short-form
"the '869 patent."
255. Zip Dee's U.S. Patent No. 4,195,877 ("the '877 Patent"), for an "Exterior Room for a
Trailer," disclosed a slatted awning cover as part of the preferred embodiment but only in an
illustration. The "preferred embodiment" is another name for the best mode. See supra note 59.
Zip Dee, 931 F. Supp. at 616.
256. U.S. Patent No. 4,576,192 ("the '192 Patent") and U.S. Patent No. 4,634,172 ("the '172
Patent"). A dependent claim is, as the name implies, a patent claim that is dependent upon
another claim, called, not surprisingly, an "independent" claim, a claim that stands by itself. A
dependent claim includes all of the claims of the independent claim upon which it depends, and
also has additional limitations. Since the greater the number of limitations a claim has the
narrower its scope, dependent claims often survive challenges that invalidate the independent
claim. That is because a narrower claim may not usurp territory already staked out by a prior art
patent, while the broader independent claim will. On the other hand, since an infringing product
must contain all the limitations contained in the claim before infringement is found, a product
cannot infringe a dependent claim (which by definition has all the limitations of the independent
claim) if it does not also infringe the independent claim. Finally, allowance of the independent
claim by the examiner should result in allowance of a claim dependent on that claim. See
generally CHisuM, supra note 36, § 8.06[5].
257. Zip Dee, 931 F. Supp. at 613.
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a. "Functional Within the Context of a Utility Patent": The Rule
The Zip Dee court rejected the Vornado test of "significant
inventive aspect" of an invention as not providing sufficient guidance
for its application.' It rephrased the Vornado rule and identified two
situations where a patentee would be precluded from obtaining trade
dress protection for a feature disclosed in an expired patent:
1. if the product configuration is functional within the context of the
utility patent in which the product configuration is claimed; or 2. if
the product configuration is functional in the more general sense
that competitors in the market generally need that configuration in
order to compete.n
The latter test is simply the traditional functionality inquiry,
couched in familiar terms of competitive need. The court, however,
elaborated upon what it meant by "functional within the context of the
utility patent" by saying:
Where a disputed product configuration is claimed as part of an
invention covered by a utility patent, and where that product
configuration is something that other persons seeking to copy or
otherwise use the invention would have to include as part of the
product to be able to compete effectively in the market in such
copying or use, then the product configuration cannot be
trademarked after the patent expires, even if the configuration is
nonfunctional in the more general trademark sense.?
In other words, a feature is "functional within the context of the
patent" only if a person must use the disclosed feature in order to
practice the patent itself. Such features may not be protected by trade
dress. 1 The court reasoned that analyzing the problem of product
configurations disclosed in an expired utility patent under its
competitive-need rubric was an improvement on Vornado because
even if it required a fact-intensive study of the patent, it nevertheless
framed the inquiry in functionality language with which courts are
familiar.62
258. Zip Dee, 931 F. Supp. at 611. See supra text accompanying note 231.
259. Id. at 611-12.
260. Id. at 611.
261. The court set forth a short-form version of the test as "whether the granting of a
trademark (and thus of an indefinite monopoly) on a product configuration that is claimed or
otherwise disclosed as part of an invention covered by a utility patent would prevent the invention
itself from being copied and used by the public." Id. (emphasis added).
262. Id.
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b. "Functional Within the Context of a Utility Patent": Applied
The court rejected a per se rule similar to Thomas & Betts II,
holding that Zip Dee was not trying to extend its patent monopoly on
the expired '869 Patent.' Having disposed of this general "patent-
extending" issue, the court then addressed whether Zip Dee's trade
dress claim must fail because it claimed or otherwise disclosed the
trade dress as part of a utility patent. The court held that under the
facts before it, none of Zip Dee's utility patents necessarily precluded
protection of its trade dress. Disclosing the feature in a patent either
as one of several embodiments of the inventionI as the preferred
embodiment of the invention, 2 ' or as a part of a dependent claim,'
263. The '869 Patent, which covered an entire roll-up awning assembly for a recreational
vehicle, included the awning itself and the protective metal cover. See supra note 254. Defendant
Dometic had argued that Zip Dee was trying to obtain trade dress protection on the entire
invention disclosed there. The court, however, observed that this broad-brush argument could
not succeed. All Zip Dee claimed as its trade dress was the "slatted metal protective cover" for a
roll-up recreational vehicle awning. Zip Dee, 931 F. Supp. at 612. Since the trade dress was not
coextensive with the patent, it could not be deemed an extension of the patent monopoly. There
is a problem with the court's conclusion in that it relies upon precisely the same evidence it used
to support its functionality conclusion in favor of Zip Dee. See infra Part V.B.2.
264. The court was ruling on Dometic's motion for summary judgment. As to the '869
patent, the court ruled that Dometic had failed to carry its burden that there was no genuine
issue of material fact. In particular, there was evidence that Zip Dee had been using a single-
sheet (rather than slatted) metal cover for its earliest commercial products based on the '869
patent. Zip Dee, 931 F. Supp. at 613. Moreover, it appeared that some of Zip Dee's competitors
had been using awnings similar to the one claimed in the '869 patent, but without using a slatted
metal cover. Id. Thus, the court leaned in the direction of finding that it is possible to practice the
'869 invention without using the asserted trade dress. Without sufficient facts before the court,
however, it deferred a final ruling.
265. The '877 Patent disclosed a slatted awning cover as part of the preferred embodiment,
see supra note 255, but only in an illustration. The court reasoned a factfinder could, upon
applying the "functional within the context of a patent" standard, find for Zip Dee on the '877
Patent and denied Dometic's summary judgment motion. Zip Dee, 931 F. Supp. at 613.
266. With the '192 Patent, for an entire awning assembly, the court engaged in a complex
analysis and construction of the dependent claim, and the independent claim upon which it
depended, see supra note 256, to determine whether the trade dress should be invalidated
because the expired patent could not be practiced without the trade dress as disclosed in the
dependent claim. Zip Dee, 931 F. Supp. at 613-15. Because an alleged infringing product must
contain all the limitations of both the independent and dependent claim, the court reasoned that
Zip Dee's competitors' use of a slatted metal cover during the term of the patent would have
infringed the patent only if they had also used the entire awning assembly. In other words, the
competitor in the recreational vehicle awning business could have used a slatted metal awning
cover throughout the term of the '192 Patent without infringing the patent. More important, if
competitors used the slatted awning cover, then Zip Dee likely would have been unable to
develop secondary meaning in its trade dress, its use of slatted metal awnings not having been
exclusive. The result would then be that the slatted cover could not function as a source
identifier, and trade dress protection would be foreclosed. If, on the other hand, competitors
were "scared off" the use of a slatted metal awning because it was included in the dependent
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.[ 9
would not preclude trade dress protection, because foreclosing the use
of the feature to others would not necessarily prevent a person from
practicing the invention. The court denied all of Dometic's summary
judgment motions.267
In summary, the Zip Dee court engaged in a complex analysis of
Zip Dee's expired patents to apply its "functional within the context of
a utility patent" standard. Although it did not reject Dometic's claims
outright-it merely ruled that material fact issues were present
precluding summary judgment-it evinced a skepticism of Dometic's
claims. As discussed immediately following, both the Zip Dee and
Vornado approaches are unnecessarily narrow inquiries in light of the
policies underlying patent law and the Supreme Court's repeated
statements that what is disclosed in a patent is free for all to copy and
use upon the patent's expiration.
claim, Zip Dee would have had exclusive use of it even without a government-sanctioned right to
exclude others. Put another way, during the term of the patent, Zip Dee would have had a free
ride to develop secondary meaning in its trade dress, its competitors not having had "a
meaningful real-world opportunity" to use the unprotected trade dress. Id. at 615. See also infra
notes 284-286, 333-335 and accompanying text.
For example, a competitor might not wish to chance an infringement suit if it were to begin
using slatted covers during the patent term. In fact, Dometic's predecessor did not begin using
slatted covers until after the '869 patent had expired. Zip Dee, 931 F. Supp. at 605. If Zip Dee
was able to develop distinctiveness in the awning cover because competitors were in a realistic
sense prevented from using the design, even though-as the court noted-they had a legal right
to do so, then it could be said that Zip Dee acquired its trade dress only because of its disclosure
in the utility patent. Id. at 615. Since configurations disclosed in a utility patent should be free for
all to copy, Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 459 U.S. 141, 165 (1989), others
should be able to use the trade dress.
Consequently, the court held that further facts were necessary to determine whether, during
the term of the the '192 Patent, competitors had a meaningful opportunity "in a realistic sense"
to employ the slatted cover. Zip Dee, 931 F. Supp. at 615. The court reasoned that the same
analysis largely applied to Zip Dee's other patent at issue that included slatted metal awnings in a
dependent claim, U.S. Patent No. 4,634,172, for a "Flexible Hinge Rain Sealing Mechanism." Id.
at 616.
267. The court also addressed whether the slatted metal cover was functional in a traditional
trademark sense, i.e., whether competitors needed it to compete effectively in the market. Id. at
616-18. The court framed the traditional inquiry as "whether the slatted awning cover
configuration is something that others in the industry must practice if they hope to be
competitive." Id. at 617. The court disposed of this assertion by citing evidence that others had
been able to compete effectively against Zip Dee in the recreational vehicle awning market
without using slatted metal awning covers. Id. The court also rejected Dometic's assertion that
the expired utility patents per se proved functionality, and that Zip Dee's advertising and other
promotional materials touted the functional advantages of slatted covers. Id. at 617-18.
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B. Criticisms of the Courts' Approaches
Each of the approaches the courts took to the issue here are
subject to criticism. One criticism might be that all of the courts
misunderstood the functionality analysis, and so misapplied it in the
factual context of a utility patent. As already demonstrated, however,
courts apply the analysis uniformly, regardless of whether a utility
patent is involved or not. 8 Other criticisms can be leveled at each
case individually. Vornado's standard may be too broad and provide
little guidance to judges who must apply it. Zip Dee's approach
appears to be nothing more than a gloss on the traditional
functionality analysis. Finally, the approach the court in Thomas &
Betts II took best implements the policies underlying the patent laws,
but nevertheless may be too narrowly drawn. Each of these is
addressed in turn.
1. Vornado
Since the Tenth Circuit issued its opinion in Vornado, only a
handful of courts and commentators have considered the decision, but
they are nearly unanimous in their criticism of the court's proposed
standard.' Although they generally have not taken issue with the
result, they have criticized the court's "significant inventive aspect"
standard as "overly broad,"' 1 "lack[ing in] doctrinal coherence,"'  or
leaving subsequent courts "without adequate guidance."' All of these
criticisms are directed at what they view as the essential unworkability
268. See supra note 204.
269. See infra text accompanying notes 288-291.
270. In addition to the cases discussed in the previous section, a few law review comments
have appeared. See Peters, Note, supra note 1; Michael S. Perez, Note, Reconciling the Patent Act
and the Lanham Act: Should Product Configurations Be Entitled to Trade Dress Protection after
the Expiration of a Utility or Design Patent?, 4 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 383 (1996) [hereinafter
Perez, Note]; Case Note, Tenth Circuit Applies 'Significant Inventive Aspect' Test to Determine
Whether Utility Patent Precludes Trade Dress Protection, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (1996)
[hereinafter Note, Significant Inventive Aspect].
271. Peters, supra note 1, at 125.
272. Note, Significant Inventive Aspect, supra note 270, at 1460.
273. Zip Dee, 931 F. Supp. at 611. The court noted that there was a question as to what a
"significant inventive aspect" was, or what the Vornado court contemplated by "could not be
said to be the same invention." Id. & n.15. In addition, one commentator argues that the
Vornado test is not really a test at all, but merely a preordained conclusion that follows from a




of the Vornado standard, that future courts simply will be unable to
apply it with any degree of consistency. 4
While the standard has been criticized for being too broad, 75
Vornado has also been faulted for limiting the standard's reach to
"significant inventive aspects" that have been claimed in a utility
patent. As the Thomas & Betts courts explained, matters disclosed in a
patent's specification are intended to teach how to copy, make, and
use the patented invention; these are the considerations which support
the grant of the patent monopoly.276 Even assuming that a "significant
inventive aspect" can be identified with any consistency, no good
reason exists for limiting its application to subject matters that appear
in the patent claims.
2. Zip Dee
Notwithstanding the court's insistence to the contrary, Zip Dee's
approach appears to be little more than a gloss on classic functionality
analysis. Zip Dee identified two situations where a patentee is
precluded from obtaining trade dress protection for a feature disclosed
in a patent. One is where the feature is functional in the traditional
trademark sense. The other occurs when the product feature is
"functional within the context of the utility patent."'  The court
explained the difference between the two: even where a feature is
nonfunctional in the trademark sense-that is, there is no need to use
it to compete effectively in the market-the feature will be denied
trade dress protection if someone who wants to copy and use the patent
must include that feature in its product "to be able to compete
effectively in the market in such copying or use [of the patent]."
Both require an application of a "competitive-need" standard. The
difference rests in when that standard is applied.
A court would apply the "patent context" test only if the disputed
product feature were nonfunctional under the traditional functionality
analysis. As already noted, that standard inquires whether a
theoretical competitor must use the disputed feature to compete at all,
even if that competitor does not compete by practicing the patent.
274. Without a firm doctrinal foundation for applying the standard, courts likely will be left
guessing as to when a nonfunctional but useful feature disclosed in a utility patent can be
protected as trade dress. See Note, Significant Inventive Aspect, supra note 270, at 1460-61.
275. Zip Dee, 931 F. Supp. at 602; Peters, supra note 1.
276. See Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 65 F.3d 654,660 (7th Cir. 1995).
277. See supra Part V.A.4.a.
278. Zip Dee, 931 F. Supp. at611.
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Functionality "within the context of the utility patent," on the other
hand, asks whether that same theoretical competitor who wants to
practice the patent would have to incorporate the disputed feature
into its product in order to practice the patent as disclosed.' If the
competitor must incorporate the feature to practice the patent, the
feature can be said to be dictated by the purpose or function of the
patented invention. This sounds suspiciously like a definition of classic
functionality.'
Although the Zip Dee court was trying to resolve the gap between
patent utility and functionality, it appears merely to have added a gloss
to traditional functionality analysis. Under the Zip Dee approach, a
court would still grant a useful product feature trade dress protection
even though it had been disclosed in a patent, so long as there were
alternatives a competitor could use. Indeed, as the Zip Dee court
actually applied the standard to the facts before it, it effectively
required the disputed trade dress to be one of a few superior
alternatives.m
If anything, then, this functional-within-the-patent's-context
standard appears to afford an even narrower umbrella for those who
wish to practice the invention than does the functionality doctrine
itself. The court went so far as to say that even if the slatted metal
cover configuration was the "best way" to practice the invention, it
was irrelevant so long as there were other alternatives.' Such a
279. Id. ("[T]he inquiry properly focuses on whether, after the patent has expired, the
previously-patented invention could be practiced competitively without employing the disputed
product configuration."). Although the court framed its standard theoretically, i.e., whether a
competitor would have to use the feature, in applying the standard a court apparently would look
at the actual market in which the competitors competed, as did the court in Zip Dee. Id. at 613-
16.
280. See, e.g., Dratler, supra note 1, at 899 & n.66, 939; In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc,
671 F.2d 1332,1338-39, 1342 (C.C.P.A. 1982L
281. For example, in applying its analysis to the '869 patent, for a recreational vehicle awning
assembly, the court noted that the patentee Zip Dee practiced the patent without the disputed
feature, supposedly indicating that the patent could be practiced without it. Zip Dee, 931 F. Supp.
at 613. What the court failed to explain, however, is that a patent does not give a person the right
to practice the patent, but rather the right to exclude others from practicing the patent. CHISUM,
supra note 36, § 16.02[1]. There was no evidence that Zip Dee was actually practicing the patent
as disclosed, as that was never at issue. In addition, the court pointed to competitors who
"seemed to be producing recreational vehicle awnings similar to that covered by the '869 Patent
without using" the disputed feature. Zip Dee, 931 F. Supp. at 613. Again, there is no proof that
the competitors were actually practicing the patent, just that they "seem to be" doing so. Id.
282. Id. ("To be sure, there may be some evidence that the slatted metal cover is the best
way to practice the invention-the portions of the Robert Miller deposition in which he testifies
that the slatted configuration offered better protection of the fabric and did not scratch or dent
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conclusion is unfathomable in light of the patent bargain. If anything,
a legal standard purportedly tailored to the patent utility concept
should be more generous than the traditional functionality standard so
as to resolve those situations where a "gap" exists between "utility"
and "functionality." The Zip Dee standard fails in this regard.
In addition to its puzzling standard for utility patents, Zip Dee
also engaged in a complicated analysis of the relationship between
independent and dependent claims in two of the patents. In essence,
the court conducted a mini-patent trial, construing the claims to
determine the patents' scope. This can be very time-consuming and
wasteful of judicial resources."'
More important, from a standpoint of the sensitive balancing
inherent in the United States' intellectual property system, is the effect
of a feature appearing in a dependent claim but not in an independent
claim. After first discussing the general significance of dependent and
independent claims, the Zip Dee court reasoned that if a feature
appeared in a dependent claim, but not the independent claim upon
which it was dependent, then a person could use the feature in any
way except in conjunction with the subject matter of the independent
claim.' Such use by others would make it difficult for the feature to
acquire secondary meaning and distinctiveness, thus avoiding the
conundrum at issue here. The problem with this approach, recognized
by the court itself, is that there might not be "a meaningful real-world
opportunity" to use the feature. The court did not explain what it
like the single sheet-but that is really irrelevant in light of the broader coverage of the '869
Patent.") (references to record omitted).
283. The Zip Dee court, of course, was not engaged in a "trial" or a "mini-trial." Instead, it
was considering several of defendant's motions for summary judgment, so the time expended
may not have been as great. Zip Dee, 931 F. Supp. at 614-16. Subsequent hearings in the case,
however, could become very time-consuming, with conflicting expert testimony on the scope and
meaning of the claims at issue, and what features are necessary to practice the patent. Another
point about Zip Dee is worth noting here. Zip Dee involved several live or extant patents. It had
not made any patent infringement allegations against Dometic, and thus the live patents were not
directly at issue. One can expect, however, that in some cases the plaintiff will assert patent
claims that would weaken the judicial economy argument. Where a plaintiff asserts patent
infringement in addition to trade dress infringement, the court would have to resolve the same
facts to decide the patent issues. This concern, however, is not present in cases such as Thomas &
Betts where the relevant patent is expired.
284. 931 F. Supp. at 614-15. This would be true because one cannot infringe a dependent
claim unless one also infringes the independent claim. See supra note 256. If you take care not to
include all the elements of the independent claim in your product, you will avoid infringement
even if you copy all the elements of the dependent claim. Such a scenario, however, may not be a
realistic proposition in a tightly contested market. See infra text accompanying notes 330-332.
285. Zip Dee, 931 F. Supp. at 615.
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meant by this phrase. It probably was aware, however, that even if a
competitor were to obtain an opinion from its counsel that its use of
the feature in a way other than related to the independent claim would
avoid infringement, the threat of an infringement suit would prevent it
from so proceeding.'
In short, theoretical possibilities do not necessarily translate into
real-world opportunities. The patent owner could thus retain exclusive
use of the feature and develop its source-identifying properties even
though not entitled to exclusive use. By the time the patent expired,
she could preclude others from using the very feature that the patent
laws make available for all to use. A strict rule, like that discussed in
Thomas & Betts II, would avoid such an anomalous result.
3. Thomas & Betts
Although the Seventh Circuit did not decide the issue raised in
Vornado, the court appeared intrigued by it, suggesting that Vornado's
standard was unnecessarily narrow in restricting its inquiry to features
disclosed in a patent's claim. The court reasoned that if a useful
feature were disclosed in the patent's specification, that feature should
also be denied trade dress protection. 287 On remand, the district court
followed the Seventh Circuit's reasoning, holding that "the subject
[e.g., product feature or configuration] of an expired utility patent
which is disclosed as the 'best mode' in the patent cannot be the
subject of trademark protection with respect to the invention disclosed
286. During the patent's term, the owner would have had exclusive use of the feature. Thus,
she would have been able to to acquire secondary meaning in the feature without interference.
This presumably is what the Zip Dee court meant when it explained:
[D]uring the term of the '192 Patent anyone has been and continues to be free to use a
slatted [awning] configuration like that employed by Zip Dee in every possible way
except in conjunction with the awning arrangement disclosed by the patent's
independent claim 1. If that has been a meaningful real-world opportunity, it would
necessarily have made it. correspondingly more difficult for Zip Dee to have established
an exclusive source identification-secondary meaning-for that configuration. And
that being so, the acquisition of such source identification would not necessarily be
ascribable to the existence of the patent that has insulated Zip Dee against
competition, but not against competition as to the use of a slatted configuration as
such. . . . On the other hand, if the opportunity to employ slatted configurations has
not been meaningful in a realistic sense because of the very existence of the patent, the
policy underpinning of patent protection (limited-term monopoly at the price of
dedication of the subject matter to unfettered competition when the term ends) would
be frustrated by an extension of the monopoly for the indefinite future.
931 F. Supp. at 615.
287. Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 65 F.3d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 1995)[hereinafter
Thomas & Betts i].
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to the public." Although the district court was on the right track in
providing a bright-line standard, several points require clarification.
First, the court expressly referred to features disclosed in the
"best mode" of the patent as part of its standard.' The question
arises, however, whether there is any reason to restrict the reach of the
standard to features disclosed as the "best mode" or preferred
embodiment of a patent, or whether the same feature disclosed as one
of several embodiments of the patent suffices to trigger the rule.
Restricting a bright-line standard to the "best mode" is appealing
because the "best mode" represents the best way to practice the
patent, at least as of the time the patentee filed his patent
application.2° If an inventor believes the feature sufficiently important
that he includes it as part of the best way to practice the patent, there
is little reason to question its utility or "functional advantage," and
upon the patent's expiration the public should be free to use that
feature.
Even if the inventor includes the feature as only one of several
embodiments, the patent bargain suggests there is no reason to limit
the free use of that feature upon the patent's expiration. Although one
can argue that it is not the best way to practice the invention, patent
law does not necessarily reward only the "best" or "superior"
advances in a particular field3m Indeed, that is precisely why the issue
addressed here arises in the first place. If the Thomas & Betts standard
is intended to prevent useful features disclosed in a utility patent being
given perpetual patent-like protection under a trademark regime, then
any such disclosure-whether in a claim, preferred or other
embodiment-should be subject to a bright-line standard.
Second, the court never expressly explained what it means when
it states that a bright-line standard would obviate a court's need to
apply "a functionality test," thereby promoting judicial economy and
fostering policies underlying patent law. It is unclear whether the court
288. Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 935 F. Supp. 1399, 1409 (N.D. I11.
1996)[hereinafter Thomas & Betts 14. The best mode is disclosed in the specification. 15 U.S.C.
§ 112.
289. Id. ("We hold that the subject of an expired utility patent which is disclosed as the 'best
mode' in the patent cannot be the subject of trademark protection with respect to the invention
disclosed to the public.").
290. See, e.g., Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d 923, 927 (Fed. Cir. 1990);
spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1987). See generally
CHISUM, supra note 36, § 7.05[2].
291. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
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means "functionality" in a patent utility sense, i.e., a useful function, or
in the trademark sense, as the best or one of a few superior
alternatives. The court's discussion of a recent Federal Circuit case,
however, suggests that the magistrate judge intended the standard to
preclude inquiry even into whether the feature has a "useful purpose."
Put another way, once a feature is identified as having been disclosed
in a patent, no further inquiry is necessary.
In Kransco Manufacturing Co. v. Hayes Specialties Corp.,m the
Federal Circuit held that a "sinuous seam" in a small game footbag
used for kicking was "ornamental," and thus could be protected as
trade dress. There was little question that the "sinuous seam," which
had been disclosed in a diagram for the best mode of a utility patent,
had a useful purpose in the patent sense, that is, holding together the
components of the footbag. The court, however, held that the patent
history revealed it was the "continuousness of the seam that provides
functional advantages such as durability, uniform pliancy, and
responsiveness to kicking."0 Thus, to practice the footbag invention
disclosed in the patent, one had to use a "continuous seam," but not
necessarily a continuous seam that "involve[d] sinuosity." In effect,
despite its use of the word "ornamental," the Federal Circuit dissected
the patent and its prosecution history to differentiate a feature having
mere patent utility (the "sinuous seam")-which is fair game for trade
dress-from a "functional" feature, which is not.2
The Thomas & Betts II standard eschews any such inquiries.
Indeed, the court took pains to hold that Kransco had no precedential
value and need not be followed.' Thus, the court effectively stated
that it would not even ask whether the feature adds to the invention's
useful purpose. In essence, Thomas & Betts II appears to set forth a
conclusive presumption that any feature disclosed in a patent's
specification is precluded from ever obtaining trade dress protection.
Third, as written, the district court's standard is limited to
"expired" patents.' There are, however, strong reasons why the
standard should also be applied to extant patents.
292. 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1722, 1724 (Fed. Cir. 1996)(unreported decision).
293. Id. (emphasis added).
294. Id.
295. Without using the terms, the court appears to have distinguished between de facto and
de jure functionality. See supra note 198.
296. Thomas & Betts 11, 935 F. Supp. at 1409.
297. Id.; see infra note 299. Although the court briefly discussed live or extant patents, it did
so to distinguish its factual situation from that of other cases. For example, the court
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To be sure, one of the reasons justifying the standard, economical
use of judicial resources by avoiding difficult factual questions, does
not apply to extant patents that the plaintiff has asserted are
infringed.2 Nevertheless, judicial economy would warrant the use of
the standard in cases such as Vornado where the plaintiff has asserted
infringement of its product configuration but not infringement of the
patent in which the feature was disclosed.' Moreover, regardless of
whether the plaintiff has also asserted patent infringement, other
policies of promoting patent policies and protecting the parties'
expectations still apply. As the Zip Dee court recognized, a patentee
could use its patent grant to preclude competitors from using an
otherwise nondistinctive feature and thus develop secondary meaning
for it without interference.3° Applying the Thomas & Betts H bright-
line standard in such cases involving live patents would "nip in the
bud" any such attempts to create secondary meaning in the feature.
The patentee would not be without recourse, however. If applicable,
he could sue for patent infringement, and the competitor could also be
liable if it were to use the feature in a way that confuses consumers.
Finally, even if the rule should be applied to both expired and live
patents, the question arises whether it should also be applied to
patents that have been declared invalid, or in situations where a patent
was denied during the application process. In either case, the trade
dress owner might argue that she had not benefited from the patent
bargain, and should not now be held to its terms. In the case of an
invalid patent, this argument is thin at best. At least during the time
before the patent was declared invalid, the trade dress owner would
have been protected from competitors' interfering in its development
of secondary meaning for the feature. The owner would have
benefited from the presumption of validity, just as if the patent had
distinguished Zip Dee's factual situation because the defendant "was copying a component of the
[presently] patented invention." Id. Note that although Zip Dee did involve several subsisting
patents, there was one patent at issue in that case, the '869 patent, that had expired.
298. Where the patent in which the alleged trade dress is disclosed is also allegedly infringed,
a court will have to make many of the same factual and legal inquiries which the judge in Thomas
& Betts H was trying to avoid, e.g., claim construction.
299. See Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1501 (10th
Cir. 1995), where both sides agreed that the defendant did not infringe Vornado's patent. In such
cases, there would be no reason to address difficult factual and legal issues such as patent
construction if a bright-line standard were used. Where standards such as those espoused in
Vornado and Zip Dee are used, however, the court must engage in such inquiries.
300. See Zip Dee, Inc. v. Dometic Corp., 931 F. Supp. 602, 615 (N.D. Ill. 1996)(discussing
whether competitors had "a meaningful real-world opportunity" to exploit an otherwise
unprotected product feature). See also supra text accompanying notes 284-286.
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been valid. Therefore, trade dress protection for a product feature
disclosed in an invalid patent should also be foreclosed. 1
Although Thomas & Betts II moves in the right direction to
implement patent law policies favoring copying and use of subject
matter in the public domain, it does not go far enough. In the next
section, the author argues that the law of intellectual property would
be best served by courts' adopting a bright-line standard applicable
not only to expired patents, but also to unexpired valid patents and
patents that have been declared invalid.
VI
The Intersection of Utility Patent Law and Trademark Law:
Resolving Conflicts
Taking their lead from a statement in Sears that if a "design is not
entitled to a design patent or other federal statutory protection, then it
can be copied at will,"'  courts have held that patent law and
trademark law, which is "other federal statutory protection," are not
mutually exclusive. 3 More important, courts have not limited the
scope of this holding to the interaction of design patent and trademark
law. Courts have presumed that so long as the functionality doctrine is
available, a person can potentially acquire trade dress protection in
useful product features disclosed in a utility patent.1' As discussed
above, however, functionality is at best a partial solution to reconcile
conflicting patent and trademark policies. 3 As we have seen, courts
have taken two general approaches to resolve this doctrinal defect:
(1) Courts may conduct a fact-intensive study of the utility patent
to determine whether the product feature identified as protectable
trade dress makes a significant contribution to the invention's being
rewarded a patent.' This fact-intensive study would include
301. As to the denied patent, the owner has a better argument. From the time the patent was
denied and the owner was using the feature, everyone was free to copy and use that feature. If
competitors chose not to do so, they cannot now be heard to complain if they now attempt to
cash in on the owner's success in developing good will for the feature. In other words, a court
would apply the same analysis as if the trade dress owner had entered the market without ever
having applied for a patent.
302. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,238 (1964).
303. See supra Part III.E.
304. See supra note 147.
305. See supra Part IV.E.
306. Another court has framed the issue as whether the public would be precluded from
practicing the claimed invention if it were denied the right to copy and use the trade dress. See,
e.g., Zip Dee, Inc. v. Dometic Corp., 931 F. Supp. 602, 611 & n.16 (N.D. Ill. 1996). Regardless of
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considering all aspects of the utility patent, the specification and
illustrations as well as the claims. Examples of this approach include
Vornado, Zip Dee, and arguably the appellate decision in Thomas &
Betts L
(2) Courts may apply a strict or per se rule by inquiring only
whether the product feature now claimed as protectable trade dress
was disclosed in the patent. If it was, then the policies underlying
patent law, in particular the "patent bargain," require that the feature
be dedicated to the public upon expiration of the patent, regardless of
whether the feature is "non-functional" or just "ornamental." Only the
district court's decision in Thomas & Betts II, holding that a feature
cannot be protected under the Lanham Act so long as it is disclosed as
part of the best mode of a utility patent, follows this model.'
Of the approaches taken, the latter is probably the soundest. The
author, however, would not restrict the per se rule of Thomas & Betts
II to the disclosure in the best mode of the patent. A broad, per se rule
invalidating trade dress in any product configuration disclosed
anywhere in a patent would best effectuate the policies of the patent
law. "Anywhere" would mean just that: in the claims, the written
specification, or the illustrations. There is no good reason to limit the
application of a strict rule to disclosure in a patent's preferred
embodiment.30
the particular inquiry being made, these cases share the same approach: analyzing the utility
patent in detail to determine whether a conflict exists.
307. Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 935 F. Supp. 1399, 1405 (N.D. Ill.
1996)[hereinafter Thomas & Betts 11]. Arguably, the court's holding was somewhat narrower
than a per se rule that would invalidate trade dress protection for any feature disclosed in a utility
patent. In Thomas & Betts II, the claimed trade dress, the oval cable tie head, was disclosed as
the "best mode" for practicing the patent. In fact, earlier in its opinion, the court stated its
holding in the limiting terms of "best mode." Id. Thus, the cable tie head was not merely a
peripheral component of the patent, incidentally disclosed. See generally Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco
Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1996); RESTATEMENT, supra note 115, § 17, cmt. b.
Nevertheless, the court later stated its holding in broad terms. Thomas & Betts I, 935 F. Supp. at
1410 ("As a matter of law, a product configuration that is claimed or otherwise disclosed within
an expired utility patent is not entitled to trademark protection.")(emphasis added). In addition,
the court took pains to distinguish the recent decision of the Federal Circuit, Kransco
Manufacturing Co. v. Hayes Specialties Corp., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1722 (Fed. Cir. 1996), where
the court had engaged in dissecting a design patent and its prosecution history to determine
whether a patent feature was functional. Taken together, these facts suggest that the court did
not want to limit its holding to features disclosed as part of a patent's best mode. See also supra
text accompanying notes 292-296.
308. The application of a per se rule where a patent has expired accords best with the tenor
of Justice O'Connor's opinion in Bonito Boats that once a patent expires, the limited-duration
term that was part of the bargain demands that the invention-including all that was disclosed in
the invention-be made freely available to the public to copy and use. Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
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Such a rule would not trample the goals of trademark law. The
product's owner could still protect its investment in goodwill; it just
could not claim trade dress protection. The owner would be able to
protect its packaging and any word or symbol marks used in
connection with the product, as well as prevent a competitor from
copying the configuration and passing it off as the competitor's own.3
Moreover, the rule would not affect protection for product
configurations or features in general, being applicable only where the
feature has been disclosed in a utility patent.
310
There are several reasons for adopting a strict rule in these cases,
all of which relate directly or indirectly to the patent bargain. A strict
rule gives effect to a system that is intended to ensure the disclosure of
knowledge for free use by others to advance knowledge of the useful
arts and, not incidentally, promote competition; satisfies the
expectations of the parties and the public as to what should be in the
public domain; avoids unnecessary costs to competitors by allowing
them to copy freely from a patent once it has expired, without their
having to conduct market searches to determine what part of a patent
is free to use, and what part is still protected; prevents a patentee from
using its patent as a shield to protect its development of good will in a
product feature that is neither distinctive nor inventive; and avoids
costly litigation and time-consuming mini- or full-blown patent trials
within trademark cases."
A. Promoting Progress of Science by Effectuating Patent Goals
By ensuring all information that is disclosed in a patent becomes,
upon the patent's expiration, freely available for all to use, a strict rule
implements the fundamental goal of patent law to promote scientific
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 161-62 (1989). While a patent is still "alive," however, it
is necessary to inquire whether the feature that is disclosed in the patent and which the
competitor seeks to use is part of the claimed invention for which the patentee has the right to
exclude the public from copying and using. See supra text accompanying note 283. Once the
patent expires, however, it is free for all to copy and use.
309. Thomas & Betts 1, 935 F. Supp. at 1407, 1411.
310. Id.
311. By adopting a strict rule, a court would avoid such time-consuming issues as whether a
patent that contained the claimed product feature was invalid, or whether the product feature is
functional or serves a useful purpose, and so forth. Of course, until a circuit court adopts a strict
rule, the first court in each circuit that addresses the issue of utility patent/trademark
compatibility will necessarily have to address all these issues, ironically in the name of judicial
economy. For example, in Thomas & Betts II, despite adopting a strict rule, the court addressed
functionality of the cable tie head, secondary meaning, and likelihood of confusion because the
case presented an issue of first impression in the Seventh Circuit. 935 F. Supp. at 1411-18.
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advance. As noted previously, the Supreme Court has identified
several purposes of the Patent Act: (1) to foster and reward invention;
(2) to promote disclosure of inventions by which further innovation is
stimulated, and to permit the public to practice the invention once the
patent expires; and (3) to assure that ideas in the public domain
remain there for the free use of the public by imposing stringent
requirements for patent protection. 312 The "centerpiece of federal
patent policy" is its "ultimate goal of public disclosure and use. ', 31
1. Disclosure
The first purpose set out above is simply a means by which the
second is accomplished. Rewarding invention provides an incentive
for making inventions, but to receive the patent reward the inventor
agrees to disclose the invention. Disclosure has a preeminent position
in patent policy because disclosing advances that are worthy of patent
protection will enable others to use and improve on those inventions,
thus ensuring the further "promot[ion of] the Progress of Science and
useful Arts."3 14 The patent system has largely been successful in
encouraging invention. For many years, the United States has been the
312. See supra text accompanying note 18. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257,
262 (1979)(citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 479, 480-81 (1974)). See also
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966)(explaining:
[Congress may not] enlarge the patent monopoly without regard to the innovation,
advancement or social benefit gained thereby. Moreover, Congress may not authorize
the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public
domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available. Innovation,
advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent
requisites in a patent system which by constitutional command must "promote the
Progress of . . .useful Arts.).
313. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 157. See also id. at 146; Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546,
569 (1973); Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 255-56(1945); Singer Mfg. Co. v.
June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896).
314. U.S. CON sT., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See also Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 481:
When a patent is granted and the information contained in it is circulated to the
general public and those especially skilled in the trade, such additions to the general
store of knowledge are of such importance to the public weal that the Federal
Government is willing to pay the high price of 17 years of exclusive use for its
disclosure, which disclosure, it is assumed, will stimulate ideas and the eventual
development of further significant advances in the art.
This further advancement can occur either during the term of the patent by others designing
around the disclosed invention, or after the patent expires, by allowing others to improve details
of the invention, actions that during the patent term would constitute infringement. Id. at 481-82.
See also United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 187 (1933).
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preeminent producer of technological innovation in the world?' The
country's success in this area is due at least in part to the free flow of
ideas and technology that the patent system promotes.316
That the patent system works so well is not remarkable. It is, after
all, designed to create a framework where facts and knowledge that
otherwise would not have been discovered but for the patent incentive
are made available for others to use. This allows other inventors to use
and build upon that knowledge to make further advances. The patent
system's framework for making new knowledge available parallels
how research and development in science ordinarily takes place. Few
discoveries are made in isolation; most are small steps built upon the
deliberate advances of another researcher, who in turn has used
knowledge gained by others. 17
The key ingredient in this give and take of scientific research and
advances is the free and open communication between and among
scientists in publications and at conferences.1 8 As communication is to
science in general, disclosure is to the patent system. Both promote
the flow of ideas. In addition to being the fuel of the system, however,
disclosure is also its currency: first, it enables others to build upon the
315. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meckstroth, Reengineering U.S. Manufacturing: Implications of
Structural Changes in the U.S. Economy, 29 Bus. ECON. 43 (1994).
316. This statement is not intended to denigrate the contributions-major in themselves-of
a United States political system that itself ensures a free flow of ideas, and the historically
generous government contributions in the form of grants and military spending on basic research
in the arts and sciences. Nor is the statement intended to ignore the American higher education
system, which continues to attract scholars from around the world because of the excellence of its
research facilities-again, funded in large part by government grants. The patent system,
however, has at least contributed to the advance of scientific knowledge, both directly and
indirectly. As an example of the latter, a research scientist at the University of Wisconsin, Harry
Steenbock, invented an inexpensive means of irradiating milk with vitamin D. He obtained a
patent and assigned it to the University of Wisconsin. For a time, the University received a
royalty for every bottle or carton of milk sold in the United States. The University used proceeds
from the Steenbock patent to fund the Wisconsin Alumni Research Fund (WARF), which in turn
supported further research at the University. One of the inventions developed under grants from
WARF was "warfarin," named for obvious reasons, a very powerful anti-coagulant. See Charles
Weiner, Universities, Professors, and Patents: a Continuing Controversy, 89 M.I.T. ALUMNI ASS'N
TECH. REv. 32 (1986).
317. As Bertrand Russell wrote: "[I]n science the successors stand upon the shoulders of
their predecessors; where one man of supreme genius has invented a method, a thousand lesser
men can apply it." BERTRAND RUSSELL, A FREE MAN'S WORSHIP AND OTHER ESSAYS, ch. 3 (1976),
reprinted in COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS (1993).
318. Admittedly, as the financial incentive of patenting scientific discoveries, such as drugs
and genetically-engineered plants and animals increases, scientists may engage in more secretive
research, hiding results from colleagues until they have secured patent priority for their
inventions. See, e.g., Weiner, supra note 316.
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advances made by the patented invention; second, it is the
consideration that supports society's grant of a patent monopoly.
Disclosure is the centerpiece, then, because without it, further advance
would be stifled or at least hindered.
2. Use
Disclosure by itself, however, may not be enough. During the
patent term, disclosure enables another person to use the information
disclosed to design around the patented invention and perhaps make a
better machine, fashion a more effective drug, or develop a more
efficient process 19 However, there are some instances where the
invention is the "best" and it would be economically inefficient to
design around it.' Under such circumstances, the copying and use of
the invention itself would be what others want. During the term of the
patent, they would pay royalties to the patent owner to use the
invention. If they were forced to pay the inventor royalties beyond the
patent term, however, then society would have gained nothing from
the patent bargain; society would have gratuitously granted the
inventor a monopoly. It would have paid the costs, but received
nothing in return. 21 From a contract law point of view, then, the
inventor would have failed to perform his end of the bargain. He must
give up his patents after he has enjoyed his limited-term monopoly so
that others may use it. By making whatever has been disclosed in a
utility patent freely available for the public to use, a strict rule would
not only help to advance scientific progress, but would also assure that
the patent bargain is enforced.
B. Satisfying the Expectations of the Public and the Parties
1. The Trade Secret Option
Every inventor who obtains a patent is aware of the terms of the
"contract" she enters into. She knows what she will receive, and is
well-aware of what she must give up in order to receive it. The terms
of the bargain are set out in the patent statute. The inventor cannot
argue that she was misled into entering it. In fact, an inventor need not
319. See supra note 24.
320. Compare this situation to Judge Shadur's discussion of the "better" but not "best"
mousetrap in Zip Dee, 931 F. Supp. at 608. See supra note 202.
321. For a discussion of the economic inefficiency of society sustaining the costs of a patent
monopoly without receiving any benefits, see Note, Significant Inventive Aspect, supra note 270,
at 1462 n.36.
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even enter into the patent bargain in order to realize a profit from her
invention. She always has another option: keeping her invention a
trade secret.
An inventor is not obliged to patent her invention. She need not
reveal her discovery, or how it works. An inventor can keep her
discovery to herself and still market it. Of course, if a competitor can
reverse engineer the invention, the patentee will have no monopoly
for even a limited period during which she can enjoin the competitor
from copying her invention. That is why the patent bargain is so
attractive and why most inventors choose the patent route.' If an
inventor chooses that avenue, she does so knowingly, and with certain
expectations guaranteed by law.
2. The Inventor's Expectations
The patent bargain thus is a contract in which the parties have
well-settled expectations. An inventor knows that if she makes an
invention that satisfies all the prerequisites of patentability, she will
receive a patent.' When an inventor receives her patent, she is aware
that upon the expiration of the patent term, her invention will be
dedicated to the public, which is given the right to copy and use the
invention. The Supreme Court has trumpeted the public's right to
copy and use expired patents on several occasions.M
322. See, e.g., Bonito Boats Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160-61 (1989).
323. The conditions for patentability are both substantive--utility, novelty, and
nonobviousness-and procedural-disclosure and candor, as well as certain technical and formal
requirements in the actual writing of the patent application. See supra Part I.A. Indeed, if an
inventor has adequately complied with the patentability requirements, she has disclosed and in so
doing has fulfilled her end of the bargain.
324. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989)
(reaffirming the Sears and Compco statements about federal right to copy and use expired
patent)("For almost 100 years it has been well established that in the case of an expired patent,
the federal patent laws do create a federal right to 'copy and to use.' Sears and Compco extended
that rule to potentially patentable ideas which are fully exposed to the public."). See also Kellogg
Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938); Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169
(1896)("It is self-evident that on the expiration of a patent the monopoly created by it ceases to
exist, and the right to make the thing formerly covered by the patent becomes public property.").
Moreover, in dicta, the Supreme Court has even more strongly insisted on the public's rights not
only to copy, but also to enjoy any goodwill the patentee may have developed during the term of
the patent:
[A]ny attempted reservation or continuation in the patentee or those claiming under
him of the patent monopoly, after the patent expires, whatever the legal device
employed, runs counter to the policy and purpose of the patent laws. . . . By the force
of the patent laws not only is the invention of a patent dedicated to the public upon its
expiration, but the public thereby becomes entitled to share in the good will which the
patentee has built up in the patented article or product through the enjoyment of his
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The inventor should also be aware that what is dedicated to the
public is not just what is set out in the claims of the patent. 5 The
public is given the right to copy and use the invention; it must be able
to know how to use it if there is to be any realistic bargain. The patent
bargain requires the inventor to include a specification in the patent
demonstrating how to make and use the invention upon expiration of
the patent monopoly.326 It is the specification, not the claims, where
the public and competitors are taught how to use the invention. The
inventor is aware of this. The inventor, then, should have expected
upon entering the patent bargain, that anything disclosed in the
patent, not just what is specifically claimed as the invention, is free for
all to copy. Consequently, she should not expect to be able, after the
patent expires, to claim as protectable trade dress any feature that was
disclosed in the patent.
3. The Public's Expectations
In addition to the inventor's expectations upon entering into the
patent bargain, the public also has expectations that whatever is
disclosed in a patent will be free for all to use and copy "slavishly."'
The government grants a monopoly to the inventor. It does so on
behalf of the public, so that it can benefit by the advancement of
science and technology.' Being in essence the beneficiary of the
patent bargain, the public also has an expectation that the invention is
free for all to copy and use upon the patent's expiration.
patent monopoly. Hence we have held that the patentee may not exclude the public from
participating in that good will or secure, to any extent, a continuation of his monopoly by
resorting to the trademark law and registering as a trademark any particular descriptive
matter appearing in the specifications, drawings or claims of the expired patent, whether
or not such matter describes essential elements of the invention or claims.
Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 256 (1945)(emphasis added). Although the
Court was not faced with the precise issue here, and thus the foregoing statement is dicta, its
intent is hardly debatable. Taken with Bonito Boats, the intervening Sears and Compco cases,
and the earlier Kellogg and Singer cases, the Supreme Court has manifested a strong preference
for the right to copy and use whatever is disclosed in the patent. Moreover, the Court went
beyond what is actually disclosed in the patent to include whatever may be associated with the
patent, that is, the owner's "good will."
325. The claims are the part of the patent that set forth the metes and bounds of the
invention. See supra note 59.
326. Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, the patent applicant must include a specification in the patent,
which "shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner of making and
using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to
which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same ....
327. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 157. See also Thomas & Betts 1H, 935 F. Supp. at 1407.
328. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
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4. Competitor's Expectations
If anyone is able to use a patent after it expires, it is the inventor's
competitors, who would be most familiar with the patent's subject
matter and thus, as members of the benefited public, in the best
position to assert the public's rights under the patent bargain. A
competitor will have expectations that the inventor's monopoly ceases
entirely upon the patent's expiration. The competitor should not have
to parse the patent for disclosed items that may not be free to copy
because, through the inventor's promotion, they have acquired
protection under trademark law.'
C. Avoiding Unnecessary Costs to Competitors
If certain aspects of a patent can be retained by the patentee for
its exclusive use after the patent expires, then the notice role of a
patent is undermined. In Bonito Boats, the Supreme Court noted with
approval that the "federal patent scheme" allows the public to
determine instantly the status-proprietary or public domain-of "the
intellectual property embodied in any article in general circulation."3
The court noted that "[t]he public may rely upon the lack of notice in
exploiting shapes and designs accessible to all."331 Put another way, if a
design or shape is not in an extant patent, it is available for public use.
Similarly, if a design or shape was disclosed in an expired patent, then
it should also be available for public use.
329. One can argue that given the present state of trade dress law, particularly decisions of
the Federal Circuit and Court of Customs and Patent Appeals holding that disclosure of a design
feature in a utility patent does not necessarily preclude trade dress protection for that feature, see
supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text, a strict rule will frustrate rather than satisfy the
expectations of the parties, public, and competitors. In other words, the argument is that
application of a strict rule would frustrate design owners who have come to expect that they can
protect certain patent-disclosed trade dress because the courts have said they can. Such an
argument misses the point. First, the patent bargain is constitutionally-mandated. For it to
operate properly, and the public's right to use that which was disclosed in a patent to be fully
realized, it is necessary that they have a straightforward and simple way of determining what is
available for use. See supra note 311. A strict rule would satisfy these criteria. Second, the
expectations of the product configuration's owner in protecting the product's good will would not
be entirely frustrated by adoption of a per se rule. The owner still would be able to identify her
goods by traditional words or symbols, and even by distinctive packaging. Moreover, a
competitor cannot misappropriate the source-identifying properties of the product configuration
for his own use. If a competitor uses the feature to pass off his goods as those of the owner, it will
still be liable for unfair competition under the Lanham Act. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 157.
330. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 161.
331. Id. at 162.
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If a patentee retains patent rights in certain product features
disclosed in the patent, however, the public, and in particular the
patentee's competitors, no longer can be certain that they can use
anything in an expired patent. They will incur costs to conduct market
analyses to determine whether a patent feature has been retained for
exclusive use by the patentee, i.e., whether it is distinctive and
nonfunctional. In short, they will incur costs to determine what the
patent system is designed to disclose by their merely reviewing the
patent.332 The costs they expend are in addition to the monopoly costs
the competitor, as a member of the public, paid to the inventor for
disclosure and use of the patented subject matter. They are not part of
the bargain.
In summary, because allowing trade dress protection in any
feature of an expired patent undermines the notice function of the
patent system and requires a competitor to incur costs in addition to
those monopoly costs already paid for disclosure and use, a strict rule
foreclosing trade dress protection to any design feature disclosed in a
patent would be economically efficient.
D. Preventing a Patentee from Using its Patent to Insulate its Development
of Goodwill
This is related to the foregoing concern that a less-than-strict rule
would undermine the notice function of the patent system. It is
possible for an owner, who has disclosed in a utility patent a
nonfunctional but non-distinctive feature now claimed as trade dress,
to use the patent to insulate from competition his attempts to develop
secondary meaning in the configuration. 3 Before a competitor would
use a feature disclosed in a patent, it would have to have a lawyer
determine the scope of the patent claims and advise it whether using
332. See Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1508 (10th Cir.
1995). Although trade dress can be registered with the Patent & Trademark Office on the
Principal Register, 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1994), it traditionally has not been registered and therefore
it can be difficult to determine precisely what is being claimed as protectable trade dress.
Vornado, 58 F.3d at n.17.
333. See supra note 266. The Zip Dee court apparently recognized this possibility when it
stated that competitors may not have a "meaningful real-world opportunity" to appropriate
unprotected product features disclosed in a patent during the patent's term. Fearful that copying
any feature disclosed in a patent would trigger infringement liability or at least a costly lawsuit to
vindicate its rights to use the feature, a competitor would refrain from any copying. This would
leave the patent owner with exclusive use of the feature and an opportunity to freely develop
secondary meaning for the feature as a source identifier. Zipp Dee, Inc. v. Dometic Corp., 931
F. Supp. 602, 615 (N.D. II1. 1996).
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the feature would infringe the patent. Where there is any doubt as to
whether the feature comes within the protectable scope of the patent,
it is likely that the competitor would be "scared off" from using the
feature, not wanting to risk an infringement suit. In other words,
although competitors may have been legally entitled to use the feature
because it was not within the scope of the patent, they would not have
had a "meaningful real-world opportunity" to have done so.'
With competitors warned off using the feature, the patentee
would be free to develop secondary meaning in it, something he might
not have been able to do but for the feature's disclosure in the patent.
By the time the patent expired, the owner would have been able to
register its dress, which may even have attained incontestable status.3
A strict rule would prevent these situations from developing
because the patentee would be on notice that whatever was disclosed
in the patent could not become protectable trade dress. The owner
would know he could not use the patent as a shield to insulate his
acquisition of good will in an otherwise non-distinctive feature. 7
E. Avoiding Costly Litigation and Consumption of Judicial Resources
It is arguable that only those features that are relevant or
necessary to the function or operation of the utility patent should be
excluded from trade dress protection. In other words, the
functionality doctrine should be able to resolve any conflicts. As
applied by the courts, however, the functionality doctrine has proved
334. See supra notes 266,281.
335. See supra note 132.
336. There is a problem in that the Lanham Act does not identify product configurations or
features disclosed in a patent as subject matter precluded from trade dress protection. There is a
possibility that the PTO would not reject an application, nor would it hold such trade dress
invalid in an opposition or cancellation proceeding. The result could be that the trade dress could
achieve incontestable status and be relatively immune to attack. See, e.g., Shakespeare Co. v.
Silstar Corp. of Am., Inc., 9 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1993)(finding trade dress that is inevitable result
of patented process nevertheless not subject to functionality defense because it had achieved
incontestable status).
337. This reasoning, of course, would not apply to a patent-disclosed feature that was
inherently distinctive since the patentee would have no need to use the patent to insulate its
investment in good will, the feature already being distinctive. Nevertheless, the other reasons
supporting a strict rule, such as effectuating patent law goals without trampling trademark
policies, satisfying the expectations of the parties and the public, and judicial economy, apply
equally to both kinds of distinctiveness.
338. Section 112, after all, does not require the disclosure of "everything under the sun,"
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980), but only such information as to "enable" a
person skilled in the art to practice the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
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to be ineffective in resolving the issue addressed in this article.339
Moreover, requiring courts or juries to engage in costly and time-
consuming factual inquiries to resolve the functionality issue makes
little sense, especially since the parties and public have reasonable
expectations that anything disclosed in a patent is free for all to use
once the patent expires.
34°
To determine functionality requires the careful consideration and
balancing of different evidentiary factors, such as whether the design
feature was disclosed in a utility patent, whether the design owner
touted the functional advantages of the design feature in its
advertising, whether there are actual or potential alternative designs
available that will enable others to compete effectively, and whether
the design results from a comparatively simple or cheap
manufacturing method. 4' With the possible exception of the first, all
of these factors would require the gathering of substantial amounts of
data and the expensive testimony of experts.
Even the first factor, the existence of a utility patent containing
the design feature, however, can require the testimony of an expert if
the court feels obliged to inquire whether the feature actually
contributes to the useful purpose of the patent or is merely
ornamentation. 342 Further, courts that focus the functionality analysis
on whether granting trade dress protection in the design feature will
"hinder competition" may also consider the complex market data
typically reviewed in antitrust litigation. 3 3 All these expenses are
unnecessary if courts simply accept the underlying principle of patent
law that what is given a monopoly should later be free for all to use.
All that a judge or jury need do is determine whether the particular
design feature appeared in the expired patent.344 It would then follow
339. See supra Part IV.E.
340. See supra Part VI.B. See also Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 935 F. Supp.
1399, 1406 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
341. See supra notes 187-189 and accompanying text. See In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc.,
671 F.2d 1332, 1340-41 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
342. See, e.g., Kransco Mfg. Co. v. Hayes Specialties Corp., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1722, 1724
(Fed. Cir. 1996); Black & Decker, Inc. v. Hoover Serv. Ctr., 886 F.2d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 7.29.
343. See, e.g., M.A. Cunningham, Utilitarian Design Features and Antitrust Parallels: An
Economic Approach to Understanding the Functionality Defense in Trademark Litigation, 18
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 569 (1996)(suggesting judge or jury can determine effect on
competition of utilitarian design by considering evidence typically presented in antitrust trials).
344. It is questionable whether this would require expert testimony. See, however, Thomas
& Betts 11, 935 F. Supp. 1399 (N.D. I1. 1996), where the court resolved the issue by exercising its
allotted function to construe the patent, concluding that the product feature was part of the
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that it was dedicated to the public upon expiration of the patent term
and cannot function as a source-identifier.
345
1. Shifting Costs to the Front End of Development
In essence, a strict rule would shift costs to the "front end" of the
process an inventor goes through to protect her intellectual property.
She would have to make choices earlier in the development of its
technology, and have to pay more costs up front to attorneys and
market consultants to help make those choices. For example, after
conducting a survey, the inventor may determine that a particular
design of a product she intends to patent is the best for marketing
purposes because it is pleasing to consumers. With the help of counsel,
she would have to determine whether she must include that design as
the best mode, or even as one of the embodiments in the patent. In
other words, she would have to choose whether she wants to assure
patent protection for a limited duration, or take her chances on
developing secondary meaning in the product configuration so that
she could subsequently preclude others from using the configuration
in a confusing manner for an indefinite period.'
patent and therefore free for all to use. See Markman v. Westview Instr., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384
(1996). A strict rule would be even easier to implement because it is not concerned with whether
the disclosure was part of the best mode. Anything disclosed in patent will trigger the rule.
345. An argument can be made that the only reason a competitor would copy a product,
feature that had appeared in a patent and was now being used as a source-identifier would be to
trade on the patentee's good will. The argument, however, begs the question. As already noted,
supra note 324, the Supreme Court in dicta has stated that everyone is entitled to share in the
good will of "any particular descriptive matter appearing in the specifications, drawings or claims
of the expired patent." Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Co., 326 U.S. 249,256 (1945). It is the right of
all to copy and use that feature. The whole point of implementing patent policies in these
situations is to send a message to patent owners that whatever they disclose in patents is fair
game for all to use and that they will not be able to acquire exclusive use of the feature beyond
the term of the patent by developing good will in it.
Moreover, competitors who use the feature still may not "pass off" their goods as those of
the patentee. That is unfair competition and still actionable under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,157 (1989):
[T]he plaintiff has the right not to lose his customers through false representations that
those are his wares which in fact are not, but he may not monopolize any design or
pattern, however trifling. The defendant, on the other hand, may copy plaintiff's goods
slavishly down to the minutest detail: but he may not represent himself as the plaintiff
in their sale.
346. It is important to understand that the best design for marketing is not necessarily the
"best mode" for practicing the invention. See, e.g.,Wahl Instruments, Inc. v. Acvious, Inc., 950
F.2d 1575, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("A description of particular method or materials or sources or
of a particular technique selected for manufacture may or may not be required as part of a best
mode disclosure respecting a device.").
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Of course, if the inventor believes at the time she applies for a
utility patent that the particular design does impart a functional
advantage to its invention, then she is obligated to disclose it and
foreclose any right she might have had in obtaining trade dress
protection for it. Otherwise, she would risk a later finding of
inequitable conduct before the PTO. Where it is a close call, counsel
would likely advise her to disclose the configuration in the patent. It
might foreclose future trade dress protection, but it very likely will
save the patent from a validity challenge.
347
At any rate, front-loading costs by forcing inventors to make
decisions about how to protect their intellectual property interests
earlier will avoid costly and time-consuming patent-related issues
later. Thus, forcing an inventor to make decisions up front will save
costs and increase efficiency. Although the costs initially might be
greater in terms of attorney's and consultant's fees, a strict rule would
avoid later litigation costs that arise because the inventor has
attempted to parlay her patent-disclosed product features into a
source-identifier. The days of a shotgun approach to protecting
intellectual property-i.e., applying for utility and design patent
protection, and simultaneously applying for trade dress protection on
a feature disclosed in a utility patent, would be over.
2. Unexpired, Invalid, and Denied Patents
This issue-whether the strict rule should also be applied to
unexpired or invalid patents, and in situations where the patent
application has been denied-has already been addressed. There is no
reason to distinguish between expired patents on the one hand, and
unexpired patents or patents that have been declared invalid, on the
other. 8
347. It is arguable that a strict rule in some situations would not support an economic use of
judicial resources. The argument would be that any time the inventor chooses not to disclose a
feature used in the commercial version of its patented product, it would invite an "automatic"
best mode defense by the alleged infringer. This would be a problem only where the plaintiff has
asserted both trade dress infringement and infringement of an extant patent. In such situations, a
defendant usually will assert numerous defenses, including best mode, regardless of whether
trade dress is at issue. Where the plaintiff has asserted only trade dress infringement, either
because the defendant is not infringing the patent, see, e.g., Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v.
Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498 (Fed. Cir. 1995), or because the patent has expired, this would not
be a problem because the patent's validity would not be at issue. The only question would be
whether the feature had been disclosed in the patent.
348. See supra notes 297-301 and accompanying text. There is also an issue that even as
broad a rule as stated here may not be sufficient to resolve the potential conflicts between patent
and trademark law, but this can be easily resolved. In Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of
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In summary, applying a strict rule in cases where a product
feature or configuration has been disclosed in a utility patent is both
economical and best effectuates the policies of copying and use of
disclosed patent subject matter that underlie the patent system.
Moreover, a strict rule would not undermine the policies of trademark
law: the configuration owner will still be able to identify her goods by
traditional words or symbols, and even by distinctive packaging, and
protection of product configurations in general will not be affected.
VII
Conclusion
Patent policies and goals mandate that what is disclosed in a
utility patent is to become, upon expiration of the patent, available to
the public for copying and use. The functionality doctrine imperfectly
resolves the conflict that arises when a patentee claims a trade dress
interest in a product feature or configuration that was disclosed in a
patent. To allow the trade dress to stand would potentially extend the
constitutionally-mandated limited-duration patent term. Applying a
strict rule-one that precludes from trade dress protection any feature
or configuration disclosed in a utility patent in the limited cases in
which this issue arises-would best effectuate patent goals by ensuring
that all matters disclosed in a patent are free for all to copy and use. It
would not trample on trademark goals: the patent owner would still
be free to identify the source of its product by traditional words or
symbols or packaging, and protection of product configurations and
features that were not disclosed in patents would not be affected.
Finally, application of the rule would also realize the expectations of
the public in the patent, as well as ensure an economical use of judicial
resources.
America, Inc., 9 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1993), the Fourth Circuit held that the trade dress there-the
color of the tip of a fishing rod-which was not specifically disclosed in the patent but which was
the inevitable result of a patented process, could not be invalidated on functionality grounds
because it had attained incontestable status. This raises the specter that even if a feature is not
disclosed, it still should be prevented from obtaining trademark protection. Shakespeare,
however, is distinguishable. There, the issue was functionality. Any feature that was the
inevitable result of a patented process necessarily would be functional in the traditional sense
and therefore not protectable by trade dress. The problem in Shakespeare was that the plaintiff
had registered the feature and had used it without dispute for over five years. Thus, the dress had
become incontestable and, the court held, subject only to certain enumerated statutory
defenses-which did not include functionality, a judge-created doctrine. Thus, the issue
Shakespeare raises is not directly relevant to the issue this article addresses-the failure of the
functionality doctrine where it actually is applied. If the court had applied the functionality
analysis, there is no question that the trade dress would have been invalid. The case has met a
fair share of criticism and no other court has followed its lead.
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